Minadeo v. Ici Paints

Decision Date18 February 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-4343.,03-4343.
Citation398 F.3d 751
PartiesChristina Murphy MINADEO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ICI PAINTS d/b/a THE GLIDDEN COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

ARGUED: Diane A. Calta, Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. & Associates, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. David A. Posner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Diane A. Calta, Joseph W. Diemert, Jr., Joseph W. Diemert, Jr. & Associates, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. David A. Posner, Baker & Hostetler, LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.

Before: SUHRHEINRICH and CLAY, Circuit Judges; NIXON, District Judge.*

OPINION

CLAY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff, Christina Murphy Minadeo ("Murphy"), appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant, The Glidden Company, d/b/a/ ICI Paints ("Glidden"),1 on claims brought pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 100 et seq., ("ERISA"), and OHIO REVISED CODE § 4112.14. Murphy contends that the district court erred: (1) in granting summary judgment to Glidden on claims brought pursuant to §§ 1024(b)(4) and 1025(a) of ERISA; (2) in finding that Murphy's claim under §§ 1024(b)(1) and (b)(2) of ERISA was not properly raised in her complaint; (3) in granting summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's claim that Glidden violated 29 U.S.C. § 1060 and 26 U.S.C. § 1563 by not crediting her service with a prior employer, a related company, for purposes of pension benefits accrual; and (4) in granting summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's age discrimination claim under Ohio law.

For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the district court's grant of summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's claim under 29 U.S.C § 1024(b)(4) and 1025(a), and REMAND that claim for further factual development, as explained below. We AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's claim under 29 U.S.C. § 1060; we AFFIRM the district court's determination that Murphy did not properly raise a claim under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(b)(1) and (b)(2); and, finally, we AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to Glidden on Murphy's state law age discrimination claims.

BACKGROUND
1. Procedural History

Murphy filed a three-count complaint against Glidden in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio on October 11, 2000. Murphy's complaint alleged that Glidden had failed to provide her with pension information and had failed to credit her years of service with a prior employer for pension benefits accrual purposes in violation of various provisions of ERISA, and that Glidden had discriminated against her on the basis of her age, in violation of § 4112.14 of the Ohio Revised Code.

Following the completion of discovery, Glidden filed a motion for summary judgment on October 12, 2001. The district court entered an order referring the case to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation on December 28, 2001. That report and recommendation was issued on March 1, 2002. The magistrate judge found that the defense motion for summary judgment should be granted as to Murphy's state law claim of age discrimination and on her claim that Glidden had failed to provide her with pension information in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 1024, but that it should be denied as to Murphy's claim that Glidden had improperly failed to transfer her pension benefits accrued during her tenure with ICI Paints Canada to Glidden, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 1563 and 29 U.S.C. § 1060. Both parties filed objections to the report and recommendation on March 18, 2001.

On August 4, 2003, the district court issued an opinion and order granting summary judgment to Glidden on all of the claims raised in Murphy's complaint. Murphy filed a notice of appeal to this Court on September 2, 2003.

2. Substantive Facts

Murphy worked for CIL, Inc., a Canadian company, and its successor-in-interest, ICI Paints Canada, Inc. ("ICI Canada"), from 1980 to 1995. In 1995, Murphy was one of several Canadians courted by Glidden, a related company, to join its paint business in Cleveland. Murphy joined Glidden in January 1995, as a Planning Manager in its Independent Dealer Division. Later that year, she became the Planning Analysis Manager for the same division, and served in that capacity until February 1998. She then held the position of Director of Operations and Administration for another division until it was eliminated in September 1998 as part of a corporate reorganization. At that time, she became the Controller for Glidden's Macco Division.

Corporate restructuring at Glidden had begun in January 1998, under the leadership of new Chairman Dennis Wright. Significant changes were made to Glidden's' internal structure, including the elimination of several Controller positions. In her position as the Macco Controller, which had been preserved, Murphy was directly supervised by Pete Appell ("Appell"), but also reported to Ashok Joshi ("Joshi"), Vice President of Finance for the Macco Division.

Murphy testified in her deposition that she received the impression during her interview with Appell that "it was the young crew that he was proud of. He was communicating the correlation between desirability and youth." Later, Appell entered Murphy's office and exclaimed, "I understand you're forty-seven years old. It's unbelievable." Murphy testified that most people at the company believed she was thirty-five years old.

On May 12, 1999, approximately one month after Appell made this comment, Murphy was informed that Glidden had decided to eliminate the Macco Controller position due to restructuring and that she was being discharged. The parties do not dispute that the decision to terminate Murphy's employment was made by Appell and Joshi.

As part of her termination package, Murphy received severance pay for forty-eight weeks, totaling $75,323.05 and based on her years of service from 1980 and a base salary of $81,600. The termination letter sent to her by Glidden informed her that "[i]f you are eligible to receive pension benefits, your pension information will be forwarded to you under separate cover." When no such information was forthcoming, Murphy repeatedly called Glidden to inquire about her pension benefits. In the fall of 1999, she had a conversation with Phil Brewer ("Brewer"), an Glidden Human Resources representative, in which she asked him for pension information. During that conversation, Brewer asked Murphy, "you were close to retirement, weren't you [?]" Murphy perceived this comment to be unusual and out of context.

Murphy did not receive the pension information that she repeatedly requested by phone, and, after eleven months, she retained an attorney. In April 2000, Murphy's counsel made a written request for her pension information to Glidden's in-house counsel. That request stated that it was "being made on behalf of Ms. Murphy Minadeo and pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act."

Despite this request, Murphy did not receive any pension information until August 2000, almost fifteen months after her termination. The information provided to her at that time made it clear that her years of service with ICI Canada had not been credited towards the accrual of her pension benefits. While Murphy was credited for years of service dating back to February 1980, when she first joined CIL, for purposes of her severance package, she was credited only with years worked in this country, beginning in 1995, for purposes of her pension benefits. Murphy contends that the failure to transfer her pension resulted in a devalued pension benefit.

DISCUSSION
1. Standard of Review

We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard as the district court. Farhat v. Jopke, 370 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir.2004)(citing Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Poe, 143 F.3d 1013, 1015 (6th Cir.1998)). Summary judgment is appropriate where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment, we view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Combs v. Int'l Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 568, 576-77 (6th Cir.2004)(citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Williams v. Int'l Paper Co., 227 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir.2000); Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1074 (6th Cir.1998)).

In addition to the grants of summary judgment in this case, we are reviewing the district court's determination that Murphy failed to properly plead her claims under 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(b)(1) or (2). A district court's decision regarding the legal sufficiency of a pleading is a question of law and is therefore also subject to de novo review by this Court. Shields v. Fox Television Station, Inc., No. 98-6689, 2000 WL 658054 (6th Cir. May 9, 2000) (unpublished opinion) (citing LRL Properties v. Portage Metro Housing Auth., 55 F.3d 1097, 1104 (6th Cir.1995)).

2. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment on claims brought under §§ 1024(b)(4) and 1025(a) of ERISA?

Murphy contends that the district court erred in adopting the magistrate judge's recommendation that summary judgment be granted to Glidden on Murphy's claims that Glidden violated 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(b)(4) and 1025(a).2 Those provisions of ERISA require a benefits plan administrator to furnish certain benefits-related documents to a plan participant upon her written request. Murphy argues that Glidden violated these provisions when, after her attorney sent a written request for specific pension benefits...

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