Meeks v. Papadopulos

Citation62 Ohio St.2d 187,16 O.O.3d 212,404 N.E.2d 159
Decision Date14 May 1980
Docket NumberNos. 79-1294,79-1299 and 79-1308,s. 79-1294
Parties, 16 O.O.3d 212, 92 Lab.Cas. P 55,308 MEEKS et al., Appellants, v. PAPADOPULOS, Sheriff, et al., Appellees. ALDERUCCI et al., Appellees, v. STOKES, Sheriff, et al., Appellants.
CourtOhio Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

R.C. 4111.03 of the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act does not require the payment of overtime compensation to any member of a police or fire protection agency working for an employer as defined in R.C. 4111.01(D), as such persons were not intended by the General Assembly to be employees within the meaning of R.C. 4111.01(E)(7).

Plaintiffs-appellants in case Nos. 79-1294 and 79-1308 are current or former full-time deputy sheriffs of Stark County who initiated actions in the Court of Common Pleas of Stark County to obtain overtime compensation under R.C. 4111.03 of the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act. 1 Upon the filing of the complaints, defendants-appellees filed motions to dismiss on the grounds that they were exempt from the operation of R.C. 4111.03 by virtue of 4111.01(E) (7). The trial court in each case sustained appellees' motion. Appeals were instituted to the Court of Appeals for Stark County and, upon motion, the actions were consolidated. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals found the payment of overtime to police and fire protection personnel inconsistent with "governmental and political facts of life" and with the "demands of the service of police protection and fire protection," concluding by virtue of R.C. 4111.01(E)(7) that police and fire protection personnel were exempt from the overtime compensation provisions of R.C. 4111.03.

Plaintiffs-appellees in case No. 79-1299 filed a class action against defendants-appellants, the Hamilton County Sheriff et al., seeking compensatory damages for work performed in excess of 40 hours a week. Appellees' suit was premised upon the contention that they were entitled, under the provisions of R.C. 4111.03, to one and one-half times their wage rate for hours worked in excess of 40 in one work week. In response to appellants' motion to dismiss the complaint, the trial court ruled that it was the intent of the General Assembly under R.C. 4111.01(E)(7) to exempt members of police or fire protection agencies from the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act and granted the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals for Hamilton County reversed, finding the language of R.C. 4111.01(E)(7) to be "plain and unambiguous," and excluding "only members of a police or fire protection agency employed on a part time or seasonal basis by a political subdivision of this state * * * "

The Court of Appeals for Stark County, finding its judgment in case No. 79-1294 to be in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County in case No. 79-1299, certified the record of the cause to this court pursuant to Section 3(B)(4) of Article IV of the Constitution of Ohio. Case No. 79-1299 is before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record, as is case No. 79-1308.

These cases have been consolidated by this court for purposes of review and final determination.

Procario, Anthony & Young, Gary J. Procario, Cross & Rose and Richard S. Dodson, Jr., Canton, for appellants in case Nos. 79-1294 and 79-1308.

James R. Unger, Pros. Atty., and Loren E. Souers, Jr., Canton, for appellees in case Nos. 79-1294 and 79-1308.

Brannon & Cox and Dwight D. Brannon, Dayton, for amicus curiae Ohio Fraternal Order of Police in case Nos. 79-1294 and 79-1308.

Sirkin, Pinales & Schwartz, H. Louis Sirkin and Howard M. Schwartz, Cincinnati, for appellees in case No. 79-1299.

Simon L. Leis, Jr., Pros. Atty. and James W. Harper, Cincinnati, for appellants in case No. 79-1299.

HERBERT, Justice.

The fundamental issue presented by this cause is the extent to which a member of a police or fire protection agency who works for an employer 2 in this state is entitled to overtime compensation under R.C. 4111.03 of the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act. It is argued that the General Assembly did not intend, under R.C. 4111.01(E)(7), 3 to exclude all members of police and fire protection agencies from the overtime compensation provisions of R.C. 4111.03. Instead, it is contended that the statute excludes only members of police or fire protection agencies employed on a part time or seasonal basis. Appellants in case Nos. 79-1294 and 79-1308 urge that to exclude all members of police or fire protection agencies from the statutory overtime compensation would constitute a denial of their property rights in violation of due process, and would deprive them of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

