In the Matter of Larry Little. — 244
| Decision Date | 24 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 71,71 |
| Citation | 30 L.Ed.2d 708,92 S.Ct. 659,404 U.S. 553 |
| Parties | In the Matter of Larry LITTLE. —244 |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Petitioner was convicted of committing a direct contempt of a judge of the District Court Division of the Forsyth County, North Carolina, General Court of Justice. He was sentenced to 30 days in jail as summary punishment authorized by General Statutes of North Carolina §§ 5—1(1) and 5—6. He sought habeas corpus in the Superior Court Division of the General Court. That court denied relief after hearing oral argument but without receiving evidence. Both the North Carolina Court of Appeals and the North Carolina Supreme Court, 181 S.E.2d 602 denied review by certiorari.
Neither the order of the District Court nor the judgment of the Superior Court details the events leading to the conviction. The petition recites these events, however, and the State's response does not challenge the accuracy of the recital. Petitioner's trial on a charge of carrying a concealed weapon was scheduled for March 8, 1971, in the District Court at Winston-Salem. Petitioner appeared and filed a written motion for continuance by reason of another trial engagement of his retained counsel in Charlotte. The trial judge denied the motion and proceeded with the trial. Without benefit of counsel petitioner attempted to defend himself. In summation following the close of the evidence petitioner made statements that the court was biased and had prejudged the case and that petitioner was a political prisoner. The trial judge adjudged petitioner in contempt for these statements. The court's order recites that '(t)he Court at this point informed the (petitioner) that he was in contempt as the Court felt that these remarks were very disrespectful and tended to subvert and prevent justice,' and further recites that '(t)he Court concludes on the foregoing facts that the conduct of the (petitioner) and the words spoken by him in the presence of the Court were contemptuous, that they reflected on the integrity of the Court and tended to subvert and prevent justice.'
The order also recites, 'As the defendant was being removed from the courtroom by deputy sheriff (following the contempt adjudication), he spoke out and called the undersigned presiding judge a M_ _ F_ _.' This language in a courtroom is, of course, reprehensible and cannot be tolerated. But this was not relied upon by either the District Court or the Superior Court for the conviction and sentence and the State defends the conviction in this Court without any reference to it. We therefore also lay it aside for the purpose of our decision.
The Superior Court had the District Court order before it but no other evidence. The Superior Court judgment tracks the statutory language in reciting that petitioner's statements 'directly tended to interrupt its proceedings and to impair the respect due the District Court's authority,' and, further, the District Court's conclusion that the statements "reflected on the integrity of the Court and tended to subvert and prevent justice' amounted to a finding by the District Court that the words were wilful and intentionally used and that the words used tended to interrupt the Court's proceedings and to impair the respect due its authority.'*
We hold that in the context of this case petitioner's statements in summation did not constitute criminal contempt. The court's denial of the continuance forced petitioner to argue his own cause. He was therefore clearly entitled to as much latitude in conducting his defense as we have held is enjoyed by counsel vigorously espousing a client's cause. In re McConnell, 370 U.S. 230, 82 S.Ct. 1288, 8 L.Ed.2d 434 (1962). There is no indication, and the State does not argue, that petitioner's statements were uttered in a boisterous tone or in any wise actually disrupted the court proceeding. Therefore, ...
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Buckley, In re
...that reversal of the order before us is compelled by the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in In re Little (1972) 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708. There the contemnor-petitioner, a layman, attempted to act as his own attorney in a state criminal trial, when his r......
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In re Kendall
...Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 281, 44 S.Ct. 103, 68 L.Ed. 293 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting)); see also In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 556, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972) (overturning lawyers' contempt convictions where “[t]heir convictions rest[ed] on nothing whatever except allegations......
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Smith v. United States
...it is uttered inside or outside the courtroom, and whether it concerns pending litigation, all have relevance. See In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708; Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed. 1295; Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 8......
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Kentucky v. Stincer
...in conducting his defense as we have held is enjoyed by counsel vigorously espousing a client's cause." In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555, 92 S.Ct. 659, 660, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972). Given these well-founded constitutional pronouncements, today's decision may create for the criminal defendant a......
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Judicial conduct
...be on guard against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the administration of justice. In the Matter of Little , 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972); Frankel v. Roberts , 165 A.D.2d 382, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dept. 1991). Therefore, trial court judge......
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Judicial conduct
...courtroom, judges must not confuse their own personal annoyances and actual obstruction to the administration of justice. In re Little , 404 U.S. 553, 92 S. Ct. 659, 30 L. Ed. 2d 708 (1972); Frankel v. Roberts , 165 A.D.2d 382, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dept. 1991). Trial court judges must bal......
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Judicial conduct
...judges must not confuse their own personal annoyances and actual obstruction to the administration of justice. In the Matter of Little , 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972); Frankel v. Roberts , 165 A.D.2d 382, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dept. 1991). Trial court judges must balanc......
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Judicial conduct
...judges must not confuse their own personal annoyances and actual obstruction to the administration of justice. In the Matter of Little , 404 U.S. 553, 92 S.Ct. 659, 30 L.Ed.2d 708 (1972); Frankel v. Roberts , 165 A.D.2d 382, 567 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1st Dept. 1991). Trial court judges must balanc......