40 731 Smith v. Kay, 83

• Decision Date: 02 March 1896
• Docket Number: No. 83,83
• Citation: 161 U.S. 355,16 S.Ct. 490
• Parties: ` 40 L.Ed. 731 SMITH et al. v. McKAY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

161 U.S. 355

16 S.Ct. 490`

40 L.Ed. 731

SMITH et al.

v McKAY.

No. 83.

March 2, 1896.

In the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, Gordon McKay, as trustee for the McKay Sewing Machine Association, and a citizen of the state of Rhode Island, filed a bill of complaint against Frank W. Smith and others, citizens of the state of Massachusetts, doing business as copartners in the firm name of Smith, Stoughton & Payne. The bill was brought upon a lease between said parties, bearing date January 23, 1878, whereby the complainant had granted to the defendants, in consideration of rent or license fees, the right to use certain sewing machines and other patented devices belonging to the complainant. The bill alleged a failure by the defendants to comply with the terms of the lease, and prayed for a discovery, accounting, payment of rent, and for an injunction restraining the defendants from using the patented machines until they had fully paid the amount found to be due.

The defendants filed an answer responding to various allegations of the bill, and averring that the complainant, so far as he had any just cause of action, had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. Subsequently the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss the bill for the alleged reason that the complainant had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law. After argument this motion was denied. The cause was heard upon the pleadings and proofs, and at the May term, 1889, an accounting was awarded (39 Fed. 556), a master was appointed, and, on the coming in of his report, on December 22, 1891, a final decree was rendered that the complainant should recover damages in excess of the sum of $5,000, and costs of suit. From this decree an appeal was taken and allowed to this court, and error was assigned to the action of the circuit court in taking jurisdiction of the bill, and in not dismissing the same for want of jurisdiction.

Causten Browne, for appellants.

J. J. Meyers, for appellee.

Mr. Justice SHIRAS, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellants seek to have this court review the action of the circuit court in entertaining jurisdiction of a bill in equity in a case in which, as they allege, it appears that the complainant had a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law.

It is contended on the part of the appellee that we should dismiss this appeal because the question of jurisdiction is not properly certified to this court.

The record discloses that the defendants below appealed upon the express ground that the court erred in taking jurisdiction of the bill, and in not dismissing the bill for want of jurisdiction, and prayed that their appeal should be allowed, and the question of jurisdiction be certified to the supreme court, and that said appeal was allowed. The certificate further states that there is sent a true copy of so much of the record as is necessary for the determination of the question of jurisdiction, and as part of the record so certified is the opinion of the court below, in accordance with which defendants' motion to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction was denied. It therefore appears that the appeal was granted solely upon the question of jurisdiction, and this brings the case within the rulings in Shields v. Coleman, 157 U. S. 168, 15 Sup. Ct. 570; and In re Lehigh Mining & Manuf'g Co., 156 U. S. 322, 15 Sup. Ct. 375.

It is further contended by the appellee that this appeal should be dismissed because there is no right of appeal to this court in such a case as the present one.

The appellants claim that this appeal is within the first class under section 5 of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891, providing that, 'in any case in which the question of the jurisdiction of the court is in issue, in such case the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the supreme court from the court below for decision.'

The position of the appellee is that only questions of federal jurisdiction can be brought directly here; that, if the circuit court has jurisdiction of the parties and of the matters in dispute, the fact that it...