Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd.
| Decision Date | 16 March 1979 |
| Citation | 398 A.2d 1111,41 Pa.Cmwlth. 302 |
| Parties | SUN SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD and Frank Januzciewicz, Respondents. SUN SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD and Curtis L. Fields, Respondents. SUN SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD and Joseph C. Kimmel, Respondents. SUN SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD and Willie Moore, Respondents. SUN SHIPBUILDING AND DRY DOCK COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD and John April, Respondents. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Argued Feb. 8, 1979. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
John J. Runzer, Jeffrey C. Hayes, Thomas E Zemaitis, Pepper, Hamilton & Scheetz, Philadelphia, for petitioner.
Marc Jacobs, Joseph Lurie, Roland Artigues, Galfand, Berger Senesky, Lurie & March, Philadelphia, for respondents.
Before WILKINSON, MENCER and CRAIG, JJ.
Each of the five cases which have been consolidated for appeal here involve awards of benefits by the Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Board) pursuant to The Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act (Act) [1] for facial disfigurement resulting from five separate work-related injuries sustained by claimants while in the employ of Sun Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company (petitioner), a company engaged in ship building and ship repair. We affirm.
The relevant findings of the referees regarding claimants' facial disfigurement are as follows: (1) a "residual scar about one-inch long over the left forehead extending into the eyebrow" (31 C.D.1978); (2) a "one inch permanent scar above the left eyebrow" (32 C.D.1978); (3) a "circular scar on the right cheek" (33 C.D.1978); (4) a "residuum of a scar along the lower border of the right eye above the cheekbone approximately three-quarters of an inch long and visible from about fifteen feet" (34 C.D.1978); and (5) "a residual oblique scar along the right side of the nose" (35 C.D.1978). In each of the cases, the referee concluded that the claimant had suffered a serious and permanent facial disfigurement within the purview of Section 306(c) (22) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 513(22). However, in 32 C.D.1978 the referee found that claimant's remedy as a matter of law fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal compensation authorities pursuant to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Act [2] (hereinafter the Longshoremen's Act) and dismissed the claim petition.
Appeals were taken and consolidated for review by the Board. The decisions of the referee were upheld in all cases with respect to the factual findings of facial disfigurement and the determinations of compensability under the Act. Further, in 32 C.D.1978 the Board held that the Longshoremen's Act did not confer exclusive jurisdiction in federal authorities.
Throughout the proceedings below, as here, the petitioner has maintained that Congress, by its 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act, pre-empted the field of workmen's compensation for employees in maritime industries thereby ending the concurrent jurisdiction previously exercised by the state and federal governments. See Calbeck v. Travelers Insurance Co., 370 U.S. 114, 82 S.Ct. 1196, 8 L.Ed.2d 368 (1962).
The original Longshoremen's Act was enacted by Congress in 1927. It contained two conditions of compensability, first that the injury occur on a navigable water and second that "(the) recovery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation proceedings may not validly be provided by State law." [3] Thus, the 1927 Longshoremen's Act was intended only to be a gap-filler, that is, to fill the void created by the inability of states to remedy injuries occurring on navigable waters. See generally, Northeast Marine Terminal Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249, 97 S.Ct. 2348, 53 L.Ed.2d 320 (1977).
The 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act significantly broadened the activities of maritime workers which would be compensated under the federal scheme to include those on the landside of the water's edge and also eliminated the reference to state law in Section 903. [4] Petitioner argues that the extension of federal coverage to injuries sustained in landside activities and the elimination of the condition that recovery could be had only if "not validly provided by state law" evidence an intent by Congress to preempt the field of compensation for maritime workers.
It is clear that where Congress enacts a comprehensive statute which is intended to occupy the field, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the states defer to the superior command of Congress. Mamula v. United Steelworkers of America, 409 Pa. 175, 185 A.2d 595 (1962). Where Congress has legislated in a field that the states have traditionally occupied, the resolution of a pre-emption question begins "with the assumption that the . . . powers of the States were not (meant) to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Co., 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S.Ct. 1146, 1152, 91 L.Ed. 1447 (1947). Here, it is clear that except for the deletion of the language referring to state law, the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act do not expressly preclude the exercise of state jurisdiction. Moreover, the legislative history of the amendments, contrary to petitioner's assertion, fails to point clearly to preemption. Rather, the purpose of the Act was declared to be two-fold: (1) to provide a "substantial increase in benefits to maritime workers so that benefits would more accurately track the workers' average wage" and (2) to extend the federal coverage "beyond the water's edge." See Caputo, supra.
Absent a clear expression by Congress, petitioner contends that an analysis of the statute shows an implied intent to preempt. The factors to be considered in determining whether preemption will be implied include: (1) the aim and intent of Congress; (2) the pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme; (3) whether the nature of the subject matter demands exclusive federal regulation to achieve national uniformity; and (4) whether state law poses an obstacle to the execution of the objective of the federal statute. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., supra. Petitioner's arguments with regard to these factors may be succinctly capsulized as follows: that by broadening coverage to include maritime workers' activities on land Congress created a pervasive federal regulatory scheme and that exclusive federal jurisdiction is necessary to achieve national uniformity in compensating maritime workers. However, it is clear that the extension of coverage of the Longshoremen's Act limited to land-based activities will not comprehensively cover all maritime activities covered on land; rather, courts must still determine the demarcation line of those areas "customarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel." 33 U.S.C. § 903(a). Thus, the federal scheme is not so pervasive as to cover the entire field of a maritime worker's activity. Similarly, the nature of the subject matter (compensation of injured workers arguably covered within the area of federal jurisdiction) does not demand national uniformity so as to require exclusive federal jurisdiction. Rather because state and federal jurisdiction must meet at some line near the water's edge the federal interest in providing some compensation to injured workmen would be more nearly served by continuing the concept of concurrent jurisdiction. Accord, G. Gilmore & C. Black, The Law of Admiralty, 425-26 (2d ed. 1975); 4 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law, § 89.70 (1978); See also Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 583 F.2d 1273 (4th Cir. 1978) ().
Assuming, as we so hold, that the 1972 amendments to the Longshoremen's Act do not preclude the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction by the states, petitioner argues that there is insufficient competent...
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