400 U.S. 542 (1971), 73, Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.
|Docket Nº:||No. 73|
|Citation:||400 U.S. 542, 91 S.Ct. 496, 27 L.Ed.2d 613|
|Party Name:||Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.|
|Case Date:||January 25, 1971|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued December 9, 1970
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer may not, in the absence of business necessity, refuse to hire women with pre-school-age children while hiring men with such children.
411 F.2d 1, vacated and remanded.
Per curiam opinion.
Petitioner Mrs. Ida Phillips commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 * alleging that she had been denied employment because of her sex. The District Court granted summary judgment for Martin Marietta Corp. (Martin) on the basis of the following showing: (1) in 1966, Martin informed Mrs. Phillips that it was not accepting job applications from women with pre-school-age children; (2) as of the time of the motion for summary judgment, Martin employed men with pre-school-age children; (3) at the time Mrs. Phillips applied, 70-75% of the applicants for the position she sought were women; 75-80% of those hired for the position, assembly trainee, were women, hence no question of bias against women as such was presented.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed, 411 F.2d 1, and denied a rehearing en banc, 416 F.2d
Section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment [91 S.Ct. 498] opportunities irrespective of their sex. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in reading this section as permitting one hiring policy for women and another for men -- each having pre-school-age children. The existence of such conflicting family obligations, if demonstrably more relevant to job performance for a woman than for a man, could arguably be a basis for distinction under § 703(e) of the Act. But that is a matter of evidence tending to show that the condition in question "is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." The record before us, however, is not adequate for resolution of these important issues. See Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256-257 (1948). Summary judgment was therefore improper, and we remand for fuller development of the record and for further consideration.
Vacated and remanded.
MARSHALL, J., concurring
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL, concurring.
While I agree that this case must be remanded for a full development of the facts, I cannot agree with the Court's indication that a "bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of" Martin Marietta's business could be established by a showing that some...
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