406 U.S. 311 (1972), 71-81, United States v. Biswell
|Docket Nº:||No. 71-81|
|Citation:||406 U.S. 311, 92 S.Ct. 1593, 32 L.Ed.2d 87|
|Party Name:||United States v. Biswell|
|Case Date:||May 15, 1972|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued March 28, 1972
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Warrantless search of locked storeroom during business hours as part of inspection procedure authorized by § 923(g) of the Gun Control Act of 1968, which resulted in the seizure of unlicensed firearm from a dealer federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons held not violative of Fourth Amendment. Pp. 311-317.
442 F.2d 1189, reversed and remanded.
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, STEWART, MARSHALL, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in the result, post, p. 317. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 317.
WHITE, J., lead opinion
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Gun Control Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1213, 18 U.S.C. § 921 et seq., authorizes official entry during business hours into
the premises (including places of storage) of any firearms or ammunition . . . dealer . . . for the purpose of inspecting or examining (1) any records or documents required to be kept . . . and (2) any firearms or ammunition kept or stored by such . . . dealer . . . at
18 U.S.C. § 923(g). Respondent, a pawn shop operator who was federally licensed to deal in sporting weapons, was visited one afternoon by a city policeman and a Federal Treasury agent who identified himself, inspected respondent's books, and requested entry into a locked gun storeroom. Respondent asked whether the agent had a search warrant, and the investigator told him that he did not, but that § 923(g) authorized such inspections. Respondent was given a copy of the section to read, and he replied, "Well, that's what it says, so I guess it's okay." Respondent unlocked the storeroom, and the agent found and seized two sawed-off rifles which respondent was not licensed to possess. He was indicted and convicted for dealing in firearms without
having paid the required special occupational tax.2 The Court of Appeals reversed, however, holding that § 923(g) was [92 S.Ct. 1595] unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it authorized warrantless searches of business premises, and that respondent's ostensible consent to the search was invalid under Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968). The Court of Appeals concluded that the sawed-off rifles, having been illegally seized, were inadmissible in evidence. 442 F.2d 1189 (CA10 1971). We granted certiorari, 404 U.S. 983 (1971), and now reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
As the Court of Appeals correctly recognized, we had no occasion in See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967), to consider the reach of the Fourth Amendment with respect to various federal regulatory statutes. In Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970), we dealt with the statutory authorization for warrantless inspections of federally licensed dealers in alcoholic beverages. There, federal inspectors, without a warrant
and without the owner's permission, had forcibly entered a locked storeroom and seized illegal liquor. Emphasizing the historically broad authority of the Government to regulate the liquor industry and the approval of similar inspection laws of this kind in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),3 we concluded that Congress had ample power "to design such powers of inspection under the liquor laws as it deems necessary to meet the evils at hand." 397 U.S. at 76. We found, however, that Congress had not expressly provided for forcible entry in the absence of a warrant, and had, instead, given Government agents a remedy by making it a criminal offense to refuse admission to the inspectors under 26 U.S.C. § 7342.
Here, the search was not accompanied by any unauthorized force, and, if the target of the inspection had been a federally licensed liquor dealer, it is clear under Colonnade that the Fourth Amendment would not bar a seizure of illicit liquor. When the officers asked to inspect respondent's locked storeroom, [92 S.Ct. 1596] they were merely asserting their statutory right, and respondent was on
notice as to their identity and the legal basis for their action. Respondent's submission to lawful authority and his decision to step aside and permit the inspection rather than face a criminal prosecution4 is analogous to a householder's acquiescence in a search pursuant to a...
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