In re Toyota Unintended Acceleration Litig.

• Decision Date: 12 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. 10–0342.,10–0342.
• Citation: 398 S.W.3d 892
• Parties: In re TOYOTA UNINTENDED ACCELERATION LITIGATION.
• Court: Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation

398 S.W.3d 892

In re TOYOTA UNINTENDED ACCELERATION LITIGATION.

No. 10–0342.

Texas Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

July 12, 2010.

ON REVIEW BY THE MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION PANEL

Chief Justice WRIGHT delivered the unanimous opinion of the MDL Panel.

Toyota has filed a motion to transfer fifteen pending lawsuits for consolidated pretrial proceedings. Plaintiffs in thirteen of the lawsuits join Toyota in its motion. They contend that all of these cases share multiple common issues of fact. Movants believe that consolidated and coordinated pretrial proceedings will eliminate duplicative discovery, avoid conflicting legal rulings, conserve judicial resources, serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses, and promote the just and efficient conduct of the lawsuits.

The Rules of Judicial Administration authorize us “to transfer ‘related’ cases from different trial courts to a single pretrial judge if transfer will (1) serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and (2) promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.” In re Ad Valorem Tax Litig., 216 S.W.3d 83, 84 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006); Tex.R. Jud. Admin. 13.3( l ), reprinted inTex. Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. F app. (Vernon Supp.2009). Cases are “related” if they involve one or more common questions of fact. Tex.R. Jud. Admin. 13.2(f); Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 74.162 (Vernon 2005).

Movants contend that all of the pending lawsuits involve sudden acceleration claims related to alleged defects in Toyota's accelerator pedals and/or floor mats or Toyota's electronic throttle control systems. The plaintiffs ¹ in two of the lawsuits oppose the motion. They contend the cases are not related because: (1) the cases do not arise from a single catastrophic event; (2) they have differing theories as to the alleged defect; (3) the vehicles involved are different years, makes, and models; and (4) some of the cases involve local issues like breach of warranty and misrepresentation claims against dealerships.

It is true that these unintended acceleration cases do not arise from a single catastrophic event. However, that is not a requirement under Rule 13. When multiple lawsuits contend that a product is defective, there will be common liability questions at the core of each case. In re Digitek Litig., 387 S.W.3d 115, 117 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2009). These cases involve numerous common questions of fact including: (1) whether certain Toyota vehicles are prone to unintended acceleration; (2) the cause of unintended acceleration; (3) whether Toyota was aware of the alleged defects relating to unintended acceleration; and (4) whether Toyota failed to timely recall its vehicles or properly test them. These common questions of fact exist regardless of whether a plaintiff claims an unintended acceleration incident was caused by a defect in the vehicle's floor mats, accelerator pedal, or electronic throttle control system. Moreover, it is irrelevant that the cases involve vehicles of differing make, model, and year. See In re DaimlerChrysler AG CLK430 Litig., 216 S.W.3d 81, 82 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2006) (transferring cases involving alleged defects in vehicles with model years ranging from 2000–03); In re Texas Windstorm Ins. Ass'n Hurricanes Rita and Humberto Litig., 339 S.W.3d 401, 402–03 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2009) (transferring cases involving different asbestos products).

We recognize that some of the cases involve local issues like breach of warranty and misrepresentation by local dealerships that depend upon their own set of facts. Opposing plaintiffs rely on In re Kone, Inc., 216 S.W.3d 68 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2005). In Kone, an elevator maintenance contractor sought to transfer four cases in four different counties for pretrial coordination. Kone involved the company's maintenance of elevators at four different hospitals. The motion to transfer was denied based on the fact that there was no showing that facts discovered as to the performance of the maintenance contract at one hospital will have any relation to what occurred at any of the other three hospitals. Id. at 70.Kone involved an alleged breach in the performance of a contract which is fact driven. By contrast, the cases before us involve a product defect. By their nature, product liability cases are related. See In re Ford Motor Co. Speed Control Deactivation Switch Litig., 285 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Tex. M.D.L. Panel 2008). Moreover, to prevail on the local dealership issues of breach of warranty and misrepresentation, the plaintiffs must first establish a defect. See Plas–Tex, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 772 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex.1989).

Here, the fifteen cases all allege unintended acceleration events in Toyota vehicles caused by product defects. The product liability issues involve numerous common questions of fact. Accordingly, we conclude the cases are related.

Having determined that the cases are related, we now turn to the second requirement for an MDL transfer. We must determine whether transfer will serve the goals of convenience, efficiency, and justice. Rule 13 aims to further these goals by eliminating duplicative discovery, minimizing conflicting demands on witnesses, preventing inconsistent decisions on common issues, and reducing unnecessary travel. See In re Hurricane...