Murray v. Earle, 03-51379.

Citation405 F.3d 278
Decision Date31 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-51379.,03-51379.
PartiesLaCresha MURRAY, et al., Plaintiffs, LaCresha Murray, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ronnie EARLE, etc.; et al., Defendants, Dayna Blazey, Individually and as an Assistant District Attorney of Travis County, Texas; Stephanie Emmons, Individually and as an Assistant District Attorney of Travis County, Texas; Angela McGown, Individually and as Supervisor of the Travis County Child Protective Services; Hector Reveles, Individually and as a Detective of the Austin Police Department; Ernest Pedraza, Individually and as a Detective of the Austin Police Department; Albert Eells, Individually and as a Detective of the Austin Police Department, Defendants-Appellants.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)

Frank P. Hernandez (argued), Law Office of Frank P. Hernandez, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Elaine Agnes Casas (argued), Marion Ann Damen, Austin, TX, for Dayna Blazey and Stephanie Emmons.

Frederick A. Hawkins, Asst. City Atty. (argued), City of Austin, Law Dept., Austin, TX, for Angela McGown, Hector Reveles, Ernest Pedraza and Albert Eells.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas.

Before WIENER and PRADO, Circuit Judges, and KINKEADE,* District Judge.

WIENER, Circuit Judge:

Defendants-appellants Dayna Blazey, Stephanie Emmons, Hector Reveles, Angela McGown, Ernest Pedraza and Albert Eells appeal the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on the grounds of immunity under federal and state law. They contend on appeal that they should not be held liable for coercing a confession from the minor plaintiff-appellee, LaCresha Murray, which ultimately led to her later-reversed conviction (and lengthy incarceration) for injury to a child.1 We reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

This case arises out of the investigation of plaintiff-appellee LaCresha Murray's ("LaCresha") involvement in the death of Jayla Belton, age two, in 1996. At the time of these events, LaCresha was eleven years old. She and her siblings lived with her grandparents, R.L. and Shirley Murray, who were her adoptive parents, as well. The Murrays also provided daycare in their home for several other children.

Late in May of 1996, Jayla, who was routinely cared for by the Murrays, was dropped off at the Murray home by her mother's boyfriend. During the course of the day, Jayla appeared to be ill. After she vomited at the lunch table, LaCresha's older sister, Shawntay, gave Jayla some medication and put her to bed. No one checked on Jayla until later that day. R.L. Murray testified that, late in the afternoon, LaCresha came in from outside and went to the back of the house, near the bedroom where Jayla was sleeping. R.L. then heard "thumping noises," but he assumed that LaCresha was playing with a ball and told her to stop. Shortly after that, LaCresha told R.L. that Jayla was throwing up and shaking. He asked her to bring Jayla to the front of the house, where he observed that Jayla appeared ill. He told Lacresha to take Jayla outside to warm her up.

At 5:00 p.m., another parent arrived to collect her children and noticed that Jayla was sweating profusely. That parent urged R.L. to call 911, but he declined to do so. R.L. took Jayla to the hospital, however; she was pronounced dead at approximately 5:30 p.m.

An autopsy conducted the following day revealed that Jayla had suffered a severe liver injury caused by a blunt blow to the abdomen. This trauma had broken four of her ribs and split her liver into two pieces. The medical examiner concluded that Jayla had died within five to fifteen minutes after receiving the injury and also noted some thirty other bruises to her head, ear, forehead, back, shoulder, elbow, chest, and the left side of her torso. The examiner ruled Jayla's death a homicide.

That same day, law-enforcement authorities removed all the children from the Murray home. They placed LaCresha and one of her sisters in Texas Baptist Children's Home, a private shelter for children which contracts with the State to provide foster care. At the time that these children were removed from their adoptive parents' home, the authorities believed that they were in danger. There is some dispute as to exactly when the police first began to suspect that LaCresha had killed Jayla, but the focus of the investigation had quickly shifted to LaCresha after law-enforcement authorities spoke with other members of the household.

