Dipaolo v. Moran, 04-1670.
| Decision Date | 10 May 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 04-1769.,No. 04-1670.,04-1670.,04-1769. |
| Citation | 407 F.3d 140 |
| Parties | Gregory DiPAOLO v. Steven MORAN; Neil A. Morris Associates, P.C.; William McCaully; William Fox; Dale Richardson; Ron Howard Tranenkle; Bensalem Township; Bensalem Township Board of Council; Heather Ody; William Maddock; Joseph Pilari; Joseph Szafran; Edward Kisselback; Joseph Digeralmo, Sued individually and in their official capacities; Neil A. Morris. Brian M. Puricelli, (*Pursuant to FRAP 12(a)) Appellant in No. 04-1670. Neil A. Morris and Neil A. Morris Associates, P.C., Appellants in No. 04-1769. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Brian M. Puricelli, Esquire, Law Office of Brian M. Puricelli, Newtown, PA, Counsel for Appellant.
Richard R. Morris, Esquire, Neil A. Morris, Esquire, Neil A. Morris Associates, P.C., Philadelphia, PA, Counsel for Appellee.
Before: SLOVITER, AMBRO and ALDISERT, Circuit Judges.
Before us is the imposition of a sanction under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with the sanctioned party arguing that a sanction was not warranted and the opposing party contending that the District Court should have awarded a monetary sanction. For the reasons that follow, we affirm both of the District Court's determinations.
Appellant Brian Puricelli filed the underlying action on behalf of his client, Gregory DiPaolo, in November 1999, claiming that the Bensalem Police Department's termination of DiPaolo's employment as a tenured police officer violated his rights under the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions and Pennsylvania law. The complaint named fifteen defendants—among whom were Neil Morris, Esquire and his law firm, Neil A. Morris Associates, P.C. (collectively "Morris")—both Appellees and Cross-Appellants here.
As the District Court stated, "[e]arly on in this litigation, it became apparent that there was extensive bad blood between Puricelli and Morris involving not only this litigation, but other litigation in other courts." DiPaolo v. Moran, 277 F.Supp.2d 528, 529 (E.D.Pa.2003). Because an account of the various suits between the parties—or the incidents evincing "bad blood"—will not shed light on those issues before us, we confine our discussion of the factual background and procedural history to those events that relate to the sanction imposed against Puricelli.
In January 2000 Puricelli (on DiPaolo's behalf) moved for a default judgment against Morris and the other defendants on the ground that they had failed to file a response to DiPaolo's complaint. Several weeks thereafter, Morris and his firm filed a motion for sanctions, in which they asserted that Morris and the other defendants had responded by filing motions to dismiss. Moreover, Puricelli refused to withdraw the motion for default judgment even after the defendants informed him that they had filed the motions to dismiss. In March 2000 the District Court granted the motion for sanctions and sanctioned Puricelli (and not DiPaolo) in the amount of $350.
Puricelli did not pay this amount, however, and defendants filed a motion seeking additional sanctions against Puricelli. In May 2000, the District Court entered an order directing Puricelli to promptly pay the $350 or he would be required to pay an additional sum.
While these events were taking place, Morris filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 111 against DiPaolo and Puricelli arguing that the complaint was frivolous and filed in bad faith. In May 2000, after holding oral argument on the various defendants' motions seeking dismissal of the complaint, the District Court issued an order setting out the claims—including claims against Morris—that the plaintiff (DiPaolo) could pursue in an amended complaint. The Court did not expressly rule on Morris's motion for sanctions. However, as it allowed the filing of an amended complaint, the Court apparently intended to deny the Rule 11 motion. See DiPaolo, 277 F.Supp.2d at 530 ().
After Puricelli filed the amended complaint, Morris filed a "supplemental" motion for Rule 11 sanctions against both DiPaolo and Puricelli, arguing that the amended complaint lacked legal and factual merit. In July 2000, after the time period for filing a response had expired and no response had been filed, the District Court granted Morris's motion for sanctions as to Puricelli only.
Several weeks later Puricelli moved for reconsideration, arguing that he had never received the supplemental motion for sanctions. The District Court held a hearing and found Puricelli not to be credible insofar as he testified that he had not received the supplemental motion. In making this credibility determination, the Court found that a letter dated July 5, 2000 authored by Puricelli was a "smoking gun." In the letter, Puricelli stated that a response to the "Rule 11 motion is forthcoming ...." As the District Court indicated, the date of the letter is subsequent to the date of the filing of the supplemental motion and supporting brief but prior to when Puricelli's response was due.
In view of these findings, the District Court deemed the violation of Rule 11 to have been established as a result of Puricelli's failure to oppose the sanctions motion. The Court declined, however, to impose a sanction at that time.
