Chicago, P.&M.R. Co. v. Atterbury

• Decision Date: 10 May 1895
• Citation: 156 Ill. 281,40 N.E. 826
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: CHICAGO, P. & M. R. CO. v. ATTERBURY et al.

156 Ill. 281

40 N.E. 826

CHICAGO, P. & M. R. CO.

v.ATTERBURY et al.¹

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 10, 1895.

Appeal from Jefferson county court; William T. Pace, Judge.

Condemnation proceedings by the Chicago, Paducah & Memphis Railroad Company against William T. Atterbury and Mary A. Atterbury. There was judgment of condemnation, and an assessment of compensation. The company appeals. Affirmed.

N. H. Moss and C. H. Patton, for appellant.

Laird & Laird, for appellees.

PER CURIAM.

This was a petition brought by the Chicago, Paducah & Memphis Railroad Company against William T. and Mary A. Atterbury, in the county court of Jefferson county, to condemn lands for a right of way. A trial was had before a jury, which resulted in a verdict fixing the compensation of appellees at $140 for land taken, and $200 for damages to lands not taken,-in all, $340. The court, after overruling a motion entered by petitioner for a new trial, rendered judgment on the verdict, and the railroad company appealed.

It is claimed that the court erred in refusing to admit in evidence Deed Record No. 51 of the Jefferson county circuit court, containing a record of petitioner's articles of incorporation. The court excluded the book on the ground that it was not proven to be a record by a proper custodian. Proof of incorporation, which the court held sufficient to establish the fact, and authorize it to condemn lands, was introduced before the court. It was therefore wholly immaterial whether the question as to the admission of the record book was decided right or wrong.

It is next claimed by the railroad company that the court erred in refusing its instructions Nos. 15 and 16. No. 15 was as follows: ‘(15) The jury are instructed that if, after the construction and operation of this railroad, either of the defendants, or any other person, should suffer loss or sustain damage, by fire or otherwise, occasioned by the negligence of the railroad company or its employés, they, or either of them so sustaining loss or damages, may sue for and recover the same in any court of law having jurisdiction of such cases.’ Refused. It may be conceded that the instruction lays down a certain proposition. But it does not follow that the court was required to give it to the jury. It is no part of the duty of a trial court to give every abstract proposition of law that an attorney may ask. Instructions must be predicated on the evidence, and relate to the issue presented by the pleadings; and when they do not, although they may announce a correct principle of law, the court is not required to give them to the jury. While it is true that the owner of a farm over which a railroad is constructed may sue for and recover such damadges as he may sustain through the negligence of the railroad company in the running of its trains over and across his lands, as announced in the instruction, yet that was not the issue the jury was called upon to try. The question, and the only question, before the jury for determination, was the value of the land taken by the...