Lyle v. Bentley

• Decision Date: 24 January 1969
• Docket Number: No. 25396.,25396.
• Citation: 406 F.2d 325
• Parties: Mrs. Elizabeth McWilliams Seekatz LYLE, Appellant, v. Nena Farrar BENTLEY et al., Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

406 F.2d 325 (1969)

Mrs. Elizabeth McWilliams Seekatz LYLE, Appellant, v. Nena Farrar BENTLEY et al., Appellees.

No. 25396.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

January 24, 1969.

Coleman Gay, Joseph Latting, Austin, Tex., for appellant.

Andrew L. Jefferson, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., San Antonio, Tex., Robert A. Rowland, Austin, Tex., for appellees.

Before GOLDBERG and CLAYTON,^* Circuit Judges, and NOEL, District Judge.

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge:

This controversy involves the rightful beneficiary of a National Service Life Insurance policy on the life of Harold R. Bentley issued pursuant to 38 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. Jurisdiction in the court below was predicated on 38 U.S.C.A. § 784.

The pertinent facts of this case begin in 1941 when the insurance policy in question was issued. Nena Bentley, Harold's wife, was then named as the principal beneficiary. Bentley divorced Nena in 1960. Two years later, on October 10, 1962, Bentley executed an insurance form which removed his divorced wife as principal beneficiary and named instead appellant herein, Elizabeth Seekatz Lyle.¹ On October 30, 1962, Bentley executed another document designating Mrs. Lyle as the principal beneficiary of his insurance policy.²

Bentley died in December, 1964, and in 1965 Nena Bentley filed a claim with the Veterans Administration for payment of insurance benefits. The claim was disallowed by the Veterans Administration on the grounds that the proceeds belonged to Mrs. Lyle. Nena Bentley then filed this suit naming Elizabeth Lyle and the United States of America as defendants, and alleging that at the time the changes of beneficiary were made in Bentley's policy he was lacking in mental capacity or subject to the undue influence of Mrs. Lyle. The case was submitted to a jury with instructions to consider both mental incapacity and undue influence. The jury returned a general verdict for Nena Bentley.

Mrs. Lyle appeals to this court solely on the ground that there was insufficient evidence in the record to support a jury finding of undue influence. She does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on the issue of mental incapacity,³ but she invokes the rule that it is improper for a court to instruct on an issue of law about which there is no evidence. Jackson v. Southern Railway Co., 5 Cir. 1962, 317 F.2d 532, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 837, 84 S.Ct. 77, 11 L.Ed.2d 65. She argues that since this case was submitted to the jury on the issues of both mental incapacity and undue influence, and since the jury returned a general verdict, it is impossible to determine upon which theory the jury verdict was based. Mitchell v. John R. Cowley & Bro., Inc., 5 Cir. 1961, 292 F.2d 105, 109; Superior Combustion Ind. v. Schollman Bros. Co., 8 Cir. 1959, 271 F.2d 357. She maintains that under the existing circumstances, the very real possibility that the jury based its verdict on a finding of undue influence makes the verdict fatally vulnerable if in fact the evidence of undue influence was insufficient to justify submission of that issue to the jury.

We find appellant's contentions to be well founded. If the jury's verdict was in fact based on undue influence, which it could have been, and if the evidence to sustain such a finding was insufficient, then the verdict must not be allowed to stand. Under such circumstances it matters not how much evidence there is in the record of mental incapacity. Since the general verdict speaks affirmatively with respect to either or both of the issues submitted to the jury, we have no way of knowing upon what basis the jury's verdict was founded. Therefore, while the subjectives of the jury's deliberations are not for us to examine, if those deliberations as directed by the court's instructions permit a verdict to be based on an issue not supported by sufficient evidence, the jury verdict must be set aside and a new trial held. Mosley v. Cia. Mar. Adra, S.A., 2 Cir. 1963, 314 F.2d 223, 229, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 835, 84 S.Ct. 52, 11 L.Ed.2d 65 and 375 U.S. 829, 84 S.Ct. 73, 11 L.Ed.2d 61.

With these considerations before us, we proceed to consider the sufficiency of the evidence in support of a possible jury verdict of undue influence. In evaluating this evidence, we are of course duty bound to accept all evidence in favor of the verdict as true and to give such evidence the benefit of all permissible inferences that would help to sustain the jury's decision. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 8 Cir. 1965, 346 F.2d 484; Hughes v. Moran, Tex.Civ.App.1959, 325 S.W.2d 829 (writ. ref., n. r. e.).

