Territory Hawai`i v. Wong

• Decision Date: 23 June 1953
• Docket Number: NO. 2900.,2900.
• Citation: 40 Haw. 257
• Parties: TERRITORY OF HAWAII v. LARRY A. C. WONG, TEOTIMO CUYO, TIBURCIO BUNAO, BUENAVENTURA CARSOLA, ALFREDO ACIDO, QUIRINO AQUINO, DIEGO SEMION, CIPRIANO SICAN CABRADILLA AND FRANCISCO BARIENTOS.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

40 Haw. 257

TERRITORY OF HAWAII

v.LARRY A. C. WONG, TEOTIMO CUYO, TIBURCIO BUNAO, BUENAVENTURA CARSOLA, ALFREDO ACIDO, QUIRINO AQUINO, DIEGO SEMION, CIPRIANO SICAN CABRADILLA AND FRANCISCO BARIENTOS.

NO. 2900.

Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawai‘i.

Argued December 4, 1952.

Decided June 23, 1953.

ERROR TO DISTRICT COURT OF KOLOA, COUNTY OF KAUAI, HON. G. AGUIAR, DISTRICT MAGISTRATE.

Syllabus by the Court

The provisions of section 11343 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945, relating to “persons present” at gambling games do not violate the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Those provisions contain an ascertainable standard of conduct to be interpreted as requiring intentional presence at gaming in progress with knowledge that such game constitutes gaming.

To accord a constitutional interpretation to a statutory provision of broad or apparent unrestricted scope, courts will strive to limit the scope of such provision to a narrow and more restricted construction in order to preserve its overall purpose and to avoid absurd results.

General terms descriptive of a class of persons subject to a penal statute will be limited where application of its terms would otherwise lead to extreme or absurd results, and where the legislative purposes gathered from the entire Act will be satisfied by a narrower and more limited interpretation.

One who approaches the line of lawful and unlawful demarcation under provisions of a penal statute thereby assumes the risk that by his conduct he is in violation of such statute.

The Constitution provides procedural safeguards to protect persons against conviction of crime except for violation of laws which have clearly defined conduct thereafter to be punished, but that safeguard does not require impossible standards of conduct.

Statutory language which conveys definite warning of proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices, satisfies the due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.E. K. Aiu, Deputy County Attorney Kauai County ( A. G. Kaulukou, County Attorney Kauai County, with him on the opening brief; J. Y. Shigemura and F. D. Gibson, Jr.,

Deputy Attorneys General, on supplemental brief), for plaintiff in error.

J. A. Mizuha (also on the briefs) for defendants in error.

TOWSE, C. J., LE BARON AND STAINBACK, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY TOWSE, C. J.

Writ of error is prosecuted by the Territory of Hawaii (R. L. H. 1945, § 9952) from the ruling of the district magistrate for the district of Koloa, county of Kauai sustaining a demurrer and dismissing the complaint charging the defendants in error with being present at a gambling game. The demurrer was sustained upon the ground that section 11343 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii 1945 is violative of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

Eight errors are assigned. All relate to the ruling of unconstitutionality of that portion of section 11343 constituting the charge as applied to the facts considered upon demurrer.

The primary contention of the defendants in error is that the provision of section 11343 under which they were charged is “so vague and uncertain in its standard of conduct that it violates the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment.” The Territory contends that the pertinent portion of the section, when interpreted “as referring to intentional presence with knowledge of the nature of the game,” formulates a sufficiently clear and ascertainable standard of conduct.

Section 11343 provides: “Every person who deals, plays, or carries on, opens or causes to be opened, or who conducts either as owner or employee, whether for hire or not, any game of faro, monte, roulette, tan, fan tan, or any banking or percentage game played with cards, dice or any device for money, checks, credit or any representative of value or any other game in which money or anything of value is lost or won, and every person who plays or bets at or against any such prohibited game or games, and every person present where such game or games are being played or carried on, is guilty of a misdemeanor.” (Emphasis added.)

The complaint alleges: “The Territory of Hawaii charges that the above named defendants, did, at Koloa, District of Koloa, County of Kauai, Territory of Hawaii, on the 8th day of January, A.D., 1952, violate the provisions of Section 11343 of the Revised Laws of Hawaii, 1945, by being present at a place where a gambling game was being played and carried on, to–wit: ‘Monte’ at which money or something of value was lost or won.”

The section expressly prohibits: first, dealing, playing, carrying on, or the conducting of any of the enumerated games; second, participation in any of the prohibited games; third, presence where such games are being played or carried on. Two classes of active participants and one of persons “present” are designated and embraced within its terms. We are here concerned solely with the latter class.

Construing the section in its component parts, we find all classes of persons at whom it is directed to be clearly and concisely defined. The defect, if any, lies not in its vagueness or indefiniteness, but rather in the patently broad scope of its application to the latter class.

To accord a constitutional interpretation of a provision of broad or apparent unrestricted scope, courts will strive to focus the scope of the provision to a narrow and more restricted construction. (Territory v. Marshall, 13 Haw. 76; Territory v. Miguel, 18 Haw. 402;Pan Am. Air. Co. v. Godbold, 36 Haw. 170; Godbold v. Manebog, 36 Haw. 206;United States v. Delaware and Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366; 53 L. Ed. 836, 29 S. Ct. 527; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U. S. 77, 93 L. Ed. 513, 69 S. Ct. 448.)

Provisions of a penal statute will be accorded a limited and reasonable interpretation under this doctrine in order to preserve overall purpose and to avoid absurd results. (R. L. H. 1945, §§ 12, 13.) Lacking interpretation, absurd results may ofttimes manifest themselves in the enforcement of penal statutes of doubtful or unrestricted class application. “General terms descriptive of a class of persons made subject to a criminal statute may and should be limited where the literal application of the statute would lead to extreme or absurd results, and where the legislative purpose gathered from the whole Act would be satisfied by a more limited interpretation.” (United States v. Katz, 271 U. S. 354, 362, 70 L. Ed. 986, 46 S. Ct. 513;United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 18 L. Ed. 830;Kirchman v. United States, 256 U. S. 363, 65 L. Ed. 992, 41 S. Ct. 514;United States v. Alford, 274 U. S. 264, 71 L. Ed. 1040, 47 S. Ct. 597;United States v. Raynor, 302 U. S. 540, 82 L. Ed. 413, 58 S. Ct. 353.)

Since enacted in 1894 section 11343 has survived without amendment, though not without numerous attacks in lower courts upon its applicability. No legislative history is available in aid of interpretation of the latter portion.

Persons actively participating in professional gaming or who are present at a place where professional gaming is being conducted are clearly within the classes encompassed by the statute as possessing the requisite elements of intentional presence and knowledge that the game constitutes gaming. In such circumstances these elements arise from mere presence. It is nonprofessional or social gaming in its varied forms in private homes and public gatherings, or gaming conducted in a nonprofessional, nonprofit environment which gives rise to...