Lewis v. Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc.

• Citation: 397 Mass. 761,493 N.E.2d 867
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Decision Date: 16 June 1986
• Parties: , 49 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1387 Emma LEWIS v. AREA II HOMECARE FOR SENIOR CITIZENS, INC. & another. 1

Page 867

493 N.E.2d 867

397 Mass. 761, 49 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1387

Emma LEWIS v. AREA II HOMECARE FOR SENIOR CITIZENS, INC. & another.

¹

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 6, 1986.

Decided June 16, 1986.

Robert C. Johnson, Jr., Boston, for plaintiff.

Walter H. Mayo, III, Boston, for defendants.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and LIACOS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The plaintiff, a black woman and a member of the Pentecostal faith, brought this action against her former employer and its executive director. The plaintiff's employment was terminated when she took a two-month leave of absence to do missionary work abroad for her church, despite the fact that her request for this leave had been denied. On October 28, 1983, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking temporary and permanent injunctive relief preventing the defendants from filling the position from which she had been dismissed and a permanent injunction ordering the defendants to reinstate her to her former position. She also sought monetary damages. The motion judge granted the plaintiff's request for a temporary restraining order, ² and ordered the case advanced for a speedy trial on the merits. The case was heard jury-waived. In his "Findings of Fact, Rulings of Law and Order for Judgment," the trial judge denominated the plaintiff's action as one "seeking relief under G.L. c. 151B, § 4 subsections 1 and 1A" for racial and religious discrimination and ordered judgment for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed, and we transferred the case here on our own motion. In addition to challenging the judge's ruling regarding the racial discrimination claim under G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1) (1984 ed.), the plaintiff contests the ruling that a two-month leave of absence for missionary work is not protected by G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1A), and that the purpose of subsection (1A) is essentially to protect people who observe a Sabbath or holy day other than the Christian Sunday. The plaintiff also argues that the judge's failure to address other causes of action alleged in her complaint and purportedly litigated at trial is reversible error. We affirm. ³

We summarize the facts found by the judge. In September, 1979, the plaintiff was hired as a case manager by the defendant, Area II Homecare for Senior Citizens, Inc. (Area II), which provides homemaker services to elderly citizens residing in its service area in Boston. During the hiring process, the plaintiff made known her need to take a leave of absence in 1980 in order to do missionary work for her church. Calvin Johnson, then the executive director, accepted that condition when he approved the plaintiff's employment. There was no discussion regarding any leave of absence other than the one to be taken in 1980. Shortly after being hired by Area II, the plaintiff was absent from work due to medical problems and she was advanced sick leave and compensatory time to cover her absence. In July, 1980, the plaintiff's written request for a leave of absence to do missionary work in the fall was approved, and she took the leave for a month and a half in September and October, 1980. The plaintiff was promoted to case manager supervisor in 1980. In 1982, the plaintiff took a two-month leave of absence for medical reasons, and also took accrued sick and annual leave time.

On February 14, 1983, the plaintiff wrote to her supervisor, Linda O'Connor, requesting a two-month leave of absence from June 20, 1983, to August 27, 1983. The plaintiff had been asked by her church to serve as a missionary during this period and she wished to honor this request. On February 22, 1983, the plaintiff's superiors informed her that they would review her request, and on March 9, they completed a review of the plaintiff's records and decided to recommend that her request for a leave be denied. The next day they met with the plaintiff and explained to her why they were denying her request. They discussed various alternatives for covering the plaintiff's staff and caseload for the two months the plaintiff proposed to leave, and told the plaintiff why they were unacceptable. The plaintiff was told that the only condition under which the leave could be approved would be if Area II received a new case manager supervisor's position from the Department of Elder Affairs (DEA), and had hired and trained the person for that position by June 20, the date the plaintiff's leave was to begin. ⁴ At a subsequent review, the reasons given for the denial of the plaintiff's request were departmental overload, high supervisory loads, and the department's negative experience with a supervisor's two-month leave in 1981. It was also stated that no responsible or workable way existed to hire a temporary supervisor from within the staff or outside, and it was concluded that a two-month leave by the plaintiff at the time requested would have "a damaging effect on other employees and the Department as a whole." The plaintiff took a leave of absence without approval, and sent a note to her supervisor on June 17 so informing her. In July of 1983, after a vote of Area II's full board of directors, the plaintiff was informed that she had been terminated as a case manager supervisor and that she could return to Area II as a case manager.

