Com. v. Signorine

Decision Date22 March 1989
Citation535 N.E.2d 601,404 Mass. 400
PartiesCOMMONWEALTH v. Louis A. SIGNORINE.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Constance L. Rudnick (Edward R. Gargiulo and Paul Griffin, Boston, with her), for defendant.

Mary Ellen O'Sullivan, Asst. Dist. Atty., for Com.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

On April 15, 1986, a jury convicted the defendant, Louis A. Signorine, of trafficking in cocaine in excess of 100 grams but less than 200 grams, and unlawful possession of marihuana. The judge ordered the unlawful possession of marihuana conviction placed on file. The defendant appealed to the Appeals Court. A single justice of that court stayed execution of the defendant's sentence pending appeal. We transferred the case here on our own motion.

The defendant challenges his cocaine trafficking conviction on several grounds. He argues that the judge erred in (1) denying his motion to suppress physical evidence, (2) refusing to permit an inquiry into an informant's identity, (3) curtailing the defendant's cross-examination of prosecution witnesses regarding the informant, (4) admitting the defendant's inculpatory statement made during a telephone call at the police station, and (5) instructing the jury on circumstantial evidence. We affirm.

On August 30, 1984, two detectives with the Brockton police department applied for and received a warrant authorizing the search of the defendant's residence, as well as two automobiles on the premises. The warrant authorized a search for: "white powder substance, cocaine, as being defined as a controlled substance under [G.L. c. 94C], and scales, packaging materials, drug records, cash." The affidavit in support of the warrant indicated that the police had received information from a confidential, reliable informant regarding the informant's purchase of cocaine from a man named "Louie" at the defendant's address. The affidavit also contained information from the informant that the house was "loaded"; that one pound of cocaine was to be delivered that evening; that the informant "observed a gray Lincoln [automobile] containing a white male, drive up to the house and exit the vehicle carrying an attache case"; and that a "short period of time later, this individual got into the Lincoln, empty-handed."

As the officers assigned to execute the warrant were enroute to the defendant's house, they observed the defendant driving an automobile described in the warrant. Two officers stopped the defendant, and the defendant agreed to return to his house with the officers. The search of the house disclosed a glassine bag of marihuana and a small plastic vial containing "the butt ends of several marihuana cigarettes," a glassine bag containing .4 grams of cocaine, three bottles of vitamin B complex, a known cutting agent in the packaging of cocaine, a mirror with two line indentations, a playing card, and two cut straws. A search of the automobile the defendant was driving, which was registered in his wife's name, revealed a hollowed-out oil can in a grocery bag. The oil can contained a white rock substance which, when analyzed, consisted of 112.2 grams of ninety-eight per cent pure cocaine.

The defendant was arrested and taken to the police station. In the course of a telephone conversation, in the presence of one of the detectives, the defendant stated, "Lou, I'm under arrest at the police station for doing what Debbie told me I was going to get caught doing."

1. Motion to suppress physical evidence. The defendant argues that the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant should be suppressed because the affidavit lacked sufficient probable cause to support a search of both the defendant's residence and the automobiles described in the warrant. In reference to the authorized search of the automobiles the judge ruled: "[S]ince the magistrate had probable cause to believe the defendant dealt with illegal drugs, it is not unreasonable to extend that connection and infer that the contraband could be in defendant's automobile." On appeal, the defendant challenges the denial of his motion only as it relates to the contraband seized from the automobile arguing (1) that the affidavit failed to set forth facts upon which the magistrate could conclude there was probable cause to believe the automobile would contain contraband, and (2) that, in these circumstances, the search of the automobile was prohibited by art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights because the warrant, to the extent it included the automobiles, was not based on probable cause. We conclude that the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of a particularly described residence includes any automobiles, owned or controlled by the owner of such residence, which are located within the curtilage of the premises at the time the warrant is executed. 1

The defendant concedes that the affidavit established sufficient probable cause authorizing a search for controlled substances of the residence belonging to the defendant and his wife. Once the warrant authorizes the search, "[a] lawful search of [a] fixed premises generally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found and is not limited by the possibility that separate acts of entry or opening may be required to complete the search." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 820-821, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2170-2171, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). In Ross, the Supreme Court noted "a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found." Id. at 821, 102 S.Ct. at 2171.

