U.S. v. Izaguirre-Flores

• Decision Date: 31 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 04-40276.,04-40276.
• Citation: 405 F.3d 270
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Raul IZAGUIRRE-FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

405 F.3d 270

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Juan Raul IZAGUIRRE-FLORES, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 04-40276.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

March 31, 2005.

Jeffery Alan Babcock, James Lee Turner, Asst. U.S. Atty., Houston, TX, for U.S.

Marjorie A. Meyers, Fed. Pub. Def., Timothy William Crooks, Norman E. McInnis, Asst. Fed. Pub. Defenders, Houston, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.

Before WIENER, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Defendant-Appellant Juan Raul Izaguirre-Flores ("Izaguirre") asks us, inter alia, to resolve a question of first impression in this circuit: whether taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of North Carolina General Statute § 14-202.1(a)(1) constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor" for purposes of the "crime of violence" sentencing enhancement in United States Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2. The district court answered this question in the affirmative. We agree and affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

In May 2002, a North Carolina grand jury indicted Izaguirre, a Honduran citizen, for taking indecent liberties with a child in violation of North Carolina General Statute § 14-202.1(a)(1).¹ Izaguirre pleaded guilty to the indictment and was sentenced to 16 to 20 months imprisonment. In June 2003, Izaguirre was deported to Honduras.

In August of that year, United States Border Patrol agents encountered Izaguirre near Falfurrias, Texas. Izaguirre admitted to the agents that he is a citizen of Honduras and that he had illegally entered the United States by crossing the Rio Grande river.

The government indicted Izaguirre under 8 U.S.C. § 1326 for illegal reentry into the United States following deportation. The indictment did not allege that Izaguirre's June 2003 deportation was subsequent to a felony or aggravated felony conviction although the indictment contained a citation to both 8 U.S.C. §§ 1326(a) and (b).² In October, Izaguirre pleaded guilty to the indictment in conformance with a plea agreement.

The district court ordered a Presentence Report ("PSR"). The probation officer recommended a base offense level of eight under Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(a). A base offense level of eight, coupled with Izaguirre's criminal history category of II, would have set a sentencing range of four to ten months. Citing Izaguirre's 2003 North Carolina indecency conviction, the probation officer recommended that Izaguirre's base offense level be enhanced under Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii), which provides a 16-level enhancement to the base offense level of an alien convicted under Section 1326 if the alien was previously deported after conviction for a "crime of violence." Izaguirre filed an objection to the PSR, in which he argued that his prior indecency conviction was not a crime of violence.

After exhaustive briefing by the parties and consideration of the issue by the district court, it held that a violation of North Carolina General Statute 14-202.1(a)(1) is a crime of violence for purposes of Section 2L1.2 because a violation of the statute constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor," which is a specifically-enumerated offense under application note (1)(B)(iii) to Section 2L1.2. Accordingly, the district court determined that Izaguirre's base offense level — after having downwardly departed — was 21, which provides a range of 41 to 51 months imprisonment. The district court sentenced Izaguirre to 41 months imprisonment. Izaguirre timely filed his Notice of Appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The district court's characterization of Izaguirre's prior conviction is a question of law that we review de novo.³

B. Discussion

1. "Sexual Abuse of a Minor"

An alien convicted of illegal reentry into the United States after deportation is subject to a much longer sentence if, before his deportation, he had committed a crime a violence.⁴ The application note to Section 2L1.2 defines a "crime of violence" as

any of the following: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault, forcible sex offenses, statutory rape, sexual abuse of a minor ... or any offense under federal, state, or local law that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.⁵

Thus, to determine whether the district court properly enhanced Izaguirre's sentence, we must resolve whether Congress intended the phrase "sexual abuse of a minor" to include conduct punishable under North Carolina General Statute § 14-202.1(a)(1).⁶ The question whether an offense falls within Section 2L1.2's definition of "crime of violence" is a question of federal law.⁷ As the federal law here includes the possibility that a previous violation may be one of state law, we look to state law to determine "its nature and whether its violation is a crime of violence under federal law."⁸

