Moore v. Barnhart

• Decision Date: 12 April 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-13176.,04-13176.
• Citation: 405 F.3d 1208
• Parties: Christi L. MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

405 F.3d 1208

Christi L. MOORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 04-13176.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

April 12, 2005.

Robin N. Bargeron, Macon, GA, Chantal J. Harrington, Bohr & Harrington, LLC, Jacksonville, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Stephen Thompson, Reginald V. Speegle, Dennis R. Williams, Mary Ann Sloan, Douglas Wilson, Office of Gen. Counsel SSA, Atlanta, GA, Hugh Randolph Aderhold, Jr., Macon, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia.

Before BARKETT, HILL and FARRIS^*, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Christi L. Moore appeals the district court's order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security's ("Commissioner") denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefit ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") payments based on a determination that she retained sufficient residual functional capacity to perform her past relevant work. Specifically, Moore takes issue with: (i) the ALJ's failure to credit testimony from her treating physicians; (ii) the ALJ's reference to an absence of objective medical evidence; (iii) the ALJ's ultimate determination that she remained able to perform the full range of light work; and (iv) the ALJ's failure to comply with regulations on the methodology for evaluating mental impairments. We find the ALJ's failure to properly evaluate Moore's psychological impairments requires remand.

BACKGROUND

In February 1994, Moore applied for DIB, claiming disability from fibromyalgia, separation of the right shoulder, a varus deformity of the knee and leg¹, asthma, depression, cervical disc disease, and headaches. After hearings before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), her DIB application was denied in August 1996. The district court affirmed, but on appeal before this court the Social Security Administration ("SSA") requested a "sentence four" remand pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)² to allow further consideration of Moore's fibromyalgia. Moore subsequently filed her claim for SSI payments in April 1998. After additional hearings and the presentation of additional evidence, the ALJ recommended that both claims be denied. Though the ALJ accepted that Moore both had not engaged in substantial gainful activity and had impairments qualifying as severe, he determined that Moore's disabilities did not meet or equal any of those resulting in a presumption of disability. See Appendix 1, 20 C.F.R. § 404 (2005). The ALJ ultimately found that while Moore was restricted from some jobs, her impairments did not preclude performance of all of her past relevant work, including light exertion positions as an office clerk, sales clerk, food production worker, or waitress. That determination was largely grounded in what the ALJ perceived as an inconsistency between Moore's accounts of her daily activities and her claims of work impairment. The ALJ also made adverse credibility determinations as to Moore's claim that she has not kept up with her prescription drug and treatment regimen due to financial constraints, in light of Moore's ability to purchase cigarettes, cocaine, and marijuana. The ALJ further found Moore's case weakened by her smoking habit, where medical professionals have repeatedly stated that it exacerbated her asthma and respiratory problems.

After the appeals council denied Moore's request for review, the Commissioner adopted the ALJ's findings as final. Moore appealed to the district court, which in turn adopted the magistrate's recommendation to affirm the Commissioner's decision. Moore timely appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

In Social Security appeals, we review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based. Chester v. Bowen, 792 F.2d 129, 131 (11th Cir.1986). However, we review the resulting decision only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir.2004). Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. This limited review precludes deciding the facts anew, making credibility determinations, or re-weighing the evidence. Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir.1983).

DISCUSSION

An individual claiming Social Security disability benefits must prove that she is disabled. Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1228 (11th Cir.1999). For SSI claims, a claimant becomes eligible in the first month where she is both disabled and has an SSI application on file. 20 C.F.R. § 416.202-03 (2005). For DIB claims, a claimant is eligible for benefits where she demonstrates disability on or before the last date for which she were insured. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(A) (2005). Because Moore's last insured date was December 31, 1997, her DIB appeal requires a showing of disability on or before that date. Conversely, as Moore applied for SSI payments in April 15, 1998, her SSI appeal requires a showing of disability between that date and the date of the ALJ's decision, on February 23, 2001.

