Lynn Teachers Union, Local 1037, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Massachusetts Com'n Against Discrimination

• Decision Date: 22 January 1990
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO
• Parties: , 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1819, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,873, 58 Ed. Law Rep. 256 LYNN TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1037, AFT,v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 97

549 N.E.2d 97

406 Mass. 515, 59 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1819,

53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,873, 58 Ed. Law Rep. 256

LYNN TEACHERS UNION, LOCAL 1037, AFT, AFL-CIO v. MASSACHUSETTS COMMISSION AGAINST DISCRIMINATION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Essex.

Argued Sept. 11, 1989.

Decided Jan. 22, 1990.

Deborah L. McCutcheon, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

Jean A. Musiker, for Massachusetts Com'n Against Discrimination.

Before LIACOS, C.J., and WILKINS, ABRAMS, NOLAN, LYNCH, O'CONNOR and GREANEY, JJ.

LIACOS, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff, Lynn Teachers Union, Local 1037 (union), appeals from the judgment entered in the Superior Court affirming the decision of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination (commission). The commission had upheld the decision of a hearing commissioner (commissioner); the commissioner had ruled that the union had engaged in illegal sex discrimination in violation of G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1) (1988 ed.). The case arose out of claims by two teachers that they had been discriminated against by the school committee of Lynn (school committee) which refused to grant them preresignation credit for seniority purposes. The teachers had been forced to resign due to pregnancy.

The union challenges the judge's decision, claiming that the original complaint filed with the commission was barred by the six-month filing limitation of G.L. c. 151B, § 5 (1988 ed.), and that the commission's decision that the claim was a "continuing" violation under 804 Code Mass.Regs. § 1.03(2) (1986), exempt from the statutory bar, was erroneous as matter of law. The union also argues that its bona fide, facially neutral seniority system is protected by G.L. c. 151B, § 4(17)(a ), from claims of sex discrimination, and that the commission erred in granting the two complainants relief from the neutral application of the system. Finally, the union claims that the commission should have dismissed the original complaint because the complainants failed to make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination.

We agree with the judge's decision that the commission's findings of fact are supported by the evidence and that its determination that the situation presented a continuing violation was not erroneous as matter of law. We affirm. We summarize the facts as found by the hearing commissioner. ¹

Early in 1962, Joyce Angelli, a tenured teacher in the Lynn school system, learned that she was pregnant and that her child would be born around December, 1962. At that time, the rules of the school committee required that teachers who became pregnant apply for a maternity leave of absence without pay. A pregnant teacher who was granted leave had to leave employment at least four months prior to the expected date of delivery and could not return any time earlier than seven months after the birth of the child. Teachers could return from maternity leave only at the beginning of the school year, and those teachers failing to return within two years were treated as having resigned. Only tenured teachers were eligible for maternity leave; nontenured teachers who became pregnant were forced to resign.

Angelli applied for, and was granted, a maternity leave for the 1962-1963 school year. Her first child was born on December 31, 1962, and her second child was born in August, 1964. Under the rules of the school committee, Angelli could not return to work at the beginning of the 1964-1965 school year in September. Because Angelli had not returned from her maternity leave within two years, the school committee treated her as having resigned her position, effective September, 1964. Angelli took a part-time teaching position in the Lynn school system in April, 1976, returning to full-time teaching duties in September, 1977.

During the summer of 1970, Carol Griffin learned that she was pregnant and would deliver in early 1971. Griffin had been employed as a teacher in the Lynn public schools since September, 1968. Because Griffin was not a tenured teacher, she was not entitled to maternity leave and was forced to resign in November, 1970, due to her pregnancy. Griffin began working part time at the Lynn English High School in November, 1974, eventually returning to a regular full-time teaching position with the Lynn school system in September, 1978.

The plaintiff union was certified in November, 1966, as the exclusive collective bargaining agent for all classroom teachers in Lynn. A collective bargaining agreement between the school committee and the union governed the terms and conditions of employment for Angelli and Griffin, both of whom were union members. ² At all times material to this case, the collective bargaining agreement provided that seniority of employees would be computed according to the number of "consecutive years of experience in the Lynn School Department" (emphasis added). Because the maternity policy had forced Angelli and Griffin to leave their jobs, their total years of employment within the Lynn school system were not consecutive. Thus, the seniority system embodied in the collective bargaining agreement did not credit either Angelli or Griffin for those years of employment preceding pregnancy and subsequent resignation.

