U.S. v. Rodriguez-Leon

• Decision Date: 17 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 02-2693.,02-2693.
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Victor RODRIGUEZ-LEON, Defendant, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

402 F.3d 17

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Victor RODRIGUEZ-LEON, Defendant, Appellant.

No. 02-2693.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Heard November 9, 2004.

Decided March 17, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Randy Olen, on brief, for appellant.

Thomas F. Klumper, Assistant United States Attorney, with whom H.S. García, United States Attorney, and Nelson Pérez-Sosa, Assistant United States Attorney, were on brief, for appellee.

Before BOUDIN, Chief Judge, TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge, and CARTER,^* Senior District Judge.

TORRUELLA, Circuit Judge.

Defendant-appellant Víctor Rodríguez León ("Rodríguez") entered into a plea agreement on one count of aiding and abetting in the possession with intent to distribute and/or distribution of multiple kilograms of controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a), for his involvement between the ages of nine and seventeen¹ in a drug organization in which both of his parents were also involved. He alleges that his competence to plead guilty was questionable and that a magistrate judge erroneously recommended that he be transferred to adult status. Consequently, he argues, the district court erred in refusing to continue sentencing proceedings in order to investigate his apparent dissatisfaction with his guilty plea. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's acceptance of the guilty plea, failure to permit its withdrawal, or refusal to continue sentencing, the decision below is affirmed.

I. Background

On September 19, 2001, Rodríguez was charged as a juvenile in a sealed criminal complaint for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. On September 21, 2001, Rodríguez plead not guilty to the charge and was placed in pretrial detention. On December 4, 2001, the government filed a Motion to Transfer to Adult Status, and amended the charge to aiding and abetting in the possession with intent to distribute and/or distribution of multiple kilograms of controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).

An evidentiary hearing was held before Magistrate Judge Aida M. Delgado Colón on May 3, 2001. At the hearing, Dr. Luis Francisco Umpierre, a clinical psychologist, and Dr. Maria T. Margarida Juliá, a clinical neuropsychologist, testified on behalf of the Government and Rodríguez, respectively. Dr. Umpierre determined that Rodríguez has an IQ of 62, corresponding to mild mental retardation, and both experts found evidence of cognitive dysfunction or brain damage. On June 13, 2002, the magistrate judge issued a detailed Report and Recommendation. In the Report, she made specific findings on each of the six factors that 18 U.S.C. § 5032 directs judicial officers to consider in deciding on transfer to adult status.² She found that Rodríguez's prior delinquency record,³ poor response to probationary supervision and corresponding need for an institutional rehabilitation program, and mental limitations on judgment and emotional control, in addition to the lack of evidence of the existence of adequate non-penal rehabilitation programs to suit Rodríguez's needs, all weighed in favor of transfer to adult status. In addition, the magistrate judge found that the nature of the alleged offense — including reliable government evidence of Rodríguez's participation in murders and "hunting" rival drug gang members — was sufficient, standing alone, to warrant transfer to adult status.

The magistrate judge also made findings as to Rodríguez's competency to stand trial. She determined, on the basis of the psychological reports, that although his mental and judgmental capacities were limited, Rodríguez was capable of distinguishing right from wrong, understanding if one penalty was harsher than another, understanding the implications of an alibi defense and assisting his counsel by providing facts and information in support thereof. Thus, she concluded, he was competent to stand trial and assist defense counsel.

Rodríguez initially filed a sealed objection to the Report and Recommendation, but just over a month later, he submitted a motion to proceed against him as an adult. The motion states that "upon advise [sic] of counsel, [Rodríguez] voluntarily waives all further transfer procedures in this case [and] requests to be proceeded against as an adult for purposes of criminal prosecution in this case." The same day, he waived indictment and plead guilty to one count of distribution of various narcotic drugs, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a).

At the change of plea hearing before district court judge Juan M. Pérez Giménez, Rodríguez's counsel orally withdrew his opposition to the Report and Recommendation. After questioning Rodríguez directly, the district judge accepted the Report and Recommendation and waiver of transfer proceedings, found Rodríguez competent to waive indictment, and accepted his guilty plea.