We begin by noting the general contours of undue influence and the considerations and kinds of evidence which courts have considered probative in establishing its existence. Our point of departure is the Texas Supreme Court case of Long v. Long, 1939, 133 Tex. 96, 125 S.W.2d 1034, wherein the following helpful discussion appears:

"It is not possible to frame a definition of undue influence which embraces all forms and phases of the term. Every case is different from every other case, and must depend largely on its own facts and circumstances. Generally speaking, undue influence is such influence or dominion as exercised at the time, under the facts and circumstances of the case, which destroys the free agency of the testator, and substitutes in the place thereof the will of another. Undue influence has also been defined as that dominion acquired by one person over the mind of another which prevents the latter from exercising his discretion, and which destroys his free agency. Also, undue influence has been defined as `that which compels the testator to do that which is against his will from fear, the desire of peace, or some feeling which he is unable to resist.\' 42 Tex.Jur., p. 792, sec. 2, and authorities there cited.

"It cannot be said that every influence exerted by one person over the mind of another is undue. The influence is not undue unless the free agency of the testator has been destroyed, and a will produced that such testator did not desire to make. 42 Tex.Jur., p. 793, sec. 4.

* * * * * *

"It is rarely possible to prove undue influence by what is generally known as direct testimony. Undue influence is usually a subtle thing, and by its very nature it usually involves an extended course of dealings and circumstances. Usually a person charging undue influence must substantiate such charges by circumstances extending over a considerable length of time. It is therefore the settled rule that undue influence can be established by what is known as circumstantial, as well as direct, evidence. Besteiro v. Besteiro, Tex.Com.App., 65 S.W.2d 759; Bergstedt v. Bender, Tex.Com. App., 222 S.W. 547.

"Undue influence and mental incapacity are two distinct grounds for avoiding a will. Undue influence in its essential elements has no real relation to mental incapacity. Mental incapacity implies the lack of intelligent mental power; while undue influence implies within itself the existence of a mind of sufficient mental capacity to make a will, if not hindered by the dominant or overriding influence of another in such a way as to make the instrument speak the will of the person exercising undue influence, and not that of the testator. Scott v. Townsend, 106 Tex. 322, 166 S.W. 1138.

"In spite of the rule just announced, weakness of mind and body, whether produced by infirmities of age or by disease or otherwise, may be considered as a material circumstance in determining whether or not a person was in a condition to be susceptible to undue influence. 42 Tex.Jur., p. 796." 125 S.W.2d at 1035-36.

More recent judicial pronouncements set forth somewhat more specific criteria of undue influence than those discussed in the Long case. For example, in Rothermel v. Duncan, Tex.1963, 369 S.W.2d 917, the Supreme Court of Texas observed:

"* * * before a testament may be set aside on the grounds of undue influence the contestant must prove: (1) the existence and exertion of an influence; (2) the effective operation of such influence so as to subvert or overpower the mind of the testator at the time of the execution of the testament; and (3) the execution of a testament which the maker thereof would not have executed but for such influence. See: Stewart v. Miller, Tex.Civ. App. (1925), 271 S.W. 311, wr. refused; Olds v. Traylor, Tex.Civ.App. (1944), 180 S.W.2d 511, wr. refused." 369 S.W.2d at 922.

The Court in Rothermel further stated:

"* * * The exertion of influence that was undue cannot be inferred alone from opportunity, but there must be some testimony, direct or circumstantial, to show that influence was not only present but that it was in fact exerted with respect to the making of the testament itself." 369 S.W.2d at 923.

Measured by the above rules, we must now consider whether the evidence in the record before us would sustain a jury finding of undue influence. Indulging in all inferences favorable to such a verdict, we find the following: For many years prior to the changes of beneficiary herein contention, Harold Bentley was psychologically disturbed and alcohol dependent. Psychiatric testimony established that he had a schizoid personality and paranoid trends and that he suffered from alcoholism. Familial instability and heavy drinking interfered with his on-the-job performance as an engineer with the Texas Water Rights Commission and eventually led to his dismissal on April 7, 1962. The record shows that from at least 1960 until Bentley's death in 1964, he was in a weakened mental and physical condition.

Bentley's friendship with the appellant, Mrs. Lyle, began in June of 1960 following Bentley's divorce from Nena Bentley. At the time Mrs. Lyle was single. During the next few years the relationship between Bentley and Mrs. Lyle grew progressively more intimate, and in fact there is evidence in the record that their relationship was sexually illicit. However, the intimacy of this relationship is...