Machinchick v. Pb Power, Inc.

• Citation: 398 F.3d 345
• Decision Date: 24 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-20418.,04-20418.
• Parties: Fred MACHINCHICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PB POWER, INC. d/b/a/ Parsons Brinckerhoff, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Page 345

398 F.3d 345

Fred MACHINCHICK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PB POWER, INC. d/b/a/ Parsons Brinckerhoff, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-20418.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

January 24, 2005.

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Gregory Scott Fiddler (argued), Law Office of G. Scott Fiddler, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Daryl G. Dursum (argued), Adams & Reese, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before HIGGINBOTHAM, SMITH and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge:

A recently terminated employee brought suit against his former employer asserting claims for age discrimination pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA). Following a hearing, the district court granted the employer's motion for summary judgment with respect to both of the employee's claims. We reverse and remand for trial.

I

In 1996, Fred Machinchick was hired by PB Power Inc. to serve as a director of business development in the Houston area. His primary job duty was to develop new energy sector clients for PB Power. In both 1997 and 1998, he received reviews describing his job performance as "excellent," and was promoted to Vice President in 1998. In December 2001, Jim Knowlton, a Vice President located in PB Power's San Francisco office, became Machinchick's new supervisor. In January 2002, PB Power changed its business development philosophy by implementing a "cradle-to-grave" strategy under which business development personnel such as Machinchick would be required to initiate new business prospects, and shepherd those prospects through the sales process to closing and beyond. Prior to the implementation of this strategy, business development personnel had been required only to develop new prospects, and then turn those prospects over to other PB Power personnel who would prepare sales presentations and close contracts.

In January 2002, PB Power released a business plan in which it described as one of its competitive advantages its intention to "hand-pick employees whose mindset resides [sic] in the 21st Century, who are highly qualified to do their job, and who are motivated toward the success of the company." In an e-mail dated April 7, 2002, Knowlton announced the continuation of his "recruiting plan" to "strategically hire some younger engineers and designers to support and be mentored by the current staff." On April 9, 2002, Knowlton sent an e-mail to Elizabeth Erichsen in PB Power's human resources department delineating Machinchick's shortcomings as an employee, including the accusation that Machinchick possessed "[l]ow motivation to adapt to a rapidly changing business environment and new company management style."

On April 17, 2002, Knowlton informed Machinchick that he was being terminated due to performance concerns. Although PB Power had a written disciplinary policy providing that a supervisor should engage in informal and formal discussions with a problematic employee before termination, Machinchick received no warnings prior to his termination. Machinchick was initially told that his last day at PB Power would be on May 17, 2002, but he later agreed to stay until May 31 to assist with the turnover of his key client base and contacts to Mike Betz, an employee assigned to PB Power's Chicago office. At this time, Machinchick was 63 years old and Betz was 42 years old.

Following his termination, Machinchick sued PB Power in the 189th Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas, alleging that he had been unlawfully fired because of his age in violation of both the ADEA and the TCHRA. PB Power removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, and moved for summary judgment. The district court held two hearings on PB Power's motion, and granted it immediately following the second hearing. Machinchick filed a timely notice of appeal.

II

We review a "grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court."¹ Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."² In making this determination, "we view the evidence and all factual inferences from that evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion and all reasonable doubts about the facts are resolved in favor of the nonmoving litigant."³

Machinchick challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment as to both his ADEA claim and his TCHRA claim. We will review the district court's ruling on each of these claims in turn.

III

A

Under the ADEA, it is unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's age."⁴ We have traditionally bifurcated ADEA cases into distinct groups: those in which the plaintiff relies upon direct evidence to establish his case of age discrimination, and those in which the plaintiff relies upon purely circumstantial evidence.⁵ Plaintiffs presenting direct evidence of age discrimination may proceed under the "mixed-motive" analysis set forth in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.⁶ The mixed-motive analysis requires only that a plaintiff produce direct evidence that "discriminatory animus played a role in the decision at issue," after which the "burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant, who must prove that it would have taken the same action regardless of discriminatory animus."⁷

Plaintiffs producing only circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus, however, must negotiate the burden-shifting analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.⁸ Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by showing that "(1) he was discharged; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was within the protected class at the time of discharge; and (4) he was either i) replaced by someone outside the protected class, ii) replaced by someone younger, or iii) otherwise discharged because of his age."⁹ Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment action.¹⁰

If the defendant meets its burden, the presumption of discrimination created by the plaintiff's prima facie case disappears and the plaintiff must meet its ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of intentional discrimination.¹¹ A plaintiff may meet this burden by producing evidence tending to show that the reason offered by the defendant is pretext for discrimination.¹² In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, Inc., the Supreme Court found that a plaintiff need not produce evidence of both pretext and actual discriminatory intent to create a fact issue on an ADEA claim, holding instead that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated."¹³

Following the Supreme Court's decision in Reeves, we have found that "[e]vidence demonstrating the falsity of the defendant's explanation, taken together with the prima facie case, is likely to support an inference of discrimination even without further evidence of [the] defendant's true motive."¹⁴

With respect to causation, we have required that a plaintiff advancing an ADEA claim using only circumstantial evidence prove that discriminatory animus was the "determinative basis for his termination."¹⁵ As a practical matter, this requirement dictates that the plaintiff put forward evidence rebutting each one of a defendant's nondiscriminatory explanations for the employment decision at issue.¹⁶ Thus, a plaintiff relying upon evidence of pretext to create a fact issue on discriminatory intent falters if he fails to produce evidence rebutting all of a defendant's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons. This approach differs from that used in the mixed-motive analysis, under which a plaintiff need only prove that discriminatory animus was a "motivating factor" in an adverse employment decision.¹⁷

In Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., we altered our ADEA jurisprudence in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace v. Costa¹⁸ by holding that direct evidence of discrimination is not necessary in order for a plaintiff to receive a mixed-motive analysis for an ADEA claim.¹⁹ We developed an "integrated" or "modified McDonnell Douglas" approach under which a plaintiff seeking to establish an ADEA claim using circumstantial evidence

must still demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination; the defendant then must articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate the plaintiff; and, if the defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff must then offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact either (1) that the defendant's reason is not true, but is instead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its conduct, and another motivating factor is the plaintiff's protected characteristic (mixed-motive alternative). If a plaintiff demonstrates that age was a motivating factor in the employment decision, it then falls to the defendant to prove that the same adverse employment decision would have been made regardless of discriminatory animus. If the employer fails to carry this burden, plaintiff prevails.²⁰

Under this integrated approach, a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence has two options for surviving summary judgment in an ADEA case: (1) the plaintiff may offer evidence...