Com. v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 19 December 1989
• Parties: COMMONWEALTH v. Sandra M. ANDERSON.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1134

547 N.E.2d 1134

406 Mass. 343

COMMONWEALTH v. Sandra M. ANDERSON.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Plymouth.

Argued Sept. 11, 1989.

Decided Dec. 19, 1989.

Kathleen A. Reagan, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

John M. Corey, Weymouth, for defendant.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

LYNCH, Justice.

The Commonwealth appeals under Mass.R.Crim.P. 15(a)(2), 378 Mass. 882 (1979), from the order of a District Court judge suppressing evidence obtained during a drunk-driving roadblock stop of the defendant's automobile. The judge ruled that, in extending the roadblock beyond 2 A.M., the State police deviated from the specific plan which was in operation for this roadblock. In doing so, the judge concluded, the police violated the defendant's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. We transferred the case here on our own motion and now affirm.

On the night of June 12 and June 13, 1987, the State police planned and executed a roadblock for detecting drunk drivers along a stretch of Route 18 in Abington. The defendant, Sandra M. Anderson, was arrested at the Abington roadblock at 2:15 A.M.--fifteen minutes after the termination of the roadblock authorized by State police troop commander Charles F. Henderson's plan. The various State police guidelines ¹ under which the roadblock was being conducted gave officers on the scene no discretion to alter any of the details of the operations. ² Under the procedure, sole authority for extending a roadblock beyond a two-hour duration was in the hands of the troop commander. ³ However, the judge found that Lieutenant Edward H. Begin, the supervisor in charge on the scene, extended the roadblock from 2 A.M. to 2:30 A.M.

The motion judge concluded that by extending the roadblock hours the officer at the scene varied from the specific plan for the roadblock in question and in so doing abridged the standards for a permissible roadblock we articulated in Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983).

1. Consistency of the rulings. The Commonwealth contends that the judge's findings did not warrant his conclusion that the roadblock guidelines were not followed. We do not agree. The guidelines provided that a roadblock not exceed two hours in duration unless the troop commander orders otherwise. The guidelines also provided that the procedure to be followed must be in writing and disseminated in advance. We conclude, therefore, that if the troop commander wishes to extend the duration of the roadblock, the guidelines require that he do so in writing and in advance. Even if we were to interpret the guidelines as permitting oral changes in duration on orders of the troop commander, our decision would not change. There was no evidence that the troop commander ordered the hours extended. ⁴

It is clear, therefore, that the judge's ruling that the police failed to comply with the established procedure is unassailable. We turn now to the effect of this failure on the constitutionality of the defendant's seizure.

2. Constitutional standards. It is beyond dispute, as the Commonwealth acknowledges, that the stopping of Anderson's automobile at a roadblock for a driver sobriety check is a "seizure," under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and art. 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. Commonwealth v. Shields, 402 Mass. 162, 164, 521 N.E.2d 987 (1988). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). In order to pass muster under both constitutional provisions, such a seizure must be "reasonable." Id.

Decisions of this court and of the Supreme Court establish that, in deciding whether a seizure is "reasonable," we balance the public interest against the individual's right to personal security free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement officials. Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 86, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985). United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). That balance in most cases takes its meaning from the warrant clause. "It is a cardinal principle that 'searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' " United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 2173, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Even in the "exceptional" cases where a neutral and detached magistrate has not made a finding of probable cause, Delaware v. Prouse, supra 440 U.S. at 654 n. 11, 99 S.Ct. at 1396 n. 11, search or seizure by the police must usually be based on the existence of facts which would allow for such a determination in order to be "reasonable." California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 394, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2070, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (while warrant was not necessary to search motor home under the "automobile exception," to meet reasonableness standard, "the search otherwise [must be such] as the magistrate could authorize"). Even in cases where "necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat" has been held to make the warrant exception and probable cause standard too exacting for practical purposes, the police have been required to "point to specific and articulable facts" in order to render a search or seizure "reasonable" by the Fourth Amendment standards. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).

If "[t]his demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of ... Fourth Amendment jurisprudence," id. at 21 n. 18, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 n. 18, then the further exception from usual Fourth Amendment demands that has been made to accommodate fixed roadblocks for detection of illegal aliens, United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (1976), and drunk drivers, Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 Mass. 137, 449 N.E.2d 349 (1983), is rather exceptional and very limited. This court has carved a "sui generis" exception for the enforcement of G.L. c. 90, § 24. Commonwealth v. Shields, supra 402 Mass. at 167, 521 N.E.2d 987. The court has done so on the grounds that a "reasonable" roadblock involves a "minimal" State intrusion upon the reduced privacy of drivers, one that is in any case outweighed by the strong public interest in reducing the carnage caused by drunk drivers. Commonwealth v. Trumble, supra 396 Mass. at 86, 483 N.E.2d 1102.

In order to assure that a roadblock seizure of a citizen without even individualized suspicion is "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 of the Declaration of Rights, the court has demanded that the roadblock meet standard, neutral guidelines, and be conducted pursuant to a plan devised in advance by law enforcement supervisory personnel. Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, supra 389 Mass. at 143-144, 449 N.E.2d 349. Commonwealth v. Amaral, 398 Mass. 98, 99-100, 495 N.E.2d 276 (1986). ⁵ This requirement is meant not only to assure the public's safety and to minimize the intimidation and surprise a driver may feel upon being asked to stop for no suspicious behavior on his or her part. More importantly, it also aims to remove the invasion of the driver's reasonable expectation of privacy from "the discretion of the official in the field." Commonwealth v. Shields, supra 402 Mass. at 165, 521 N.E.2d 987, quoting Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 532, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1733, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967).

Commonwealth v. Trumble, supra, involved the very same Department of Public Safety and State police regulatory system under which the Abington roadblock of June 12 and June 13, 1987, was planned to operate. These guidelines, the judge concluded, were "entirely responsive" to the "substitute" standard for constitutional "reasonableness" in the unique roadblock seizure context that we had articulated in McGeoghegan. Commonwealth v. Trumble, supra 396 Mass. at 91, 483 N.E.2d 1102. Having found "nothing" in the statement of agreed facts of how that particular roadblock was carried out "to indicate that the guidelines were not carefully followed," id., the court ruled the roadblock seizure to be "reasonable." Since Trumble, the constitutionality of such roadblocks under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments and under the adequate and independent State constitutional ground of arts. 12 and 14 has been measured by the officers' compliance with these guidelines. See Commonwealth v. Shields, supra 402 Mass. at 164-165, 521 N.E.2d 987 ("where the Commonwealth shows a roadblock employed to enforce c. 90, § 24, was operated in accordance with the established guidelines, the accompanying seizures, although not conducted on the basis of individualized suspicion, are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14"); Commonwealth v. Amaral, supra 398 Mass. at 100, 495 N.E.2d 276 ("roadblocks stand or fall based on some set of neutral criteria governing the officers in the field," quoting State v. Jones, 483 So.2d 433, 438 [Fla.1986], in which that court required a written set of uniform guidelines be followed to render a roadblock stop constitutional).

Once the Department of Public Safety and the State police have adopted such standard, written guidelines for the conduct of roadblocks, which have been accepted as a sufficient substitute for the usual Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" demands, it follows that the Commonwealth must carefully comply with them. In order that the privacy interests of the motoring public under the Fourth Amendment and art. 14 be given fair weight in the unique balance that has been struck...