Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano

• Decision Date: 10 June 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. 93-1171,93-1236,s. 93-1171
• Parties: VOTE CHOICE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Joseph DiSTEFANO, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellees, Elizabeth Leonard, Plaintiff, Appellant. VOTE CHOICE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Joseph DiSTEFANO, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellants. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 26

4 F.3d 26

62 USLW 2157

VOTE CHOICE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Joseph DiSTEFANO, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellees, Elizabeth Leonard, Plaintiff, Appellant.

VOTE CHOICE, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. Joseph DiSTEFANO, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellants.

Nos. 93-1171, 93-1236.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard June 10, 1993.

Decided Aug. 31, 1993.

Neal J. McNamara, with whom Matthew F. Medeiros, Providence, RI, was on brief, for plaintiff Elizabeth Leonard (No. 93-1171) and for plaintiffs-appellees (No. 93-1236).

Donald J. Simon, with whom Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse & Endreson, Washington, DC, was on brief for Common Cause and Common Cause of R.I., amici curiae (No. 93-1171).

Anthony J. Bucci, Jr., with whom Licht & Semonoff, Providence, RI, was on brief, for defendants Joseph DiStefano, et al.

Donald J. Simon, with whom Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse & Endreson, Roger M. Witten, Carol F. Lee, W. Hardy Callcott, Eric J. Mogilnicki, and Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Washington, DC, were on brief, for Common Cause and Common Cause of R.I., amici curiae (No. 93-1236).

Before SELYA, CYR and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges.

SELYA, Circuit Judge.

These consolidated appeals, which implicate various aspects of Rhode Island's campaign finance law, necessitate the exploration of largely uncharted constitutional terrain. One appeal, prosecuted on behalf of the state, seeks to reinstate a statute requiring certain political action committees (PACs) ¹ to disclose information about all their contributors. The other appeal, prosecuted by an unsuccessful gubernatorial candidate, Elizabeth Leonard, inveighs against state statutes that bestow special advantages on candidates who comply with eligibility requirements for public campaign financing. At the end of our journey across terra incognita, we conclude that the district court acted appropriately both in striking down the first dollar disclosure requirement and in upholding the incentive provisions. Therefore, we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Before addressing the merits, we offer an overview of Rhode Island's campaign finance law and a brief synopsis of the proceedings below. In so doing, we strive to place each challenged provision in its overall statutory context and to describe the nature of the disagreement surrounding it.

A. Statutory Framework: The State's Appeal.

Rhode Island has a set of laws regulating the financing of state and local election campaigns. See R.I.Gen.Laws Secs. 17-25-1 to 17-25-30.1 (1988 & Supp.1992). The entity charged with primary responsibility for implementing these laws is the Rhode Island Board of Elections. See id. at Sec. 17-25-5.

Rhode Island law directs all PACs and candidates to file reports with the Board of Elections at regular intervals. See id. at Sec. 17-25-11. The Board then "prepare[s] and make[s] available for public inspection ... summaries of all reports." Id. at Sec. 17-25-5(a)(4). The reports are to include the name, address, and place of employment of every person or entity contributing more than $100 to the reporting PAC or candidate. See id. at Sec. 17-25-7.

In 1992, the Rhode Island General Assembly, desirous of ensuring that the voting public possesses accurate information about organizations whose contributions and expenditures may influence elections, devised extra reporting obligations for PACs. Every PAC now must file a notice listing its goals and purposes, the positions it plans to advocate on ballot questions, the names of any candidates it intends to support, and the names and addresses of its officers. See id. at Sec. 17-25-15(a). Moreover, every PAC must report the name and address of all persons to whom it makes expenditures, indicating the amount and purpose of each such payment. See id. at Sec. 17-25-15(c)(2). The Board of Elections is empowered to halt PACs from using names which are misleading or which do not accurately identify a committee's membership and contributor base. See id. at Sec. 17-25-15(d).

Under the neoteric amendments, PACs must also "include in each report required to be filed ... [t]he source and amount of all funds received." Id. at Sec. 17-25-15(c)(1). This added requirement of "first dollar disclosure"--the duty to disclose the identity of, and the amount given by, every contributor, no matter how modest the contribution--applies to most PACs, but does not apply in the same way to PACs sponsored by labor unions or those which are funded through payroll checkoff plans. See id. The requirement does not apply to candidates at all.

