Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Ass'n

Decision Date24 January 1995
Docket NumberNo. 94-2324,94-2324
Parties, 95 Ed. Law Rep. 867, 3 A.D. Cases 1479, 7 A.D.D. 378, 5 NDLR P 427 Edward Leo POTTGEN, Appellee, v. The MISSOURI STATE HIGH SCHOOL ACTIVITIES ASSOCIATION, Appellant. National Federation of State High School Associations; Iowa High School Athletic Association; Nebraska School Activities Association; South Dakota High School Activities Association, Amicus Curiae.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Mallory V. Mayse, Columbia, MO, argued, for appellant.

Kenneth M. Chackes, St. Louis, MO, argued (John T. Murray, on the brief), for appellee.

Before RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

BEAM, Circuit Judge.

The Missouri State High School Activities Association (hereinafter "MSHSAA") appeals the issuance of a preliminary injunction which restrains it from enforcing its age limit for interscholastic sports against Edward Leo Pottgen. Pottgen repeated two grades in elementary school due to an undiagnosed learning disability. By his senior year, this delay in completing his education made him too old to play interscholastic baseball under MSHSAA eligibility standards. In district court, Pottgen challenged the age limit as violating section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and section 1983. Because we find that Pottgen is not a qualified individual under these statutes, we reverse.

I. BACKGROUND

After Pottgen repeated two grades in elementary school, the school tested him to see whether he needed special classroom assistance. When the school discovered that Pottgen had several learning disabilities, it placed him on an individualized program and provided him with access to special services. With these additional resources, Pottgen progressed through school at a normal rate. It is not clear from the evidence whether he attempted to make up the lost time through summer school or other remedial activities.

Pottgen was active in sports throughout junior high and high school. He played interscholastic baseball for three years in high school and planned to play baseball his senior year as well. However, because he had repeated two grades, Pottgen turned nineteen shortly before July 1 of his senior year. Consequently, MSHSAA By-Laws rendered Pottgen ineligible to play. 1 The MSHSAA By-Law states, in relevant part, "A student shall not have reached the age of nineteen prior to July 1 preceding the opening of school. If a student reaches the age of nineteen on or following July 1, the student may be considered eligible for [interscholastic sports during] the ensuing school year."

Pottgen petitioned MSHSAA for a hardship exception to the age limit since he was held back due to his learning disabilities. Pottgen struck out. MSHSAA determined that waiving the requirement violated the intent of the age eligibility rule.

Pottgen then brought this suit, alleging MSHSAA's age limit violated the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the "Rehabilitation Act"), the Americans With Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), and section 1983. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining MSHSAA from "(i) preventing [Pottgen] from competing in any Hancock High School baseball games or district or state tournament games; and (ii) imposing any penalty, discipline or sanction on any school for which or against which [Pottgen] competes in these games." Pottgen v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 857 F.Supp. 654, 666 (E.D.Mo.1994).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Mootness

Pottgen has now played his last game of high school baseball. Thus, the portion of the injunction permitting him to play is moot. However, a live controversy still exists regarding the portion of the injunction which prohibits MSHSAA from imposing sanctions upon a high school for whom or against whom Pottgen played. See Wiley v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 612 F.2d 473, 476 (10th Cir.1979) (graduation of college track athlete did not completely moot injunction allowing him to compete because athlete's victories, records and awards were still at issue), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943, 100 S.Ct. 2168, 64 L.Ed.2d 798 (1980). In Beck v. Missouri State High Sch. Activities Ass'n, 18 F.3d 604, 606 (8th Cir.1994), we recently found completely moot an appeal involving the denial of a preliminary injunction regarding student eligibility standards. However, because the student in Beck did not play during his ineligible period no permanent records and awards were affected by the district court action.