In June, 1980, Griffin began to inquire about obtaining seniority credit for her preresignation employment. Her efforts at that time were unsuccessful. In November, 1980, the Massachusetts electorate voted to implement Proposition 2 1/2. St.1980, c. 580. Anticipating a layoff of teaching personnel due to Proposition 2 1/2, the union requested that the school committee delineate each teacher's seniority.

On March 4, 1981, both Angelli and Griffin (complainants) filed a "charge of discrimination" with the commission against the school committee for its failure to credit the complainants for their service prior to the forced resignations. It was not until March 18, 1981, when the school committee distributed the seniority list which the union had requested, that the complainants formally learned that the committee would not credit their prior service. ³

In August, 1982, the school committee voted to grant Griffin and Angelli seniority credit for their preresignation service. The union, however, grieved the committee's decision as a violation of the collective bargaining agreement. An arbitrator upheld the grievance, and, as a result, both teachers were sent a termination notice. Griffin and Angelli filed amended complaints in November, 1982, naming the union as well as the school committee as respondents.

On February 21, 1985, the hearing commissioner issued her decision finding that the union had discriminated against the complainants on the basis of their sex in violation of G.L. c. 151B, § 4. ⁴ The union was ordered to credit the complainants for their preresignation seniority and to pay Griffin $1,000 plus interest to compensate for her emotional distress. The union appealed the decision to the full commission which upheld the hearing commissioner's decision on September 25, 1985. Pursuant to G.L. c. 30A, § 14(1), the union applied for judicial review of the commission's decision. On July 5, 1988, a judge of the Superior Court affirmed the decision of the commission. The union appealed the decision of the Superior Court.

1. G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1), and the application of the continuing violation rule. General Laws c. 151B, § 4(1), prohibits discrimination in the "terms, conditions or privileges of employment" on the basis of an employee's sex. ⁵ Any person who feels that his or her rights under G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1), have been violated may file a complaint with the commission, which has the power to hold hearings and render judgments regarding claims of unlawful discrimination. G.L. c. 151B, § 3(1)-(13). Ordinarily, a complaint of unlawful discrimination must be filed with the commission within six months of the alleged act of discrimination. G.L. c. 151B, § 5. However, this six-month limitation will not be applied where "the unlawful conduct complained of is of a continuing nature." 804 Code Mass.Regs. § 1.03(2). Where there is a determination of a continuing violation, a complaint is timely filed even though the discriminatory action commenced more than six months prior to the challenge. See Rock v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 384 Mass. 198, 207-208, 424 N.E.2d 244 (1981). The purpose of this "continuing violation" rule is to permit the commission to "remedy ongoing discriminatory policies by an employer." Id. at 207, 424 N.E.2d 244.

In the present case, the commission decided that the union's failure to credit the complainants for their preresignation seniority was a continuing violation, thereby releasing the complainants from the six-month filing limitation of G.L. c. 151B, § 5. The union challenges this decision, claiming that the only discriminatory acts occurred in 1964 and 1970, when the maternity leave policy dictated the resignation of the complainants. ⁶ Such acts, the union argues, are too remote to meet the filing requirements of G.L. c. 151B, § 4.

The commission found a continuing violation of G.L. c. 151B, § 4(1), in the failure of the union to credit the complainants with their preresignation seniority under the seniority system's requirement of consecutive years of service. The commission reasoned that, because the number of the complainants' consecutive years of service had been reduced by an illegal maternity leave policy, the seniority system gave effect to that discriminatory policy by failing to credit the complainants for their preresignation service. According to the commission, the complainants underwent a new act of illegal discrimination each day that their status on the seniority list remained lower than it would have been but for the illegal maternity leave policy. Thus, under this analysis, the union's refusal to credit the complainants with their preresignation seniority was a daily, continuing violation of ...