A sentencing hearing was held on November 22, 2002. At the hearing, the following exchange occurred between the district judge and Rodríguez's counsel:

MR. ANGLADA: Your Honor, let me put something on the record before we start. I am ready for sentence and we have reviewed the PSI with the client. The client would like the sentence to be continued. One of the reasons is that his mother was already sentenced and his father is to be sentenced at an adjacent court on December 10th. We are within the thirty-five days. I am ready but I have the duty and the loyalty to my client to inform the court that he would prefer sentencing to be continued.

THE COURT: What is the reason?

MR. ANGLADA: The reason, Your Honor, is that he would prefer sentence not to be imposed in accordance with the written plea agreement. His father is to be sentenced by the Honorable Court if the plea is accepted by that neighboring court for a prison term of eighteen and a half years and, of course, I am bound by the plea agreement before this court and this plea calls for the imposition of a sentence of thirty seven points with a criminal history of two for the imposition of a sentence of 240 months. So, I am ready, he would —

THE COURT: But the fact that his father may be sentenced before or after he is sentenced, how does that affect his own sentence?

MR. ANGLADA: Your Honor, in my opinion I don't see any reasoning other than the generic attitude of his father now that our plea agreement is not a satisfactory plea agreement for his father and, therefore, for him, remember that he is now 18 or 19 and his IQ is one of 62. Now he is with his father at MDC and now he is again under the influence of his father.

....

THE COURT: Again my question is, do you think it would be beneficial for him to continue now under his father's supervision or if I sentence him today ask the Marshals to transport him out of Puerto Rico, so he is not under that influence, which apparently is a very bad influence.

MR. ANGLADA: Well, Your Honor, as an attorney, as a father, I have an opinion. I don't want to further jeopardize my relationship to him, so, you know, I don't know, if you are going to accept my words as an answer.

....

THE COURT:.... [W]e will proceed to sentence the defendant today. I think that your actions in this case were professionally carried out. You obtained the best plea agreement you could with the government under the circumstances and I would rather have him be sentenced today than leave the door open that might create problems between yourself and your client, which apparently they have been a very fruitful relationship.

Sentencing Transcript at 3-6 (emphasis supplied). Without directly asking Rodríguez to clarify his reasons for wanting a continuance, Judge Pérez Giménez sentenced him to 235 months in prison, eight years supervised release, and a $100 assessment.

Rodríguez appealed, claiming that his counsel's remarks at sentencing put the court on notice that he was challenging the plea agreement and sought to withdraw his plea. Accordingly, Rodríguez argues that the court erred in failing to further investigate whether he was entitled to a change of plea, and in denying the requested continuance.

II. Analysis

A. Change of plea

For purposes of our analysis, we will assume arguendo that counsel's statements amounted to a request to withdraw Rodríguez's guilty plea.⁴ The district court's failure to permit withdrawal, or to inquire further into the basis for the request are therefore reviewed for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Isom, 85 F.3d 831, 834 (1996). A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, but rather must show a "fair and just reason" therefor. Fed. R.Crim. Proc. 32(e);⁵ Isom, 85 F.3d at 834. The burden of persuading the court that such a reason exists is on the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 362 F.3d 129, 134 (1st Cir.2004); cf. Browne, 318 F.3d at 265 (holding that court need hear additional evidence in support of a change of plea only if there was an adequate tender by defendant). Rodríguez has offered no authority to support his contention that, despite this burden, the district court was under an affirmative obligation to inquire further into his reasons for dissatisfaction with his plea.

We turn now to an evaluation of the reasons offered by defense counsel. We have identified several factors that must be considered in determining whether a defendant has shown a "fair and just reason" for withdrawing a plea,

the most significant of which is whether the plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent within the meaning of [Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11]. The other factors include 1) the force and plausibility of the proffered reason; 2) the timing of the request; 3) whether the defendant has asserted his legal innocence; and 4) whether the parties had reached a plea agreement.

Isom, 85 F.3d at 834 (quoting United States v. Cotal-Crespo, 47 F.3d 1, 3-4 (1st Cir.1995) (internal citations omitted)). If these factors...