B. Injunctive Relief

When considering a motion for a preliminary injunction, a district court weighs the movant's probability of success on the merits, the threat of irreparable harm to the movant absent the injunction, the balance between this harm and the injury that the injunction's issuance would inflict on other interested parties, and the public interest. Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 114 (8th Cir.1981) (en banc). We reverse the issuance of a preliminary injunction only if the issuance "is the product of an abuse of discretion or misplaced reliance on an erroneous legal premise." City of Timber Lake v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, 10 F.3d 554, 556 (8th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2741, 129 L.Ed.2d 861 (1994).

The district court's issuance of a preliminary injunction required the court to determine that Pottgen was a proper plaintiff under the Rehabilitation Act, the ADA and section 1983. Because we find that Pottgen is not an aggrieved party under these statutes, we do not reach MSHSAA's other arguments on appeal.

1. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act

MSHSAA appeals the district court's finding that Pottgen could potentially prevail under the Rehabilitation Act. MSHSAA contends Pottgen is not an "otherwise qualified individual" under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.

Section 504 states that "No otherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 2 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794(a). In Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 406, 99 S.Ct. 2361, 2367, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979), the Supreme Court defined an "otherwise qualified individual" as "one who is able to meet all of a program's requirements in spite of his handicap." 3 Courts cannot apply the Davis test to all the requirements; if they did, "no reasonable requirement could ever violate Sec. 504, no matter how easy it would be to accommodate handicapped individuals who cannot fulfill it." Brennan v. Stewart, 834 F.2d 1248, 1261 (5th Cir.1988). Rather, individuals with disabilities need only meet a program's necessary or essential requirements. Simon v. St. Louis County, 656 F.2d 316, 321 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 976, 102 S.Ct. 1485, 71 L.Ed.2d 688 (1981).

The district court found Pottgen to be an "otherwise qualified" individual because, except for the age limit, Pottgen meets all MSHSAA's eligibility requirements. The court framed the issue as not whether Pottgen meets all of the eligibility requirements, but rather whether reasonable accommodations existed. We disagree. A Rehabilitation Act analysis requires the court to determine both whether an individual meets all of the essential eligibility requirements and whether reasonable modifications exist.

Here, Pottgen cannot meet all the baseball program's requirements in spite of his disability. He is too old to meet the MSHSAA age limit. This failure to meet the age limit does not keep Pottgen from being "otherwise qualified" unless the age limit is an essential or necessary eligibility requirement.

We find that MSHSAA has demonstrated that the age limit is an essential eligibility requirement in a high school interscholastic program. An age limit helps reduce the competitive advantage flowing to teams using older athletes; protects younger athletes from harm; discourages student athletes from delaying their education to gain athletic maturity; and prevents over-zealous coaches from engaging in repeated red-shirting to gain a competitive advantage. These purposes are of immense importance in any interscholastic sports program.

Even though Pottgen cannot meet this essential eligibility requirement, he is "otherwise qualified" if reasonable accommodations would enable him to meet the age limit. See School Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 287 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. 1123, 1131 n. 17, 94 L.Ed.2d 307 (1987); Kohl v. Woodhaven Learning Ctr., 865 F.2d 930, 936 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 892, 110 S.Ct. 239, 107 L.Ed.2d 189 (1989). Reasonable accommodations do not require an institution "to lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person." Davis, 442 U.S. at 413, 99 S.Ct. at 2370-71. Accommodations are not reasonable if they impose "undue financial and administrative burdens" or if they require a "fundamental alteration in the nature of [the] program." Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n. 17, 107 S.Ct. at 1131 n. 17 (citations omitted).

Since Pottgen is already older than the MSHSAA age limit, the only possible accommodation is to waive the essential requirement itself. 4 Although Pottgen contends an age limit waiver is a reasonable accommodation based on his disability, we disagree. Waiving an essential eligibility standard would constitute a fundamental alteration in the nature of the baseball program. Other than waiving the age limit, no manner, method, or means is available which would permit Pottgen to satisfy the age limit. Consequently, no reasonable accommodations exist.

Since Pottgen can never meet the essential eligibility requirement, he is not an "otherwise qualified" i...

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