It is a well-settled principle under both Federal law and the law of other jurisdictions that the scope of a warrant authorizing the search of a particularly described premises, includes automobiles owned or controlled by the owner thereof, which are found on the premises. See, e.g., United States v. Asselin, 775 F.2d 445, 447 (1st Cir.1985) (search warrant for premises justified search of disabled automobile parked adjacent to carport); United States v Bulgatz, 693 F.2d 728, 730 n. 3 (8th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 1203, 75 L.Ed.2d 444 (1983) (warrant for premises authorized search of automobile parked in attached garage); United States v. Freeman, 685 F.2d 942, 955 (5th Cir.1982) (warrant authorizing search of premises justified search of automobile parked on premises); United States v. Cole, 628 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1043, 101 S.Ct. 1763, 68 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981) (search of truck parked in carport attached to rear apartment authorized by warrant); United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920, 97 S.Ct. 316, 50 L.Ed.2d 287 (1976) (search of camper parked in driveway authorized by warrant); Brooks v. United States, 416 F.2d 1044, 1050 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Nipp v. United States, 400 U.S. 840, 91 S.Ct. 81, 27 L.Ed.2d 75 (1970) (warrant authorizing search of cabin and lot included automobile parked near cabin). See also United States v. Griffin, 827 F.2d 1108, 1113 n. 3 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 909, 108 S.Ct. 1085, 99 L.Ed.2d 243 (1988); United States v. Bonner, 808 F.2d 864, 868 (1st Cir.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1006, 107 S.Ct. 1632, 95 L.Ed.2d 205 (1987); In re One 1970 Ford Van, 111 Ariz. 522, 523, 533 P.2d 1157 (1975); People v. Elliott, 77 Cal.App.3d 673, 689, 144 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1978); Louis v. State, 188 Ga.App. 435, 437, 373 S.E.2d 231 (1988); Massey v. Commonwealth, 305 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Ky.Ct.App.1957); State v. Lewis, 270 N.W.2d 891, 897 (Minn.1978); State v. Reid, 286 N.C. 323, 326, 210 S.E.2d 422 (1974); Leslie v. State, 294 P.2d 854, 855-856 (Okla.Crim.App.1956); Long v. State, 532 S.W.2d 591, 595-596 (Tex.Crim.App.1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 937, 96 S.Ct. 1670, 48 L.Ed.2d 179 (1976).

Thus, the issue before us is whether art. 14 affords the defendant any greater protection in these circumstances. 2 In other contexts we have read the description of the premises to be searched in a commonsense rather than hypertechnical fashion so as to include areas not specifically mentioned in the warrant and areas where the police lacked independent probable cause to suspect that the object of the search would be found. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Scala, 380 Mass. 500, 508-509, 404 N.E.2d 83 (1980); Commonwealth v. Snow, 363 Mass. 778, 790, 298 N.E.2d 804 (1973). See also Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 21 Mass.App.Ct. 565, 567-568, 488 N.E.2d 42 (1986). Compare Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790, 799-800 & n. 11, 323 N.E.2d 319 (1975). We note that here, in searching the automobile at the residence, the police did not rely solely on the description of the residence. Rather, the warrant specifically described the automobile as one of the places to be searched as recommended by the decisions authorizing the search of an automobile found on the premises. See, e.g., United States v. Percival, 756 F.2d 600, 612 (7th Cir.1985).

It is clear that a valid search may include any area, place, or container reasonably capable of containing the object of the search. Commonwealth v. Wills, 398 Mass. 768, 774, 500 N.E.2d 1341 (1986). Commonwealth v. Lett, 393 Mass. 141, 147-148, 470 N.E.2d 110 (1984). There is nothing in art. 14 or the particularity requirement of G.L. c. 276, § 2 (1986 ed.), that requires that automobiles found on the premises be treated differently. "Although a car is less fixed than a closet or cabinet ... it is no less fixed than a suitcase or handbag found on the premises, both of which can be readily searched under [United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982) ] if capable of containing the object of the search." United States v. Percival, supra, at 612. Here, the object of the search was moveable contraband that...

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