Commonwealth v. Barnett
Citation | 398 A.2d 1019,484 Pa. 211 |
Parties | COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. Dennis BARNETT. |
Decision Date | 16 March 1979 |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
Argued Nov. 13, 1978.
Steven H. Goldblatt, Deputy Dist. Atty.-Law, Maxine J. Stotland, Asst. Dist. Atty., Philadelphia, for appellant.
Stephen R. Bolden, Philadelphia, for appellee.
Before O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, NIX, MANDERINO and LARSEN, JJ. OPINION OF THE COURT
This appeal by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia, which suppressed certain physical evidence [1] during the trial of appellee Dennis Barnett. The suppression court held that appellee's arrest was not based upon probable cause and therefore, certain physical evidence had to be suppressed. We agree with the holding of the suppression court and will affirm its order.
The facts, as found by the Suppression Court, are as follows:
A ballistics exam revealed that appellee's gun had been used in the June 6, 1977 shooting death of seven-year-old Kent Bennett. Appellee was subsequently charged with murder and various firearms offenses for the shooting of Bennett. He was also charged with assault, resisting arrest and other firearms violations arising from the June 10, 1977 arrest. While the various charges had been severed for trial, a single suppression hearing was held as only one issue of law was involved.
Following the hearing on the motion to suppress, the court ordered both the pistol and the bullets suppressed. It is from this order that the Commonwealth now appeals.
In Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 454 Pa. 320, 311 A.2d 914 (1973), we reviewed the following factual situation:
There, we held that flight alone was insufficient to constitute probable cause for arrest. Further, we held that the police had no right to stop Jeffries under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), as the officers were unable to articulate any facts which indicated that criminal activity was afoot. We further held that based on this factual setting, the property was abandoned because of unlawful police coercion, and thus the heroin should have been suppressed. We can find no factual distinction between Jeffries and the instant case which is sufficient to allow the Jeffries holding to be distinguished. Jeffries thus supports the finding in the instant case that appellee's arrest was not based on probable cause.
The Commonwealth, however, argues that the officers had the right to make a limited investigatory stop. As we stated in Commonwealth v. Berrios, 437 Pa. 338, 340, 263 A.2d 342-343 (1970):
(Footnote omitted.)
We must thus view the totality of the circumstances to determine whether appellee was being "stopped" or was merely approached for allowable questioning by the officers.
As we stated in Commonwealth v. Jones, 474 Pa. 364, 371, 378 A.2d 835, 839 (1977):
...
To continue reading
Request your trial