Turney v. Pugh

Decision Date15 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-35165.,03-35165.
Citation400 F.3d 1197
PartiesFrank W. TURNEY, Petitioner, v. Margaret PUGH, Commissioner, Respondent.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Mary C. Geddes, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Anchorage, AK, for the petitioner.

Douglas H. Kossler, Assistant Attorney General, Anchorage, AK, for the respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska; John W. Sedwick, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-01-00010-JWS.

Before: B. FLETCHER, GOULD, Circuit Judges, and KING, District Judge.*

BETTY B. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge:

This case raises the perennially difficult issue of the proper balance between two of our society's most treasured guarantees: the fair administration of justice (including, most importantly, a defendant's right to a fair trial) and the right to freedom of expression. In this appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, petitioner Frank Turney alleges that the Alaska jury tampering statute under which he was convicted is overbroad in violation of the First Amendment. As interpreted by the Alaska Supreme Court, the statute prohibits knowingly communicating with a juror, directly or indirectly, with the intent to influence the outcome of a specific case, unless such communication is permitted by the rules of the proceeding. We conclude that the Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted the statute narrowly enough that it does not reach a substantial amount of protected speech. We therefore affirm the denial of Turney's petition.

I. BACKGROUND

In July 1994, prior to the commencement of jury selection in the Alaska criminal case State v. Hall in Fairbanks, jury-nullification proponent Frank Turney approached three members of the venire in the courthouse and told them to call the toll-free number of the Fully Informed Jury Association. Some of the individuals Turney lobbied were wearing badges that identified them as jurors. At the time, a person calling the number Turney publicized, 1-800-TEL-JURY, would have heard the following message:

Thank you for calling the Fully Informed Jury Association. FIJA is a nonprofit educational association that wants all Americans to know their rights as jurors to judge the law itself as well as the facts regardless of the instructions from the judge because jurors cannot be punished for their verdict. They are the final check and balance on our government, with more power than the President, Congress, or the Supreme Court. To talk to a live person, call 406-793-5550 or we will mail you more free information on jury veto power, if you tell us how you heard of us. Then name and spell your name, address, and zip code. Here's the tone. [TONE]

Juror Ellis, one of the individuals Turney approached, was selected for the petit jury in State v. Hall. At one point during deliberations, Ellis announced to the other jurors that he had called 1-800-TEL-JURY and that he was changing his vote in the case because "I can vote what I want." He urged the other jurors to call the number. The jury was unable to reach a decision and was excused.

Turney was subsequently indicted for three counts of jury tampering and charged by information with two counts of criminal trespass in the first degree. Alaska's jury tampering statute provides:

A person commits the crime of jury tampering if the person directly or indirectly communicates with a juror other than as permitted by the rules governing the official proceeding with intent to

(1) influence the juror's vote, opinion, decision, or other action as a juror; or

(2) otherwise affect the outcome of the official proceeding.

Alaska Stat. § 11.56.590(a). A "juror" for purposes of this statute is "a member of an impanelled jury or a person who has been drawn or summoned to attend as a prospective juror." Id. § 11.56.900(3).

The superior court denied Turney's motion to dismiss the charges. The Alaska Supreme Court permitted an interlocutory appeal and affirmed the denial of Turney's motion to dismiss. Turney v. State, 936 P.2d 533, 545 (Alaska 1997). Holding that the jury tampering statute "proscribes only speech intended to influence a juror in his or her capacity as a juror in a particular case," and that such speech is unprotected, the court rejected Turney's overbreadth challenge to the law. Id. at 541.1

Turney was convicted at trial of three counts of jury tampering. The court sentenced him to fourteen months on each count to run concurrently, with all but sixty days suspended, plus a $2,500 fine (mostly suspended), 160 hours of community service work, and six years of probation. On direct appeal, the Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed, in an unpublished opinion that rejected Turney's overbreadth and vagueness arguments as foreclosed by the Alaska Supreme Court's decision in the interlocutory appeal. One judge dissented. The Alaska Supreme Court denied Turney's petition for review.

In 2001, Turney petitioned the federal district court in Alaska for a writ of habeas corpus, which the court denied. According to the court, the Alaska Supreme Court's overbreadth decision was fully in accord with United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, which makes clear that attempts to interfere with the administration of justice by improperly influencing jurors are not entitled to First Amendment protection. The court also rejected Turney's vagueness challenge and his argument that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because the jury was not presented with every element of the crime of jury tampering. The district court denied a certificate of appealability, but we granted one with respect to the question of whether Alaska's jury tampering statute is overbroad. We therefore have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a).

II. ANALYSIS

A district court's denial of habeas relief is reviewed de novo. Beardslee v. Woodford, 358 F.3d 560, 568(9th Cir.2004). A habeas petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 cannot obtain relief based on a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless

the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The "clearly established Federal law" inquiry refers to "the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision." Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003).

A state court decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent where the court "applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme Court's] cases," or "confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of [the Supreme] Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from[that] precedent." Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court decision is an "unreasonable application of" clearly established Supreme Court precedent where the court "identifies the correct governing legal principle from[the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case." Id. at 413, 120 S.Ct. 1495.

The "highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings" reflects a respect for state courts as "part of a co-equal judiciary" and as "competent interpreters of federal law." Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir.2003) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Though we review the district court's decision de novo, we "cannot grant relief ... by conducting our own independent inquiry into whether the state court was correct as a de novo matter." Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 124 S.Ct. 2140, 2150, 158 L.Ed.2d 938 (2004). Accordingly, for federal habeas relief to be granted, it is not enough that our independent review indicate that the state court decision was incorrect or clearly erroneous; the state court's application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent must be "objectively unreasonable." Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75-76, 123 S.Ct. 1166.

In applying the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the relevant state decision is the "last reasoned decision by a state court." Robinson v. Ignacio, 360 F.3d 1044, 1055 (9th Cir.2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Here, because the Alaska Court of Appeals treated the overbreadth issue as settled by the Alaska Supreme Court on interlocutory review, it is the Alaska Supreme Court's decision whose conformity to federal law (under the deferential standard of § 2254(d)) is at issue.

Under the doctrine of First Amendment overbreadth, a litigant may mount a facial attack on a statute that restricts protected speech even if the litigant's own speech is unprotected. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). The overbreadth must be substantial in order for the statute to be invalidated on its face; the fact that a court may conceive of a single impermissible application is insufficient to justify striking down the law. City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458, 107 S.Ct. 2502, 96 L.Ed.2d 398 (1987).

When examining a law for overbreadth, a court's first task is to determine "whether the enactment reaches a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Where a state statute challenged for overbreadth has been construed by the state's highest court, the scope of the statute is to be assessed in light of the construction that court has given. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 113, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990).

The Alaska Supreme Court's decision...

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