Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corp.

• Decision Date: 13 September 1939
• Citation: 4 S.E.2d 364
• Parties: TOLER. v. OAKWOOD SMOKELESS COAL CORPORATION.
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court

4 S.E.2d 364

TOLER.

v.OAKWOOD SMOKELESS COAL CORPORATION.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Sept. 13, 1939.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 13, 1039.

Appeal from Industrial Commission.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Martha Toler to recover compensation for the death of Raymond Toler, employee, opposed by the Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corporation, employer. From an order of the Industrial Commission dismissing the claim, claimant appeals.

Affirmed.

Argued before HOLT, HUDGINS, GREGORY, BROWNING, EGGLESTON, and SPRATLEY, JJ.

S. H. & Geo. C. Sutherland, of Clint-wood, for appellant.

Bandy & Bandy, of Norton, for appellee.

SPRATLEY, Justice.

This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission of Virginia, which dismissed the claim of the appellant, Martha Toler, for compensation for the death of her alleged husband, Raymond Toler. Raymond Toler died on April 29, 1938, as a result of injuries arising out of an accident to him in the course of his employment by the Oakwood Smokeless Coal Corporation, on the 14th day of April, 1938, in Buchanan county, Virginia.

The facts were not in dispute before the Commission. As stated by Commissioner Nickels, they are as follows:

"The record shows that claimant was married to J. M. Lawson in the year 1927, and that she lived with him for a period of five and one-half years. She separated from said Lawson and resided at various places thereafter. About four years after her separation from Lawson she married Raymond Toler, the deceased. She was married to him in Boone County, West Virginia, on March 27, 1937. Thereafter she and her second husband came to Virginia on April 14, 1937, where they had resided until the date of the foregoing fatal accident.

"The evidence of claimant shows that Raymond Toler, her last husband, had seen a newspaper article wherein it was related that her former husband, J. M. Law-son, had been killed in an automobile accident; that she had not instituted any divorce proceedings against her former husband, J. M. Lawson, and, so far as she knew, he had not instituted divorce suit against her; that the last marriage was solemnized in the belief that her former husband was dead. The record further shows this information to be incorrect, because witnesses were introduced who knew the said J. M. Lawson and who testified that he was still alive and a resident of the State of West Virginia."

The sole question for our decision is whether the claim of Mrs. Toler to be the lawful widow of Raymond Toler, and as such entitled to compensation provided by the law of Virginia for the widow of a deceased employee, shall be determined under the laws of West Virginia, the place of the celebration of her second marriage; or under the laws of Virginia, the forum State, and the residence of herself and Toler at the time of the latter's accident and death.

The precise question here presented has never been decided by this court; that is, no case has here been decided touching the validity of a marriage in another state, between citizens of that state, where such marriage, though prohibited, is made void only from the time it may be so declared by a decree of nullity, and the parties so married afterwards came to Virginia, where the marriage between them is by statute declared absolutely void, and there resided together as man and wife.

An examination of the numerous cases bearing upon the subject of the validity of foreign marriages, especially as regards the essentials of marriage and the capacity of parties, discloses an amazing and perplexing diversity of judicial determination. As interesting as it may be to review those cases, we cannot, within the scope of this opinion, undertake to enter into a discussion of the varying factors and circumstances involved in a consideration of them. A mere reading of the cases and the authorities therein cited will direct the exploring investigator into a wide field of conflict of laws and opinions. The question before us must be settled upon general principles, and governed by our own statutes.

The general rule throughout the civilized world is that the law of the place of its celebration governs as to the form and ceremonies incident to marriage. Thus arises the often cited rule that a marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere. But to this rule there are two well recognized exceptions, as universal as the rule itself, namely: (1) marriages deemed contrary to the laws of nature as generally recognized in Christian countries, such as polygamous and incestuous marriages; and (2) marriages positively forbidden by statute because contrary to local public policy. Kinney v. Commonwealth, 30 Grat. 858, 71 Va. 858, 32 Am.Rep. 690; Greenhow v. James' Ex'r, 80 Va. 636, 56 Am. Rep. 603; Heflinger v. Heflinger, 136 Va. 289, 118 S.E. 316, 32 A.L.R. 1088; Long on Domestic Relations, chapter 6, Conflict of Laws; Minor, Conflict of Laws, page 160, et seq.; Story on Conflict of Laws, 8th Ed., page 188, et seq.; Bishop on Marriage, Divorce and Separation, page 359, et seq.; Tiffany on Persons and Domestic Relations, page 46; 12 Corpus Juris, Conflict of Laws, section 43.

We are not concerned with the form and ceremony of the celebration of the marriage in the instant case. We are confronted with the question of the capacity of one of the parties to contract a marriage in another state, which will be binding and lawful in Virginia, and out of which relation a benefit may be claimed under a Virginia statute.

Marriage is very properly regarded as the foundation of human society. Every state in the Union has its own peculiar laws regulating marriage and the effect of the marriage contract upon the parties and their property. Every state has the power to determine who shall assume or occupy the matrimonial relationship within its borders. Unfortunately, there is no great uniformity in these laws, except that they are designed to promote public morality and the moral and physical development of the parties. The control and regulation of marriage for this useful purpose is left to the states and not to the federal government. In this control and regulation, the states are fully sovereign and are foreign as to each other. Pennegar and Haney v. State, 87 Tenn. 244, 10 S.W. 305, 2 L.R.A. 703, 10 Am.St.Rep. 648; Long on Domestic Relations, chapter 6, Conflict of Laws.

One state, however, cannot force its own marriage laws, or other laws, on any other state, and no state is bound by comity to give effect in its courts to the marriage laws of another state, repugnant to its own laws and policy. Otherwise, a state would be deprived of the very essence of its sovereignty, the right of supremacy within its own borders. Such effect as may be given by a state to a law of another state is merely because of comity, or because justice and policy may demand recognition of such law. Such recognition is not a matter of obligation. Minor, Conflict of Laws, chapter 1; 11 American Jurisprudence, Conflict of Laws, sections 4, 5, 6 and 126.

It is in recognition of the principle of comity or of justice that, in testing the validity of a foreign marriage, the law of the place of the celebration of the marriage, as applied to the marriage in question, is usually adopted as a law of the forum, unless such law is contrary and opposed to the statutes or public policy of the forum state.

"The Legislature is fully competent to declare what marriages shall be void in its own state, notwithstanding their valid-ity in the state where celebrated, whether contracted between parties who were in good faith domiciled in the state where the ceremony was performed, or between parties who left the state of domicile for the purpose of avoiding its statute, when they come or return to the state. * * * This right in the Legislature is generally conceded by all the courts which have pronounced upon the subject." Osoinach, Administrator, etc. v. Watkins, 235 Ala. 564, 180 So. 577, 581, 117 A.L.R. 179, with cases cited and annotation on page 186.

The pages of the reports and textbooks are replete with statements of the general rules, exceptions, and qualifications, which apply to the varying circumstances under which conflicts between lex fori and the lex loci have arisen. In our citations and references, we shall endeavor to confine ourselves as closely as possible to the peculiar circumstances of this particular case.

Polygamy is now prohibited in all of the States and territories of the American Union. It is repugnant to the moral sense of Christendom, contrary to public policy, and is made criminal by statutes. In Virginia and West Virginia, the offense of bigamy is punishable as a felony. Virginia Code 1936, § 4538; West Virginia Code 1937, § 6056.

In Virginia: "All marriages between a white person and a colored person, and all marriages which are prohibited by law on account of either of the parties having a former wife or...