B. Statutory Framework: Leonard's Appeal.

In addition to regulating campaign contributions, Rhode Island also affords public funding to gubernatorial candidates. ² See id. at Sec. 17-25-18. Candidates may elect whether or not to accept such funds. See, e.g., id. at Sec. 17-25-19. If a candidate elects to participate, and meets the law's eligibility requirements, ³ the state will match money raised from private sources up to a maximum of $750,000. See id. In return, the state requires participants to observe certain restrictions on campaign spending and related activities.

A candidate must signify a desire to use public funds for campaign purposes upon formally declaring his or her candidacy for office. ⁴ See id. A candidate choosing this option must sign a sworn statement pledging to comply with the various terms and conditions of the grant. See id. at Sec. 17-25-20(1). Once made or omitted, the election and pledge are irrevocable. See id. at Secs. 17-25-19, 17-25-20(1). Thereafter, a participating candidate must meet the law's threshold requirements, limit the use of public funds received to certain enumerated purposes, compare R.I.Gen.Laws Sec. 17-25-20(7) & (8) (listing permissible uses) with id. at Sec. 17-25-7.2 (describing permissible uses of privately raised funds), abide by overall expenditure ceilings and fundraising caps, ⁵ see, e.g., id. at Sec. 17-25-20(2), and return a percentage of any unexpended funds. See id. at Sec. 17-25-25.

To make the offer of public financing more attractive and thereby increase participation, the 1992 amendments included a contribution cap gap. A candidate can ordinarily receive up to $1,000 from any given person or PAC in a single calendar year. See id. at Sec. 17-25-10.1. The amendment doubled this limit for publicly funded candidates, see id. at Sec. 17-25-30(3), and, in the bargain, created a cap gap between privately and publicly funded candidates. At the same time, the legislature ordained that candidates who comply with the eligibility criteria for public financing would be

[e]ntitled to an additional benefit of free time on community antenna television to be allocat[ed] pursuant to rules determined by the administrator for the division of public utilities.

Id.; see also id. at Sec. 17-25-30.1 (obligating state public utilities administrator to formulate relevant rules). Such candidates are also entitled to "free time on any public broadcasting station operating under the jurisdiction of the Rhode Island public telecommunications authority." Id. at Sec. 17-25-30(2).

C. Proceedings Below.

Two PACs (Vote Choice and Gun Owners PAC), certain individuals who wish to contribute anonymously to each, and the Rhode Island affiliate of the American Civil Liberties Union brought suit in the district court seeking to enjoin the Board of Elections from enforcing R.I.Gen.Laws Sec. 17-25-15(c)(1). They posited that the provision self-destructed on three separate bases, viz., (1) the first amendment bars any attempt to mandate first dollar disclosure of political contributors' identities; (2) Rhode Island's first dollar disclosure law, when placed in its statutory context, places an impermissible burden on associational rights; and (3) the proviso denies the plaintiffs equal protection. The Board and two amici, Common Cause and Common Cause of Rhode Island, eventually took up the cudgels in defense.

In the same complaint, Leonard sought to enjoin the Board of Elections, the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities, and the Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority from implementing the contribution cap gap and the free-television-time incentive provisions. ⁶ She argued that these enactments violate the first amendment in a variety of ways, and, moreover, that federal law, specifically 47 U.S.C. Sec. 315 (1988), preempts the statutory grant of free television time. The state resisted these exhortations on the merits and also contended that Leonard lacked standing because she did not face a publicly funded opponent in the general election. ⁷ The amici supported the state's position.

The district court merged the hearing on preliminary injunction with trial on the merits. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(a)(2). After taking testimony, the court held first dollar disclosure, in and of itself, to be unconstitutional and invalidated R.I.Gen.Laws Sec. 17-25-15(c)(1) on that basis. See Vote Choice v. DiStefano, 814 F.Supp. 195, 199-202 (D.R.I.1993). The court also ruled that, although Leonard had standing to mount a constitutional challenge, id. at 204, her contentions were impuissant. See id. at 207. The Board appeals from the district court's nullification of the first dollar disclosure rule and Leonard appeals from the court's refusal to outlaw the contribution cap gap and the free-television-time incentives.

II. THE STATE'S APPEAL

The first amendment is incorporated into the fourteenth amendment and, in that way, constrains state action. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276-77, 84 S.Ct. 710, 723-24, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) (ruling that the free speech clause applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment; collecting cases). Accordingly, our consideration of R.I.Gen.Laws Sec. 17-25-15(c)(1) starts with a discussion of whether first dollar disclosure provisions are always repugnant to the first amendment. Concluding (contrary to the court below) that they are not, ...