DiPaolo's claims against Morris and his law firm were voluntarily dismissed in December 2000 and DiPaolo's claims against the remaining defendants were dismissed six months later as the result of the parties' settlement. As such, the District Court never determined the merits of the amended complaint.
Although the underlying action was dismissed with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a), proceedings in the District Court continued as to sanctions. In June 2003 the Court determined that the dismissal of the case pursuant to Rule 41 did not deprive it of the jurisdiction or authority to impose sanctions against Puricelli. DiPaolo, 277 F.Supp.2d at 531-32. The Court scheduled an evidentiary hearing to determine the nature of any sanction to be imposed.
During the hearing the parties informed the District Court that Morris had begun litigation against Puricelli in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, in which Morris alleged that the suit before the District Court was "baseless and without merit" and that Puricelli's conduct was an abuse of process. After noting that Morris was seeking damages in the case pending in state court, and, indeed, had established liability but was awaiting an assessment of damages, the District Court declined to award a monetary sanction. Instead, it reprimanded Puricelli and ordered him to attend and complete twelve hours of continuing legal education (in addition to the Pennsylvania bar's requirements) related to civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and constitutional tort litigation. Puricelli appealed this order, and Morris cross-appealed because the sanction ordered did not include money.
The District Court had jurisdiction over the § 1983 claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and had supplemental jurisdiction over DiPaolo's state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In reviewing a district court's Rule 11 determination, we apply the abuse of discretion standard. Garr v. U.S. Healthcare, 22 F.3d 1274, 1279 (3d Cir.1994).
Puricelli's core issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in granting the Rule 11 motion by default. Beyond the conclusory assertion of error, however, Puricelli gives little in the way of argument directly bearing on this issue. Instead, his brief devolves into a series of arguments that he could have raised in opposition to the Rule 11 motion had he responded to the motion for sanctions.
As the District Court explained, the pertinent local court rule provides that Eastern District of Pennsylvania Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7.1(c). In light of the District Court's finding that Puricelli received the Rule 11 motion but failed to respond, the application of this local rule seems on its face to doom Puricelli's appeal. Moreover, citing Local Rule 7.1(c) or a rule similar to it, courts have held that a Rule 11 sanctions motion can be granted by default. See, e.g., Geller v. Randi, 40 F.3d 1300, 1304 (D.C.Cir.1995); Aziz v. Pa. State Univ., 1998 WL 964483, at *3 (E.D.Pa. Nov.17, 1998); Carbone v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 1996 WL 420427, at *2 (E.D.Pa. July 25, 1996).
Nevertheless, there is authority from our Court that, while not cited by the parties, lends some support to Puricelli. See Landon v. Hunt, 938 F.2d 450 (3d Cir.1991) (per curiam). In Landon the District Court sanctioned the plaintiffs after they failed to file a timely response to the defendants' motion for sanctions under Rule 11 subsequent to two of the plaintiffs not appearing for trial. Although recognizing that the sanctions motion was unopposed, we nonetheless concluded that Rule 11 did not provide authority for imposing sanctions. See id. at 453. As we explained, imposing sanctions suffered from two obvious deficiencies. First, Rule 11 authorizes sanctions against the signer of any pleading, motion or other paper. Fed. R.Civ.P. 11(b) and (c). The conduct at issue in Landon, however, was entirely unrelated to the signing of any pleading, motion or other...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
In re Antonelli
...of a copy of the motion for sanctions); Radcliffe v. Rainbow Constr. Co., 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 2001)). But see DiPaolo v. Moran, 407 F.3d 140, 145 (3d Cir. 2005) (where party defaulted on Rule 11 motion, district court could consider safe harbor defense waived); Nisenbaum v. Milwauke......
-
Smoot v. Mazda Motors of America, Inc.
...continuing legal education class in federal jurisdiction. E.g., In re Maurice, 69 F.3d 830, 832, 834 (7th Cir.1995); DiPaolo v. Moran, 407 F.3d 140, 144, 146 (3d Cir.2005); In re Dragoo, 186 F.3d 614, 615-16 (5th Are we being fusspots and nitpickers in trying (so far with limited success) t......
-
In re Thomas
...Comitatus, 373 F.3d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 2004) ). The purpose of a sanction is "to deter undesirable future conduct." DiPaolo v. Moran, 407 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). The court has broad discretion to determine an appropriate sanction. Langer v. Monarch Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 786, 811 (3d ......
-
In re Redante
...Whatever sanction is determined to be appropriate, the purpose to be served is "to deter undesirable future conduct." DiPaolo v. Moran, 407 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). In this regard, this court is afforded broad discretion in determining the appropriate sanction. Langer v. Monarch Life I......