Croom v. Croom, 1669
| Decision Date | 18 March 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 1669,1669 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Charles E. CROOM, Jr., Respondent-Appellant, v. Theodosia S. CROOM, Appellant-Respondent. . Heard |
Peter M. Perrill, Rock Hill, for appellant-respondent.
Tony M. Jones, of Elrod & Jones, Rock Hill, for respondent-appellant.
Charles E. Croom, Jr., commenced this action to terminate or reduce alimony payments to his former wife, Theodosia S. Croom. The family court refused to terminate alimony, but did reduce it, based on a finding of changed circumstances. Theodosia appeals the reduction of alimony. Charles cross appeals the refusal to terminate alimony. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
On July 1, 1986, Charles and Theodosia entered into an integrated property settlement and support agreement incident to a marital separation. The agreement was drafted by Charles's lawyer. The agreement recited that the parties had agreed to live separate and apart. They both agreed that either might date and that neither would bring a divorce action against the other upon the ground of adultery. The agreement provided for a division of certain property of the marriage. It further provided that Charles would pay Theodosia $25,000.00 a year in alimony, terminable upon his death or her death or remarriage. Alimony was to be periodically increased or decreased in proportion to changes in the Cost of Living Index. The agreement specified that it would be submitted to the Family Court of York County to be approved by the court and merged into an appropriate judicial order. The agreement finally provided that the terms and conditions of the agreement and any court order approving it "shall not be modifiable by the parties or any court without written consent of the Husband and Wife."
By an order of the family court filed July 3, 1986, the agreement was approved and adopted as the order of the court. With the written consent of Charles and Theodosia, the court filed a second order on November 14, 1986, adopting a further agreement completing the division of the marital property. This second agreement and order did not affect the provisions concerning alimony. It, like the first agreement and order, stated that the agreement and order were not modifiable by the parties or any court without written consent of the Husband and Wife.
Charles and Theodosia were divorced in May, 1987. Soon after the divorce, Theodosia began living with a paramour. She continued to receive alimony payments from Charles. In April, 1988, financial difficulties forced Charles to file personal and business bankruptcies.
In July, 1988, Charles commenced this action seeking termination or reduction of alimony payments to Theodosia. The ground for termination was that Theodosia was admittedly cohabiting with a man to whom she was not married and was supporting him, at least in part, with the alimony she received from Charles. The ground for reduction was that the financial circumstances of the parties had substantially changed warranting a modification of alimony.
In this case, there was evidence that Theodosia and her paramour decided not to marry so that she would continue to receive alimony from Charles. South Carolina has not decided whether alimony should be terminated on the sole ground that the supported spouse is not entitled to alimony if he or she chooses to live in a continuing illicit relationship rather than remarry.
Other courts have reasoned, however, that it is inequitable to allow the partners to the illicit relationship to benefit from alimony payments at the expense of the supporting ex-spouse by the simple expedient of choosing not to marry. The purpose of alimony is to provide the ex-spouse a substitute for the support which was incident to the former marital relationship. Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 372 S.E.2d 107 (Ct.App.1988). It is not awarded to support a live-in partnership between the supported ex-spouse and a third party. A rule...
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...a part of the decree and are binding on the parties and the court." Moseley at 353, 306 S.E.2d at 627; accord Croom v. Croom, 305 S.C. 158, 161, 406 S.E.2d 381, 383 (Ct.App.1991). Thereafter, the agreement, as part of the court order, is fully subject to the family court's authority to inte......
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