1. Racial discrimination in employment. This court has previously set forth the proof which is necessary to establish unlawful discrimination in violation of G.L. c. 151B. Wheelock College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 371 Mass. 130, 355 N.E.2d 309 (1976). The plaintiff has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Id. at 138, 355 N.E.2d 309. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). The burden then shifts to the defendants to produce a lawful explanation for the treatment accorded the plaintiff. Wheelock College, supra. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra; Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 2949, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978). If the defendants meet this burden, the plaintiff must prove that the explanation given by the employer is a pretext, that is, lacks reasonable support in evidence or is wholly disbelievable. Wheelock College, supra, 371 Mass. at 138-139, 355 N.E.2d 309. Smith College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 376 Mass. 221, 230, 380 N.E.2d 121 (1978). See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1095, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 411 U.S. at 804-805, 93 S.Ct. at 1825. The ultimate burden of persuading the fact finder that the defendants intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra. Wheelock College, supra, 371 Mass. at 139, 355 N.E.2d 309. The judge found, and the defendants concede, that the plaintiff did establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination. ⁵ The plaintiff, however, takes issue with the judge's rulings that the defendants successfully rebutted the plaintiff's prima facie case, and that the plaintiff failed to prove pretext.

After the plaintiff has met her threshold burden of establishing a prima facie case, the burden which shifts to the defendants is that of production only, they must articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for their action and "produce credible evidence to show that the reason or reasons advanced were the real reasons." Sarni Original Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. Cooke, 388 Mass. 611, 614-615, 447 N.E.2d 1228 (1983), quoting Wheelock College, supra, 371 Mass. at 138, 355 N.E.2d 309. See Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, 384 Mass. 559, 566-567, 428 N.E.2d 124 (1981); Smith College v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, supra, 376 Mass. at 230, 380 N.E.2d 121. The judge concluded that the defendants did articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for their action and found these reasons to be "departmental overload, staff stress, and an unsatisfactory experience with an extended absence of a Case Manager Supervisor in 1981." More precisely, the reasons given for denying the plaintiff's request were: pressure and overload in the client services department; extremely high supervisory loads in that department created by the fact that other supervisors would be taking earned vacations during the summer months; and the department's unsatisfactory experience in 1981 as a result of a supervisor's two-month leave of absence. These "articulated reasons" are legitimate and nondiscriminatory. ⁶ We reiterate that the employer's burden following a prima facie showing of discrimination is "only a responsibility to produce evidence. Once the employer has proposed a reason and presented supporting facts, the presumption of discrimination is dispelled.... The employer need not persuade the trier that it was correct in its belief" (citations omitted, emphasis in original). Trustees of Forbes Library v. Labor Relations Comm'n, supra, 384 Mass. at 566, 428 N.E.2d 128. The reasons given for a decision may be unsound or even absurd, but if they are not discriminatory and if the plaintiff does not prove they are pretexts, the plaintiff cannot prevail. See Smith College, supra, 376 Mass. at 229, 380 N.E.2d 121.

The plaintiff, however, contends that the judge committed error by allegedly failing to "determine whether [the defendants'] reasons were supported by underlying facts." The judge's findings do not specifically identify facts which the defendants produced to support the reasons given for their action. He stated that the "case turns on whether the plaintiff has proven that the reasons articulated by the defendants for the denial of the plaintiff's request ... were a pretext for a racially discriminatory motive" and ruled that the defendants' treatment of the plaintiff showed no...