Keiver v. Pennsylvania In re Barbara Burrus et al., Petitioners

• Decision Date: 21 June 1971
• Docket Number: Nos. 322,128,s. 322
• Parties: Joseph McKEIVER and Edward Terry, Appellants, v. State of PENNSYLVANIA. In re Barbara BURRUS et al., Petitioners
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

403 U.S. 528

91 S.Ct. 1976

29 L.Ed.2d 647

Joseph McKEIVER and Edward Terry, Appellants,

v State of PENNSYLVANIA. In re Barbara BURRUS et al., Petitioners.

Nos. 322, 128.

Argued Dec. 9 and 10, 1970.

Decided June 21, 1971.

Syllabus

The requests of appellants in No. 322 for a jury trial were denied, and they were adjudged juvenile delinquents under Pennsylvania law. The State Supreme Court, while recognizing the applicability to juveniles of certain due process procedural safeguards, held that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial in juvenile court. Appellants argue for a right to a jury trial because they were tried in proceedings 'substantially similar to a criminal trial,' and note that the press is generally present at the trial and that members of the public also enter the courtroom. Petitioners in No. 128 were adjudged juvenile delinquents in North Carolina, where their jury trial requests were denied and in proceedings where the general public was excluded. Held: A trial by jury is not constitutionally required in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding. Pp. 540—551, 553—556.

438 Pa. 339, 265 A.2d 350 and 275 N.C. 517, 169 S.E.2d 879, affirmed.

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice WHITE, concluded that:

1. The applicable due process standard in juvenile proceedings is fundamental fairness, as developed by In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, and In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, which emphasized factfinding procedures, but in our legal system the jury is not a necessary component of accurate factfinding. P. 543.

2. Despite disappointments, failures, and shortcomings in the juvenile court procedure, a jury trial is not constitutionally required in a juvenile court's adjudicative stage. Pp. 545—550.

(a) The Court has not heretofore ruled that all rights constitutionally assured to an adult accused are to be imposed in a juvenile proceeding. P. 545.

(b) Compelling a jury trial might remake the proceeding into a fully adversary process and effectively end the idealistic prospect of an intimate informal protective proceeding. P. 545.

(c) Imposing a jury trial on the juvenile court system would not remedy the system's defects and would not greatly the factfinding function. P. 547.

(d) The States should be free to experiment to achieve the high promise of the juvenile court concept, and they may install a jury system; or a juvenile court judge may use an advisory jury in a particular case. P. 547.

(e) Many States by statute or judicial decision deny a juvenile a right to jury trial, and the great majority that have faced that issue since Gault, supra, and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, have concluded that the considerations involved in those cases do not compel trial by jury in juvenile court. Pp. 548—549.

(f) Jury trial would entail delay, formality, and clamor of the adversary system, and possibly a public trial. P. 550.

(g) Equating the adjudicative phase of the juvenile proceeding with a criminal trial ignores the aspects of fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention inherent in the juvenile court system. P. 550.

Mr. Justice BRENNAN concluded that:

Due process in juvenile delinquency proceedings, which are not 'criminal prosecutions,' does not require the States to provide jury trials on demand so long as some other aspect of the process adequately protects the interests that Sixth Amendment jury trials are intended to serve. In the juvenile context, those interests may be adequately protected by allowing accused individuals to bring the community's attention to bear upon their trials. Since Pennsylvania has no statutory bar to public juvenile trials, and since no claim is made that members of the public were excluded over appellants' objections, the judgment in No. 322 should be affirmed. Pp. 553—556.

Mr. Justice HARLAN concurred in the judgments in these cases on the ground that criminal jury trials are not constitutionally required of the States, either by the Sixth Amendment or by due process. P. 557.

No. 322:

Daniel E. Farmer, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellants.

Arlen Specter, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellee.

Michael Meltsner, New York City, for petitioners.

Robert Morgan, Raleigh, N.C., for respondent.

Alfred L. Scanlan, Washington, D.C., for National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, amicus curiae.

[Amici curiae information intentionally omitted.]

Mr. Justice BLACKMUN announced the judgments of the Court and an opinion in which THE CHIEF JUSTICE, Mr. Justice STEWART, and Mr. Justice WHITE join.

These cases present the narrow but precise issue whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment assures the right to trial by jury in the adjudicative phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding.

I

The issue arises understandably, for the Court in a series of cases already has emphasized due process factors protective of the juvenile:

1. Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948), concerned the admissibility of a confession taken from a 15-year-old boy on trial for first-degree murder. It was held that upon the facts there developed, the Due Process Clause barred the use of the confession. Mr. Justice Douglas, in an opinion in which three other Justices joined, said, 'Neither man nor child can be allowed to stand condemned by methods which flout constitutional requirements of due process of law.' 332 U.S., at 601, 68 S.Ct., at 304.

2. Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962) where a 14-year-old was on trial, is to the same effect.

3. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), concerned a 16-year-old charged with housebreaking, robbery, and rape in the District of Columbia. The issue was the propriety of the juvenile court's waiver of jurisdiction 'after full investigation,' as permitted by the applicable statute. It was emphasized that the latitude the court possessed within which to determine whether it should retain or waive jurisdiction 'assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a 'full investigation." 383 U.S., at 553, 86 S.Ct., at 1053.

4. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967), concerned a 15-year-old, already on probation, committed in Arizona as a delinquent after being apprehended upon a complaint of lewd remarks by telephone. Mr. Justice Fortas, in writing for the Court, reviewed the cases just cited and observed.

'Accordingly, while these cases relate only to restricted aspects of the subject, they unmistakably indicate that, whatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.' 387 U.S., at 13, 87 S.Ct., at 1436.

The Court focused on 'the proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a 'delinquent' as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution' and, as to this, said that 'there appears to be little current dissent from the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to play.' Ibid. Kent was adhered to: 'We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court adjudication of 'delinquency,' as a requirement which is part of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of our Constitution.' Id., at 30—31, 87 S.Ct., at 1445. Due process, in that proceeding, was held to embrace adequate written notice; advice as to the right to counsel, retained or appointed; confrontation; and cross-examination. The privilege against self-incrimination was also held available to the juvenile. The Court refrained from deciding whether a State must provide appellate review in juvenile cases or a transcript or recording of the hearings.

5. DeBacker v. Brainard, 396 U.S. 28, 90 S.Ct. 163, 24 L.Ed.2d 148 (1969), presented, by state habeas corpus, a challenge to a Nebraska statute providing that juvenile court hearings 'shall be conducted by the judge without a jury in an informal manner.' However, because that appellant's hearing had antedated the decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522 (1968), and because Duncan and Bloom had been given only prospective application by DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 88 S.Ct. 2093, 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968), DeBacker's case was deemed an inappropriate one for resolution of the jury trial issue. His appeal was therefore dismissed. Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Douglas, in separate dissents, took the position that a juvenile is entitled to a jury trial at the adjudicative stage. Mr. Justice Black described this as 'a right which is surely one of the fundamental aspects of criminal justice in the English-speaking world,' 396 U.S., at 34, 90 S.Ct., at 166 and Mr. Justice Douglas described it as a right required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments 'where the delinquency charged is an offense that, if the person were an adult, would be a crime triable by jury.' 396 U.S., at 35, 90 S.Ct., at 167.

6. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970), concerned a 12-year-old charged with delinquency for having taken money from a woman's purse. The Court held that 'the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged,' 397 U.S., at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 1073, and then went on to hold, at 368, 90 S.Ct., at 1075, that this standard was applicable, too, 'during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding.'

From these six cases—Haley, Gallegos, kent, Gault, DeBacker, and...