Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Association v. Bresler
Decision Date | 18 May 1970 |
Docket Number | No. 413,413 |
Parties | GREENBELT COOPERATIVE PUBLISHING ASSOCIATION, Inc., et al., Petitioners, v. Charles S. BRESLER |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Roger A. Clark, New York City, for petitioners.
Abraham Chasanow, Greenbelt, Md., for respondent.
The petitioners are the publishers of a small weekly newspaper, the Greenbelt News Review, in the city of Greenbelt, Maryland. The respondent Bresler is a prominent local real estate developer and builder in Greenbelt, and was, during the period in question, a member of the Maryland House of Delegates from a neighboring district. In the autumn of 1965 Bresler was engaged in negotiations with the Greenbelt City Council to obtain certain zoning variances that would allow the construction of high-density housing on land owned by him. At the same time the city was attempting to acquire another tract of land owned by Bresler for the construction of a new high school. Extensive litigation concerning compensation for the school site seemed imminent, unless there should be an agreement on its price between Bresler and the city authorities, and the concurrent negotiations obviously provided both parties considerable bargainign leverage.
These joint negotiations evoked substantial local controversy, and several tumultuous city council meetings were held at which many members of the community freely expressed their views. The meetings were reported at length in the news columns of the Greenbelt News Review. Two news articles in consecutive weekly editions of the paper stated that at the public meetings some people had characterized Bresler's negotiating position as 'blackmail.' The word appeared several times both with and without quotation marks, and was used once as a subheading within a news story.1
Bresler reacted to these news articles by filing the present lawsuit for libel, seeking both compensatory and punitive damages. The primary thrust of his complaint was that the articles, individually and along with other items published in the petitioners' newspaper, imputed to him the crime of blackmail. The case went to trial, and the jury awarded Bresler $5,000 in compensatory damages and $12,500 in punitive damages. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. 253 Md. 324, 252 A.2d 755. We granted certiorari to consider the constitutional issues presented. 396 U.S. 874, 90 S.Ct. 154, 24 L.Ed.2d 133.
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686, we held that the Constitution permits a 'public official' to recover money damages for libel only if he can show that the defamatory publication was not only false but was uttered with "actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' Id., at 279, 280, 84 S.Ct. at 726. In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094, we dealt with the constitutional restrictions upon a libel suit brought by a 'public figure.'
In the present case Bresler's counsel conceded in his opening statement to the jury that Bresler was a public figure in the community. This concession was clearly correct. Bresler was deeply involved in the future development of the city of Greenbelt. He had entered into agreements with the city for zoning variances in the past, and was again seeking such favors to permit the construction of housing units of a type not contemplated in the original city plan. At the same time the city was trying to obtain a tract of land owned by Bresler for the purpose of building a school. Negotiations of significant public concern were in progress, both with school officials and the city council. Bresler's status thus clearly fell within even the most restrictive definition of a 'public figure.' Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 154—155, 87 S.Ct. 1991—1992 (opinion of Harlan, J.). See also Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 8 Cir., 362 F.2d 188, 195—196, cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909, 87 S.Ct. 2097, 18 L.Ed.2d 1347.
Whether as a state legislator representing another county, or for some other reason, Bresler was a 'public official' within the meaning of the New York Times rule is a question we need not determine. Cf. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390, 87 S.Ct. 534, 543, 17 L.Ed.2d 456; Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n. 12, 86 S.Ct. 669, 676, 15 L.Ed.2d 597. For the instructions to the jury in this case permitted a finding of liability under an impermissible constitutional standard, whichever status Bresler might be considered to occupy. In his charge to the members of the jury, the trial jduge repeatedly instructed them that Bresler could recover if the petitioners' publications had been made with malice or with a reckless disregard of whether they were true or false. This instruction was given in one form or another half a dozen times during the course of the judge's charge.2 The judge then defined 'malice' to include 'spite, hostility or deliberate intention to harm.' Moreover, he instructed the jury that 'malice' could be found from the 'language' of the publication tiself.3 Thus the jury was permitted to find liability merely on the basis of a combination of falsehood and general hostility.
This was error of constitutional magnitude, as our decisions have made clear. 'This definition of malice is constitutionally insufficient where discussion of public affairs is concerned; '(w)e held in New York Times that a public official might be allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes that the utterance was false and that it was made with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of whether it was false or true." Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra, at 84, 86 S.Ct. at 675. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 73, 85 S.Ct. 209, 215, 13 L.Ed.2d 125. See also Beckley Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 82, 88 S.Ct. 197, 198, 19 L.Ed.2d 248. And the constitutional prohibition in this respect is no different whether the plaintiff be considered a 'public official' or a 'public figure.' Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra.
