Holt v. United States, 9859.

Decision Date24 February 1969
Docket NumberNo. 9859.,9859.
Citation404 F.2d 914
PartiesJoseph Daniel HOLT, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

H. A. Leatherman, Oklahoma City, Okl., for appellant.

John E. Green, Asst. U. S. Atty., for appellee (B. Andrew Potter, U. S. Atty., was with him on the brief).

Before MURRAH, Chief Judge, and HILL and SETH, Circuit Judges.

Certiorari Denied February 24, 1969. See 89 S.Ct. 872.

HILL, Circuit Judge.

Appellant was tried to a jury and convicted of the unlawful possession of counterfeit money in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472. Judgment was entered upon the jury verdict and sentence was pronounced from which this appeal was taken.

The three points made here all go to the admission of evidence during the course of the trial. Appellant contends: (1) that certain evidence obtained from his person at the time of his arrest was obtained through an illegal search and seizure and should have been excluded; (2) that a tape recording of a conversation had with an informant shortly before this arrest was obtained pursuant to an unreasonable search and seizure and should likewise have been excluded; and (3) that certain palm-fingerprint evidence should not have been admitted because it was obtained from a previous trial of appellant on a different counterfeiting charge and one in which the court had directed a verdict of "not guilty" in favor of appellant.

Appellant was arrested without a warrant on June 14, 1967, at the Will Rogers World Airport, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma by Special Agent Copeland of the United States Secret Service for possession of counterfeit money. Upon searching the appellant, Agent Copeland uncovered a package containing 150 counterfeit $100.00 Federal Reserve Notes. It is the admission of these notes into evidence that appellant asserts as one of the errors on appeal.

The circumstances surrounding the arrest are that an informant had arranged to purchase counterfeit money at a meeting to be had with the appellant at the airport in Oklahoma City. The informant having been in contact with the Secret Service, a team of such agents began their surveillance of appellant approximately one week before the contemplated meeting. On the morning of the arrest the informant met with agents in Dallas, Texas, where a miniature electronic recording device was concealed on his person. The informant was also searched at that time and no counterfeit currency was found. Shortly thereafter, in the company of Agent Edward Moore, the informant boarded an airplane for the flight to Oklahoma.

Contemporaneously with the activity in Dallas, the agents conducting the surveillance of the appellant in Oklahoma, convened at the airport. Upon the arrival and deboarding of the informant and Agent Moore, each agent was stationed at a strategic location within the terminal building of the airport. The informant went into the airport coffee shop where he was observed in conversation with the appellant. This conversation was overheard in part by other agents listening over a receiver that had been set up to receive the transmissions of the recording device carried by the informant. The two men then separated, whereupon the informant stated to one Agent McWerthy that "he's in the phone booth and he's got it on him." This information was relayed to other agents who in turn relayed this fact to Agent Copeland who made the arrest and search at issue here.

During the trial the Government presented the testimony of the various Secret Service Agents involved. The cumulative effect of this testimony was to establish the facts as set forth above. After the Government rested its case, appellant testifying in his own behalf, related the facts of various previous criminal convictions involving assorted illegal acts. Appellant also testified that the informant had given him the money to finance the purchase of used automobiles and that he was unaware that the money was counterfeit. On rebuttal the informant related his role in the case and flatly denied having given the money to appellant. It was at this time that the tape recording of the airport conversation between the informant and appellant was played in open court to the jury. It is admitted that this recording was largely unintelligible and inaudible. Appellant assigns as his second basis of appeal, the admission of this recording into evidence.

The Government then proceeded to introduce palm-fingerprint evidence that had been withdrawn from a criminal trial in a Texas court involving the appellant in a similar counterfeiting charge. Because that trial had previously resulted in a directed verdict in favor of the appellant, he assigns as his third and final ground for appeal, the admission of that evidence.

The search of appellant and the seizure of the counterfeit money were undertaken without the authority of a search warrant and therefore the counterfeit money was admissible into evidence only if it was seized as the result of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.1

The Secret Service is empowered to effectuate a lawful arrest without a warrant only if there is "reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing" a felony. 18 U.S.C. § 3056. "Reasonable grounds" as used in that statute and "probable cause" as used in the Fourth Amendment are substantially equivalent.2 Thus, the ultimate question determining the propriety of the evidentiary allowance is one of probable cause.

This court has "grudgingly sanctioned interception and apprehension of a moving vehicle or person and the search of such vehicle or person for contraband if the enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that the law is being violated in his presence and it is then impractical to secure a warrant."3 Because counterfeit currency is contraband, the mere possession of which is unlawful, the appellant was committing a continuing felony as long as he possessed the counterfeit money. Hence, if the arresting agent had probable cause to believe such felony was being perpetrated, the arrest was proper. The Government, seeking to establish probable cause, relies upon the reliability of the informant as established by his previous dealings with the Secret Service; the corroborative effect of the appellant's appearance at the airport; and the fact of the observance by the arresting officer of a bulge in the appellant's clothing which revealed a brown paper bag wrapped around "something white" exposed through a torn corner of the bag. Appellant contends that the admitted inability of the officer to recognize the contents of the paper bag as counterfeit currency until after a detailed examination had been conducted, reflects a lack of corroboration of the informant's statement, thereby negating the existence of probable cause.

It was established in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), that to constitute probable cause for an arrest it must be shown at the time the officer makes the arrest that the facts and circumstances within his knowledge and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that an offense has been or is being committed. "The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating * * * often opposing interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers' whim or caprice."4 In order to further this policy of accommodating competing policies, courts have allowed statements by a credible informant to constitute the nucleus of the requisite probable cause. In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 269, 80 S.Ct. 725, 735, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), the court, citing Draper, stated: "We have held that the arresting officer may rely upon information received through an informant, rather than upon his direct observations, so long as the informant's statement is reasonably corroborated by other matters within the officer's knowledge." In Draper, the "other matters within the officer's knowledge" were that a reliable informant had indicated that the defendant, who was adequately described, would arrive at a particular place, at a specific time, and would be carrying narcotics. Upon the officer's observation of a man meeting the description given by the informant, the valid arrest was consummated. Similarly, in McCray v. State of Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 87 S.Ct. 1056, 18 L.Ed.2d 62 (1967) the statement of a known informant that the defendant would be at a specific place at a given time was held sufficient probable cause to sustain the subsequent arrest.

In the case at bar the Secret Service agents testified that the informant had provided reliable "tips" in the past. It was also shown that he correctly stated that the appellant would be in the airport at the particular time in question. Consequently, here as in Draper, a reliable informant has indicated that the appellant, who was adequately described, would arrive at a particular place at a specific time, and would be carrying contraband. But here there was even more. Once having conversed with the appellant and being satisfied that he possessed contraband, the informant notified an agent who relayed the information to the arresting officer who in observing the appellant noticed a torn brown sack bulging from the latter's pocket. It is well settled that an agent may rely upon his fellow officers to supply the information which forms the basis of the arresting officer's reasonable grounds for believing that the law is being violated. Hence, the fact that the informant's reliability and his statement that appellant was carrying the currency were provided through the statements of the arresting officer's colleagues, is not...

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