Chesapeake Bay Bridge and Tunnel District v. Lauritzen
Decision Date | 02 May 1968 |
Docket Number | No. 11886.,11886. |
Citation | 404 F.2d 1001 |
Parties | CHESAPEAKE BAY BRIDGE AND TUNNEL DISTRICT, Respondent, Appellant, v. J. LAURITZEN, owner M/S BELLA DAN, Libellant; Tidewater Construction Corporation, Raymond International, Inc. and Peter Kiewit Sons' Company, a joint venture, trading as Tidewater-Raymond-Kiewit, and Merritt-Chapman and Scott Corporation, Respondents, Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
R. M. Hughes, III, and Peter W. Martone, Norfolk, Va., (Seawell, McCoy, Winston & Dalton, Norfolk, Va., on brief) for appellant.
Hugh S. Meredith, Norfolk, Va., (Eli Ellis and Francis L. Gannon, New York City, and Vandeventer, Black, Meredith & Martin, Norfolk, Va., and Hill, Betts, Yamaoka, Freehill & Longcope, New York City, on brief) for appellees.
Before HAYNSWORTH, Chief Judge, BRYAN, Circuit Judge, and RUSSELL, District Judge.
The M/S Bella Dan, a merchantman hailing from Denmark, suffered hull damage on May 21, 1965 when snagged by a submerged obstruction at the bridge-tunnel spanning Chesapeake Bay, just within the Virginia capes. In the suit of the Danish shipowner, J. Lauritzen, against the owner-operator of the facility, the Bridge-Tunnel District, a body corporate and politic of the State, judgment went against the defendant.
In its decree the District Court overruled the defenses of sovereign immunity generally and under the Eleventh Amendment,1 acquitted the vessel of any want of care, and found the defendant the creator of this hazard to shipping. On appeal, while confessing liability if it can be sued, the defendant revives its claim of immunity and, alternatively lest this defense not succeed, lays concurring fault to the vessel — to make her bear a share of her damages. We refuse immunity, but we find the vessel also to blame.
The facts are beyond critical dispute. For present purposes the bridge-tunnel may be considered as running north and south. The principal Bay passageway for ships in and out of Hampton Roads is Thimble Shoals Channel. It transits the structure, in a general east-west direction, over the sites of the submarine tunnel sections. Thimble Shoals consists of a main channel 1000 feet in width, with an adjacent auxiliary channel of 450 feet on each side. The auxiliaries — the north for inbound and the south for outbound traffic — provide passage for vessels of 20 feet draft or less, as these are forbidden the main channel. The incident in suit occurred in or along the waters between the north shore and the north boundary of the north auxiliary. The location is also fixed as at the south end of North Island, one of the artificial causeways of the bridge-tunnel.
I. Before looking at the specifics of the causative events of the misadventure, the suability of the Tunnel District ought first to be demonstrated. Paragraphed, the defense is this. The District is a political subdivision of the State — the same status accorded a city, town or county. It is organized to perform an essential governmental function, i. e. provision of a State highway connecting the eastern peninsula of Virginia with the mainland. Indeed, the organic act gives the District a definite territory, including in its compass the counties, cities and towns situate at each end of the construction as well as the "area of Chesapeake Bay between" these termini. It thus enjoys the same optional exemption from a tort action as does the State. Elizabeth River Tunnel District v. Beecher, 202 Va. 452, 117 S.E.2d 685, 85 A.L.R.2d 469 (1961). Nor can consent to suit be extracted from the "sue-and-be-sued" or the "plead and be impleaded" clause of the siring statute. Id. at 689. This is State law but, in addition, because of the libellant's foreign citizenship, the United States courts are withdrawn as a forum by the Eleventh Amendment.
Nevertheless, libellant's replication must prevail — the State obstacle and the Constitutional impediment are both waivable and they have been disclaimed. Virginia relinquished both of these pleas by seeking and obtaining admission into an exclusive Federal realm — interstate and foreign commerce. Art. I, Sec. 8, U.S. Constitution. Necessarily, the State recognized that she built in the Bay only by sufferance of the Federal government. This acknowledgment is conclusively evidenced by her petition for permission pursuant to the act of Congress, 33 U.S.C. § 401 et seq., to occupy navigable waters with bridges and tunnels. The supplication of the State, and her reception into the Federal domain, meant surrender, pro tanto and pro tempore, of State sovereignty and submission to the paramount overlordship of the United States during the tenancy.
To begin with, whether Virginia's entry into the Federal province amounts to consent to be sued, and to be sued in the United States court, is a question of Federal law. Hence, the decision of the State court upon the State's invulnerability to suit is not conclusive in resolving the relationship of the State and the plaintiff in a dispute arising in the Federal zone. This was the declaration of Parden v. Terminal R. Co. of Ala., 377 U.S. 184, 196, 84 S.Ct. 1207, 1215, 12 L.Ed.2d 233 (1964):
"Where a State\'s consent to suit is alleged to arise from an act not wholly within its own sphere of authority but within a sphere — whether it be interstate compacts or interstate commerce — subject to the constitutional power of the Federal Government, the question whether the State\'s act constitutes the alleged consent is one of federal law."
Furthermore:
Ibid.
Congressional regulation allows causes involving activities in and upon the navigable waterways of the Nation to be adjudicated in the admiralty. 28 U.S.C. § 1333. Accordingly, we think liability of the Tunnel District to the Danish suitor upon the maritime tort was justiciable in the chosen instant court.
II. For an understanding of the negligence taxed to the Bella Dan, the circumstances and events of her misfortune must be particularized. These, as closely recounted in the findings of the District Court, point to its happening in this way:
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