The erroneous instructions to the jury would, therefore, alone be enough to require the reversal of the judgment before us. For when 'it is impossible to know, in view of the general verdict returned' whether the jury imposed liability on a permissible or an impermissible ground 'the judgment must be reversed and the case remanded.' New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at 284, 84 S.Ct. at 728. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, supra, 385 U.S. at 394—397, 87 S.Ct. at 545—547; Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra, 383 U.S. at 82, 86 S.Ct. at 674; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 367 368, 51 S.Ct. 532, 535, 75 L.Ed. 1117.
This, however, does not end the inquiry. As we noted in New York Times, 376 U.S., at 285, 84 S.Ct., at 728.
This case involves newspaper reports of public meetings of the citizens of a community concerned with matters of local governmental interest and importance. The very subject matter of the news reports, therefore, is one of particular First Amendment concern. 'The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means * * * is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system.' Stromberg v. Cali- fornia, supra, 283 U.S. at 369, 51 S.Ct. at 536. 'Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102, 60 S.Ct. 736, 744, 84 L.Ed. 1093.4 Because the threat or actual imposition of pecuniary liability for alleged defamation may impair the unfettered exercise of these First Amendment freedoms, the Constitution imposes stringent limitations upon the permissible scope of such liability.5
It is not disputed that the articles published in the petitioners' newspaper were accurate and truthful reports of what had been said at the public hearings before the city council.6 In this sense, therefore, it cannot even be claimed that the petitioners were guilty of any 'departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers,' Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra, 388 U.S. at 155, 87 S.Ct. at 1991 (opinion of Harlan, J.), much less the knowing use of falsehood or a reckless disregard of whether the statements made were true or false. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at 280, 84 S.Ct. at 726.
The contention is, rather, that the speakers at the meeting, in using the word 'blackmail,' and the petitioners in reporting the use of that word in the newspaper articles, were charging Bresler with the crime of blackmail, and that since the petitioners knew that Bresler had committed no such crime, they could be held liable for the knowing use of falsehood. It was upon this theory that the case was submitted to the jury, and upon this theory that the judgment was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. 253...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Balla v. Hall
... ... , a trier of fact could conclude that the publishing of this advertisement conveying that Heebner supported ... 137, 690 P.2d 610 ; see e.g., Greenbelt Cooperative Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler (1970) 398 U.S. 6, 8-9, ... 145 Cal.Rptr.3d 484 [letter asserting homeowner association official "used her position ... to settle a lawsuit" in ... ...
-
McCoy v. Hearst Corp.
... ... at p. ----, 104 S.Ct. at p. 1962; see also Greenbelt Pub. Assn. v. Bresler (1970) 398 U.S. 6, 11, 90 S.Ct. 1537, ... published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the ... , he felt, was based on inneundo and guilt-by-association testimony from police officials ... ...
-
Westfall, Matter of, No. 72022
... ... legal ethics, culminating in the American Bar Association's issuing the Canons of Professional Responsibility in ... an expression of opinion and not actionable); Greenbelt Co-op. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S.Ct. 1537, ... published, or would have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence to permit the ... ...
-
GUILFORD TRANSP. INDUSTRIES v. Wilner
... ... She also cited Greenbelt Coop. Publ'g Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 11-15, 90 ... ...
-
Opinions Actionable As Securities Fraud
...have been interpreted as stating actual facts about the public figure involved”). 276. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970). 442 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the contempt felt by union members.” ......
-
Tortious Tweets: A Practical Guide to Applying Traditional Defamation Law to Twibel Claims
...only moments later. 249. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1990). 250. Greenbelt Coop. Publ’g Ass’n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13–14 (1970). 596 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73 The Court’s decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Company 251 highlights the importance o......
-
Bearing false witness: perjured affidavits and the Fourth Amendment.
...U.S. at 270. (155.) See id. at 270-72; see also Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 291 (1971); Greenbelt Cooperative Pub. Ass'n. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10-11 (1970); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-07 (156.) See supra Part III.A (explaining role of neutral and detached magistrate......
-
Citizens United: Strengthening the First Amendment in American Elections
...Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Greenbelt Coop. Publ‘g Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970)). 273Id. at 930 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 274Id. 275Id. 276Id. at 947. Page 752 752 CAPITAL UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [39:723 Although Ste......