In Sears v. Weimer (1944), 143 Ohio St. 312, 55 N.E.2d 413, paragraph five of the syllabus states that, "(w)here the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning there is no occasion for * * * (resort) to rules of statutory interpretation. An unambiguous statute is to be applied, not interpreted." The same principle was expressed in a different manner in Carmelite Sisters, St. Rita's Home v. Bd. of Review (1969), 18 Ohio St.2d 41, 247 N.E.2d 477, where this court indicated, at page 46, 247 N.E.2d at page 480, that " * * * legislative intent may be inquired into only if the enactment is ambiguous upon its face." Where a statute is found to be subject to various interpretations, however, a court called upon to interpret its provisions may invoke rules of statutory construction in order to arrive at legislative intent. Henry v. Central Natl. Bank (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342; Carter v. Youngstown (1946), 146 Ohio St. 203, 65 N.E.2d 63; Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer (1929), 120 Ohio St. 568, 166 N.E. 808.

The disagreement among the trial and appellate courts below, and others, 4 indicates strongly that R.C. 4111.01(E)(7) is ambiguous. Our perusal of the briefs and arguments herein brings us to that conclusion.

In adopting rules of statutory construction formulated by the judiciary, the General Assembly has enacted R.C. 1.49:

"If a statute is ambiguous, the court, in determining the intention of the legislature, may consider among other matters:

"(A) The object sought to be attained;

"(B) The circumstances under which the statute was enacted;

"(C) The legislative history "(D) The common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the same or similar subjects;

"(E) The consequences of a particular construction;

"(F) The administrative construction of the statute."

Appellees in case Nos. 79-1294 and 79-1308 have proffered for the record certified copies of the Ohio Legislative Service Commission's analysis of Sub.H.B.No. 201, R.C. 4111.01 et seq., during the time it was introduced, voted upon, and passed by the Ohio Senate and House of Representatives. Although this court is not bound by such analyses, we may refer to them when we find them helpful and objective. This legislative history indicates that the commission, in analyzing the bill and explicating the classes of employers or employees to be exempted from the operation of R.C. 4111.01 et seq., informed the members of the General Assembly that Sub.H.B.No. 201 excluded "public employers of police and fire protection personnel * * *." To the same effect is the 1973-74 Legislative Service Commission's Summary of Legislative Enactments. 5 See ITT Canteen Corp. v. Porterfield (1972), 30 Ohio St.2d 155, 158, 283 N.E.2d 124; Weiss v. Porterfield (1971), 27 Ohio St.2d 117, 120, 271 N.E.2d 792. "(S)tatutes are to be read in the light of attendant circumstances and conditions, and are to be construed as they were intended to be understood, when they were passed." Miller v. Fairley (1943), 141 Ohio St. 327, 48 N.E.2d 217, paragraph two of the syllabus.

In State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt (1956), 164 Ohio St. 463, 466, 132 N.E.2d 191, 194, it was stated that " * * * statutes relating to the same matter or subject, although passed at different times and making no reference to each other, are in pari materia and should be read together to ascertain and effectuate if possible the legislative intent. 37 Ohio Jurisprudence 599, Section 332; Thoman v. Farmers & Bankers Life Ins. Co., 155 Kan. 806, 130 P.2d 551; State ex rel. Carlton v. Weed, 208 Minn. 342, 294 N.W. 370." The basis for this rule is that the General Assembly, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have been aware of other statutory provisions concerning the subject matter of the enactment even if they are found in separate sections of the Code. See State ex rel. Darby v. Hadaway (1925), 113 Ohio St. 658-659, 150 N.E. 36. It is accepted that in arriving at legislative intent, such related provisions should be reconciled with the enactments in question, if possible. Trotwood Trailers, Inc. v. Evatt (1943), 142 Ohio St. 197, 51 N.E.2d 645; State ex rel. O'Neil v. Griffith (1940), 136 Ohio St. 526, 27 N.E.2d 142.

That the General Assembly intended to exclude all police and fire personnel from the operation of R.C. 4111.01(E)(7) is borne out by the conflict which would otherwise emerge between R.C. 4111.03 and statutes in effect at the time of the adoption of the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act. Under R.C. 4111.03, compensation for "employees," as defined by R.C. 4111.01(E)(7), is fixed at one and one-half times the normal wage rate for hours worked by that "employee" in excess of 40 hours in one work week. Although the word "week" is not defined by the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, R.C. 1.44(A) provides that " '(w)eek' means seven consecutive days." Thus, a "work week" under R.C. 4111.03 apparently consists of 40 hours of work in 7 consecutive days. However, under R.C. 737.07 6 a work week is expressly defined to mean work not in excess of 44 hours. A similar inconsistency is evident when R.C....

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