U.S. v. Lockett

Decision Date05 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-2244.,04-2244.
Citation406 F.3d 207
PartiesUNITED STATES of America v. Rogers LOCKETT, III a/k/a Manny Strong Rogers Lockett, Appellant
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Robert Epstein, Esq. (Argued), Defender Association of Philadelphia, Federal Court Division, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellant.

Thomas R. Perricone, Esq. (Argued), Office of the United States Attorney, Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellee.

Before: NYGAARD, McKEE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

NYGAARD, Circuit Judge.

Rogers Lockett argues that the District Court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the police exceeded the scope of his consent to search his suitcase and unlawfully seized him, rendering the search of his backpack involuntary. Additionally, he submits that he is no longer bound by the dictates of his plea agreement as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). We will affirm.

I.

Lockett was sitting on a bench in the Amtrak 30th Street Train Station in Philadelphia. After watching Lockett for approximately fifteen minutes, Special Agent Carl Giardinelli1 and Corporal William Burdette2 approached him. Burdette showed Lockett his badge, identified himself, and asked if Lockett would answer a few questions. After Lockett answered "yes," Burdette sat down on the bench approximately two feet to Lockett's right and Giardinelli remained standing a few feet to the right of Burdette. Burdette asked Lockett some questions about his travel and Lockett explained that he was from Philadelphia but was traveling to Boston, where he attends Newbury College. Burdette examined Lockett's identification and train ticket and then returned them to Lockett.

Burdette explained to Lockett that he and Agent Giardinelli were looking for contraband including narcotics, large sums of money, guns, and other weapons. He asked Lockett if he had any of these items in his possession; Lockett said that he did not. Then Burdette asked Lockett if the rolling suitcase on the seat next to Lockett belonged to him and Lockett admitted that it did. Burdette asked if he could look in the suitcase and Lockett said "yes." Lockett then placed the suitcase on the floor and started to open it, at which point Burdette said, "that's okay, I can get that." Lockett responded, "no, I'll get it," but Burdette repeated, "no, that's okay, I can get it." Burdette then opened the bag.

After opening the suitcase, Giardinelli and Burdette saw three large plastic bags that contained numerous small clear plastic bags, which the Officers recognized as the type of bags commonly used to package illegal drugs. On one of the larger bags was a picture of a marijuana leaf. Burdette pushed the rolling suitcase over to Giardinelli, who continued searching through it.

While Giardinelli was searching the suitcase, Burdette asked Lockett if the other bag, a backpack, belonged to him and Lockett said "yes." Burdette asked if he could look in the backpack and Lockett said "yes" and handed the backpack to Burdette.

As Giardinelli was searching the rolling suitcase, his finger hit a metal object and he realized it was a gun.3 He yelled "gun" in a loud voice so as to get the attention of Burdette and the other law enforcement officers in the vicinity. Burdette and Officer Sean Martin, an Amtrak police officer, handcuffed Lockett and walked him from the public area of the train station to the Amtrak police station, which was a short distance away within the same building. Lockett was handcuffed to a bench in the Amtrak police station while Burdette physically searched through the bags with Giardinelli observing nearby.4 After the search, Officer James Corbett, a member of the Philadelphia Police Department, read Lockett his Miranda rights and then asked him who owned the guns. Lockett answered, "the guns are mine." Corbett then asked Lockett from whom he obtained the firearms, at which point Lockett said that he wanted to talk to a lawyer. At this point all questioning of Lockett stopped.

II.

Lockett was charged with possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute, possession of firearms in connection with a drug trafficking offense, and possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers. Lockett filed a motion to suppress the physical evidence and the statements he made to the law enforcement officers. After a hearing, the District Court denied the Motion, with the following detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law: (1) the encounter between Burdette, Giardinelli, and Lockett was not coercive and did not constitute a stop or seizure under the Fourth Amendment; (2) a reasonable person in Lockett's position would have felt free to refuse to talk to Giardinelli and Burdette; (3) Lockett voluntarily gave his consent to search his rolling suitcase and backpack; (4) Lockett never revoked his consent to the searches of his rolling suitcase and backpack; (5) Lockett was not in custody until his arrest after Giardinelli discovered the gun in his rolling suitcase; and (6) Lockett voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his Miranda rights prior to saying "the guns are mine."

Pursuant to a written guilty plea agreement, Lockett pleaded guilty to all charges, reserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The plea agreement expressly limited the defendant's right to appeal, excepting only an appeal based on a claim that the defendant's sentence exceeded the statutory maximum, that the sentencing judge erroneously departed upwards from the guidelines range, or that the district court erroneously decided the suppression issues.

The District Court imposed a sentence of six months imprisonment for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of firearms with obliterated serial numbers pursuant to the federal sentencing guidelines. The District Court also imposed a sentence of sixty months imprisonment to run consecutively for possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, which is the statutory mandatory minimum. The total sentence was for 66 months imprisonment, five years of supervised release, a $2,000 fine, and a special assessment of $300. Lockett now appeals his conviction and sentence.

III.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the District Court. We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review a District Court's denial of a motion to suppress for clear error as to the underlying factual findings and exercise plenary review over the District Court's application of the law to those facts. United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir.2002). A District Court's determination of consent to search is a finding of fact. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

IV.
A. Seizure

Lockett asserts that he was unlawfully seized when he submitted to authority by relinquishing control of his suitcase. We do not agree.

It is well established that no seizure has occurred when an officer approaches an individual in a public place, identifies himself as a law enforcement agent, asks questions, asks to search a person's bags, or explains that he is conducting a narcotics investigation. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 202-03 (3d Cir.1988). Even when law enforcement officers have no basis for suspecting a particular individual, they may pose questions, ask for identification, and request consent to search luggage, provided they do not induce cooperation by coercive means. See Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991). If a reasonable person would feel free to terminate the encounter, then he or she has not been seized. Id.

Under similar circumstances, we have held that questioning of a traveler by police officers, followed by a request to search the traveler's bags did not amount to a "seizure" of that traveler under the Fourth Amendment. See Thame, 846 F.2d at 204. We reasoned that the officers had not restrained Thame, blocked his path, or otherwise controlled his movement by retaining his papers. Id. Nor had the police, in any way, suggested to Thame that he was positively identified as a suspect. Id. Thus, despite the fact that other law enforcement officers may have been in Thame's view, we concluded that no seizure had occurred. Id.

As in Thame, the encounter here took place in an open public area. The officers did not control or block Lockett's movement. They did not retain Lockett's papers or identification. And they did not tell Lockett that he was a suspect. We hold that the officers did not induce Lockett's cooperation by coercion. In light of all the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the encounter, and therefore Lockett was not "seized."

B. Consent

Under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is "per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041. "It is equally well settled that one of the specifically established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is conducted pursuant to consent." Id. Consent must be voluntary, may be express or implied, and need not be knowing or intelligent. Id. at 235, 93 S.Ct. 2041. It may be given unintentionally and without knowledge of the right to refuse consent, and the police are not required to warn an individual of the right to refuse consent. Id.

Lockett does not dispute the District Court's finding of consent, but instead claims that he gave "limited consent" only to a "visual inspection." Lockett asserts that, even though counsel below may not have used the precise term "limited...

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