Lawson v. Smith
Decision Date | 17 October 1975 |
Docket Number | No. C-75-1382-CBR.,C-75-1382-CBR. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of California |
Parties | William LAWSON, Jr., and Donna Lawson, Plaintiffs, v. Paul M. SMITH et al., Defendants. |
Pettit, Evers & Martin, Neil H. O'Donnell, Michael Braunstein, San Francicso, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Philip M. Arnot, Eureka, Cal., for defendants Paul M. Smith, Hope E. Smith, and Hope E. Smith, doing business as Majestic Properties, and Humboldt Land Title Co.
McKenna & Fitting, Charles G. Miller, Martin H. Kresse, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant Marina Federal Savings and Loan Assn.
Mahin & Schrenk, Carol A. Atkinson, San Francisco, Cal., for defendant Emma Cox Alcala.
Plaintiffs have brought this action to invalidate a trustee's deed of sale conveying title to a certain parcel of land located within Humboldt County, California, to defendants Paul M. and Hope E. Smith, and have invoked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. They allege that defendants Smith purchased the land at a foreclosure sale held by defendant Humboldt Land Title Company pursuant to California Civil Code §§ 2924 through 2924h, but that the deed issuing from that sale is void and ineffective to convey title since those statutory provisions governing non-judicial foreclosure sales are unconstitutional under the due process clauses of both the Federal and State Constitutions. Plaintiffs further allege that the deed is void on the grounds of bad faith, fraud, negligence and general principles of equity. They seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages in excess of $500,000 and costs of suit. All defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction.1 The matter was argued at a hearing on September 25, 1975, with all parties represented by counsel.
In order for jurisdiction to arise under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 two requirements must be met. First, the matter in controversy must exceed the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and second, the complaint must present a substantial federal question. It is the second requirement that defendants contend is lacking here.
The precise question before the Court — whether a challenge on due process grounds to California's nonjudicial foreclosure sale procedures presents a substantial federal question — was considered and answered in the affirmative by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit in Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank, 483 F. 2d 1074, 1077 (9 Cir. 1973). That case, which inexplicably none of the parties brought to the attention of the Court, is binding authority on the question of this Court's jurisdiction unless distinguishable from the instant case. That court held that the constitutional question presented was not "obviously without merit" in light of recent decisions concerning fundamental due process, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 84 S.Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969); Randone v. Appellate Dept. of S. Ct. of Sacramento Co., 5 Cal.3d 536, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13 (1971). It further stated that the question there presented was not clearly foreclosed by previous decisions which "leave no room for the inference that the question sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy", Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 32, 54 S.Ct. 3, 4, 78 L.Ed. 152 (1933). The only ground for distinguishing Garfinkle is that subsequent to that decision more recent decisions, e.g., Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U. S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974), may have so altered the current state of the law as to require the Court to give a contrary answer to the jurisdictional question.
Even were this Court predisposed to examine the extent, if any, to which Mitchell has limited the application of Fuentes and its progeny, such an approach would be wrong, for it would be based on a misconception of what is meant by a holding that a constitutional claim is "obviously without merit". As the court emphasized in Garfinkle, and the Supreme Court in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), the relevant consideration in determining whether the district court has jurisdiction is not whether plaintiff's cause of action lacks merit:
Bell v. Hood, supra, 327 U.S. at 682, 66 S.Ct. at 776.
Thus, Garfinkle is indistinguishable from this case. Therefore, the Court holds that the instant complaint presents a substantial federal question and that jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
After concluding that the Court had jurisdiction in Garfinkle, the Court of Appeals went on to hold that the doctrine of abstention should be applied in that case. Garfinkle, supra, 483 F.2d at 1078. Although abstention was deemed proper in Garfinkle, this Court feels that it should reach the merits of plaintiffs' constitutional claim at this time, for the following reasons.
While the Court would normally abstain as Garfinkle directs, it fails to see what issues remain to be considered by the state courts.
Furthermore, federal case law has developed subsequent to the decision in Garfinkle upholding the constitutionality of foreclosure statutes analogous to California's statute. See, e.g., Bryant v. Jefferson Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C.Cir. 1974); Law v. United States Department of Agriculture, 366 F.Supp. 1233, 1239 (N. D.Ga.1973). Even the case upon which plaintiffs rely heavily in support of their claim of unconstitutionality held that a similar foreclosure statute was not invalid on its face. Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Association, 372 F. Supp. 594, 598 (E.D.Mich.1974). See also Adams v. Southern California First National Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330 (9 Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006, 95 S.Ct. 325, 42 L.Ed.2d 282 (1974) ( ), decided subsequent to Garfinkle.
Turning to the merits of plaintiffs' claim, the Court agrees with those other courts, cited supra at 854, which have examined and upheld the constitutionality of similar nonjudicial foreclosure sale statutes on the ground that such procedures do not involve state action. The reasoning is clearly and amply set forth in Bryant v. Jefferson Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, supra, and elsewhere. Briefly, however, the Court notes that plaintiffs have set forth two grounds on which a finding of state action could be based: (1) sections 2924 through 2924h of the California Civil Code encourage private parties to act in a particular way, and therefore involve state action; and (2) the participation of the county recorder in nonjudicial foreclosure sales involves state action.
While it is true that under certain circumstances state action may be found when the state encourages parties to act in a certain way, Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375-376, 87 S.Ct. 1627, 18 L.Ed.2d 830 (1967), the test is whether there has been significant state involvement. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972); Adams v. Southern California First National Bank, supra, 492 F.2d at 330. "Statutes and laws regulate many forms of purely private activity, such as contractual relations and gifts, and subjecting all behavior that conforms to state law to the Fourteenth Amendment would emasculate the state action concept." Id. at 330-331. Both Hertz and Bryant held that the degree of state involvement in nonjudicial foreclosure sales is not sufficiently significant to make that conduct state action. U. S. Hertz, Inc. v. Niobrara Farms, supra, ...
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