The parties disagree about the analysis that we are supposed to employ to decide whether "taking indecent liberties with children" constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor."⁹ Izaguirre urges us to apply the categorical approach of Taylor v. United States,¹⁰ which requires us to analyze the elements of the state criminal statute and then to match them to the elements of the offense of "sexual abuse of a minor." Specifically, Izaguirre argues that we must base our determination on the language of the statute itself and not the defendant's underlying conduct, viz., each element of the statute of conviction must necessarily be encompassed within the elements of the enumerated offense in Section 2L1.2, cmt. (1)(B)(iii) to warrant the 16-level enhancement.¹¹

The district court employed a "common sense" approach to determine whether a violation of Section 14-202.1(a)(1) constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor."¹² The district court held that

basic language and common sense indicates to you then indecent liberties with a child is sexual abuse of a minor ... And then reading this statute, it would be clear to this Court that this is sexual abuse of a minor. And that it would be the common sense to read as to what the actions would be to violate this statute.

The government argues that the district court's "common sense" approach is correct and should prevail.

Izaguirre's reliance on Calderon-Pena, Vargas-Duran, and Rodriguez-Rodriguez is misplaced. In those cases, we considered whether the underlying statute of conviction "has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another."¹³ Here, we do not decide whether a violation of the North Carolina child indecency statute has force as an element. Thus, we need not find that the elements of a violation under Section 14-202.1(a)(1) coincide with those of "sexual abuse of a minor" because "sexual abuse of a minor" is a specifically enumerated offense.¹⁴ Our analysis is not — as the underlying statutes at issue were in cases such as Calderon-Pena — contingent on whether a particular element is encompassed within the underlying statute.¹⁵ Thus, a common sense approach to the question satisfies us here. In other words, we must determine whether a violation of Section 14-202.1 constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor" as that term is understood in its "ordinary, contemporary, [and] common" meaning.¹⁶

The parties do not dispute that a violation of Section 14-202(a)(1) involves a minor. The dispute here turns on the term "sexual abuse." As "sexual abuse" is not defined by the Sentencing Guidelines, we look first to its plain, ordinary meaning.¹⁷ Black's Law Dictionary defines "sexual abuse" as "[a]n illegal sex act, esp[ecially] one performed against a minor by an adult."¹⁸ Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "sexual" as "of, relating to, or associated with sex as a characteristic of an organic being."¹⁹ It is therefore clear that a Section 14-202.1(a)(1) violation is sexual because it must have sexual arousal or gratification as its purpose.²⁰

Less clear is whether every violation of Section 14-202.1(a)(1) constitutes "abuse." Webster's defines "abuse" as to "take unfair or undue advantage of" or "to use or treat so as to injure, hurt, or damage."²¹ In Zavala-Sustaita, we held that a violation of Texas Penal Code § 21.11(a)(2) — the Texas indecency by exposure statute — constituted "sexual abuse of a minor" even though the defendant, by exposing himself, did not physically touch the minor.²² There, we reasoned that, even though the defendant never caused physical harm, "[t]he act [was] `abusive' because of the psychological harm inflicted irrespective of the presence of physical injury."²³ Thus, we reasoned that "abuse" involved either physical or psychological harm to the minor.²⁴

We hold that the conduct criminalized by Section 14-202.1(a)(1) constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor," as we generally understand that term. Gratifying or arousing one's sexual desires in the actual or constructive presence of a child is sexual abuse of a minor.²⁵ Taking indecent liberties with a child to gratify one's sexual desire constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor" because it involves taking undue or unfair advantage of the minor and causing such minor psychological — if not physical — harm.²⁶

Izaguirre concedes that a physical act is not required for conduct to be violative of the North Carolina statute. He contends, however, that Section 14-202.1(a)(1) encompasses a broader range of conduct than that prohibited by the Sentencing Guidelines. In sum, Izaguirre argues that, in addition to criminalizing conduct that constitutes "sexual abuse of a minor," Section 14-202.1(a)(1) also encompasses conduct that does not. Izaguirre cites to several North Carolina decisions to support this argument.²⁷ Attempting to distinguish our prior holding in Zavala-Sustaita, Izaguirre argues that there is no requirement under Section 14-202.1(a)(1) "that the sexual content of the act, or, indeed, the act...