The social security regulations establish a five-step evaluation process, which is used to determine disability for both SSI and DIB claims. McDaniel v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (11th Cir.1986); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912 (2005) (five-step determination for SSI); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (2005) (five-step determination for DIB). These regulations place a very heavy burden on the claimant to demonstrate both a qualifying disability and an inability to perform past relevant work. Spencer v. Heckler, 765 F.2d 1090, 1093 (11th Cir.1985). Moore's appeal focuses on step four in the evaluation process: her capacity to perform her past relevant work.

First, Moore contends that the ALJ erred in failing to properly consider her symptoms of pain and fibromyalgia. Specifically, Moore contends that the ALJ's decision improperly focused on the absence of objective findings to corroborate her claims of impairment, and conflicts with our unpublished decision in Stewart v. Apfel, No. 99-6132, 245 F.3d 793, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 33214 (11th Cir. Dec. 20, 2000).³ In Stewart, we reviewed medical research on fibromyalgia, which often lacks medical or laboratory signs, and is generally diagnosed mostly on a individual's described symptoms. Because the impairment's hallmark is thus a lack of objective evidence, we reversed an ALJ's determination that a fibromyalgia claimant's testimony was incredible based on the lack of objective evidence documenting the impairment. Id. 245 F.3d 793, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 33214, at *9, n. 4.

While in this case the ALJ did note that Moore's treating sources documented a "lack of corroborative objective findings of impairment," this absence of laboratory evidence was not the basis for the ALJ's own negative credibility determination. Unlike the situation in Stewart, where the lack of objective findings formed the basis for the adverse credibility determination, the ALJ here relied on the inconsistencies between Moore's descriptions of her diverse daily activities and her claims of infirmity. More specifically, the ALJ questioned Moore's contentions that she could not maintain consciousness or perform light work, in light of her ability to drive, provide childcare, bathe and care for herself, exercise, and perform housework.

We recognize that credibility determinations are the province of the ALJ. Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 517 (11th Cir.1984). As the ALJ provided a detailed factual basis for his credibility determination⁴, which did not turn on the lack of objective evidence documenting fibromyalgia, Stewart is unavailing to Moore. Indeed, the ALJ even cited to our decision in Stewart, making clear that Moore's lack of corroborative medical evidence "did not establish the claimant has no impairment from fibromyalgia." R. 1182.

Second, Moore suggests that the ALJ improperly discredited the testimony of her treating chiropractor. Moore cites to decisions of this court requiring that the ALJ clearly articulate the reasons for giving less weight to the testimony of a treating physician. MacGregor v. Bowen, 786 F.2d 1050, 1053 (11th Cir.1986). While a treating physician's testimony can be particularly valuable in fibromyalgia cases, where objective evidence is often absent, see Stewart, 245 F.3d 793, 2000 U.S.App. LEXIS 33214 at *9, the ALJ here adequately articulated specific justification for discounting Dr. Pardo's opinion. Dr. Pardo treated Moore for approximately six months before opining, in February 1997, that Moore was unable to work indefinitely. The ALJ found this opinion deficient because it failed to account for Moore's diverse daily activities, or to give any specific assessment of Moore's functional capacity or explanation of how it bore on Dr. Pardo's conclusion that Moore could not work. In addition, the ALJ discounted Dr. Pardo's opinion because the opinion was prepared on a short form used to support Moore's food stamp eligibility. Where our limited review precludes re-weighing the evidence anew, Miles v. Chater, 84 F.3d 1397, 1400 (11th Cir.1996), and as the ALJ articulated specific reasons for failing to give Dr. Pardo's opinion controlling weight, we find no reversible error.

Third, Moore urges error in the ALJ's ultimate determination that her residual functional capacity ("RFC") enabled her to perform some of her past work. On this point, the ALJ relied on medical testimony that Moore's varus orthopedic problem only "moderately restricted" her gait, did not restrict light duty employment, and could be treated with high-top shoes and over-the-counter medications. R. 1185. The ALJ drew on similar medical testimony that Moore's psychiatric and depressive impairments resulted in moderate deficiencies in concentration and attention, but did not affect Moore's mobility or require hospitalization.⁵ R. 1184-85. Likewise ...