Chicago & W.I.R. Co. v. Englewood Connecting Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 25 January 1886 |
| Citation | 115 Ill. 375,4 N.E. 246 |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
| Parties | CHICAGO & W. I. R. CO. v. ENGLEWOOD CONNECTING RY. CO. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from county court, Cook county.
C. M. Osborn, for appellant.
R. Biddle Roberts
, for appellee.
A reversal of the judgment in this case is urged on several grounds; but, as one of them is deemed sufficient, it will not be necessary to consider the others. Appellee having stipulated to put down, at its own expense, and thereafter keep and maintain in good repair and condition, all necessary frogs and crossings for its two main tracks across the tracks of appellant, ‘the court on the trial excluded all evidence from the jury tending to show that either the value of respondent's road, or its capacity to do the business of the company, would be impaired by the proposed crossing.’ In short, the court ruled, in effect, that the respondent was only entitled to nominal damages. The ruling of the court in this respect, when formulated into a distinct proposition, seems to be this: A railway company may locate its tracks across the road of another company at any point it pleases, and without regard to the effect it will have on the value of the road to be crossed, or its capacity to do the necessary and legitimate business of the company to which it belongs; and, however serious the injury will be in these respects to the company whose road is thus crossed, it will be entitled to nominal damages only, provided the company proposing to do the injury will stipulate that it will make and maintain the crossing at its own expense.
A law leading to such results can hardly be distinguished on principle from one which would permit a railway company to locate its depot grounds in the center of another's farm, upon the payment of a copper or other nominal sum, provided the company would stipulate to relieve the owner of the farm of the burden of erecting and maintaining the depot buildings. That the enforcement of such a provision in the name of law would be simple confiscation but poorly disguised, is manifest. That no government in which the distinction between meum and tuum is recognized would sanction or enforce a rule of that kind may well be assumed.
It is claimed the ruling of the court below, in the respect stated, is sustained by Peoria & P. U. Ry. Co. v. Peoria & F. Ry. Co., 105 Ill. 110, and Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Joliet, L. & A. Ry. Co., Id. 388.
Before remaking on these cases it is proper to call attention to the case of Lake Shore & M. S. Ry. Co. v. Chicago & W. I. R. Co., 97 Ill. 506. A bill was filed by the appellant in that case to enjoin the present appellant from prosecuting a condemnation suit, commenced by it in the county court of Cook county, to obtain the right of way across certain grounds and tracks of the complainant in the city of Chicago. The chief grounds relied on for a perpetual injunction in that case were that the crossing of the complainant's tracks by the defendant's trains would so interfere with the running of the complainant's trains as to greatly embarrass its business, and subject it to immense loss, that could not be accurately determined or compensated for in an action at law. It was further urged upon the argument that inasmuch as the eminent domain act did not make any provision as to the manner or the place of crossing other roads, that it was inoperative and void; that the legislature could not have intended to have put it in the power of a company seeking to cross over another's tracks to practically ruin the latter's business, and consequently the value of its road as a property; that such a power would be dangerous to the rights of other corporations and the interests of the public. This court, in the opinion filed in the case, conceded that a railway company seeking to cross the road of another company has, under our statute, the right to determine both the place and manner of crossing; and, in answer to the argument that such a power might be arbitrarily and wantonly exercised, said:
‘The security against a wanton and arbitrary exercise of this power upon mere whim or caprice, and that in all cases the point and manner of taking selected will be that least injurious to the owner and yet suited to the public necessity, is found in the fact that such corporations will be induced by considerations of their own best interests to select, in making such crossings, that practical place, and that practical mode, which will be least detrimental to the owner, because the corporation so selecting is required by law to make the owner full compensation, and the more injurious to the owner the place selected and mode chosen the greater will be the amount of necessary compensation to be paid.’
This language, when considered in the light of the facts in that case, and the argument that was then pressed upon the court, leaves no doubt as to what was meant. The obvious and palpable meaning...
To continue reading
Request your trial