Three days after LaCresha had been removed from her adoptive parents' home, Detective Reveles directed Detectives Pedraza and Eels, along with Angela McGown, the supervisor of the Travis County Child Protective Services, to interview LaCresha. It is undisputed that, by this time, the police no longer feared for LaCresha's safety but instead considered her a suspect in Jayla's death.

Before the interview of LaCresha, Detectives Reveles and Pedraza consulted with assistant district attorney Emmons on the proper method of interrogating LaCresha. Emmons testified that, even though LaCresha had been at the Texas Baptist Children's Home for three days, none of the officials believed that she was in the custody of the State. In their minds, this obviated the need for them to take her before a magistrate, as required by Texas law for children who are in state custody. Pedraza and Eels gave LaCresha a Miranda warning before beginning to interrogate her, but they did not take her before a magistrate or notify her parents or attorney.

The detectives questioned LaCresha at the Baptist Children's Home for approximately two hours, eventually eliciting a confession that she had dropped Jayla and kicked her. The State then charged her with capital murder and injury to a child; the juvenile court ruled her confession admissible; and the jury convicted her of negligent homicide and injury to a child. Extensive publicity followed, presumably influencing the juvenile court to order a new trial on its own motion. At the second trial, the State charged LaCresha with injury to a child; her confession was again admitted; and the second jury convicted her. The juvenile court adjudicated LaCresha delinquent and sentenced her to twenty-five years in the custody of the Texas Youth Commission.

Three years later, the Texas Court of Appeals reversed LaCresha's conviction.2 The appellate court ruled that LaCresha had been in the custody of the State, that law-enforcement authorities had violated Texas law by not taking her before a magistrate prior to interrogating her, and that her confession was therefore inadmissible.3

LaCresha then brought suit in district court for damages against numerous individuals, some of whom were only tangentially related to the LaCresha's judicial proceedings, asserting various violations of her constitutional and state rights. On motions for summary judgment, the district court dismissed all her claims except those against the DefendantsAppellants (collectively, "the defendants") for violations of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and for state law civil conspiracy. The defendants now appeal the denial of their summary judgment motions for qualified immunity on LaCresha's Fifth Amendment claims and for official immunity under state law on her civil conspiracy claims.

We have jurisdiction over both appeals. A defendant may immediately appeal the denial of qualified immunity, even though it is not a "final decision" under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.4 The Texas law of official immunity provides the same protection against both suit and liability as does the federal doctrine, so we also have jurisdiction to review denial of state law immunity claims on interlocutory appeal.5

II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review

We review denials of grants of summary judgment de novo.6 Summary judgment may be granted if the moving party shows there is no genuine issue of material fact, and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.7 We construe all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party when reviewing grants of motions for summary judgment.8

B. Fifth Amendment Violation: Qualified Immunity

In undertaking a qualified immunity analysis, we must first determine whether the plaintiff has suffered a violation of his constitutional rights and, if so, whether a reasonable official should have known that he was violating the plaintiff's constitutional rights.9 The district court held that, under these narrow circumstances — an eleven-year-old child is removed from her home, housed at a private shelter by the State for three days, interrogated there for hours by two seasoned investigators to the point of confession without an adult or advocate present to represent her interests, and is convicted largely on the strength of that confession — the child may, after the conviction is overturned on the grounds that the confession was inadmissible, sue under § 1983 for damages she suffered as a result of the violation of her constitutional rights.10 On appeal, the defendants insist that, even if LaCresha's right against self-incrimination was violated, § 1983 does not, or at least should not, provide her with a remedy. We hold that, because LaCresha cannot demonstrate that defendants acted unreasonably, in that their actions did not proximately cause the damages that she suffered, she may not maintain a Fifth Amendment cause of action against them under § 1983.

1. Constitutional Violation

It is axiomatic that a criminal defendant's constitutional rights have been violated "if his conviction is based, in whole or in part, on an involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or falsity."11 The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is a fundamental trial right which can be violated only at trial, even though pre-trial conduct by law enforcement officials may ultimately impair that right.12 The...

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