Vessels v. Atlanta Independent School System, No. 04-13729.

Citation408 F.3d 763
Decision Date09 May 2005
Docket NumberNo. 04-13729.
PartiesGordon VESSELS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ATLANTA INDEPENDENT SCHOOL SYSTEM, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (11th Circuit)

Matthew C. Billips, Miller, Billips & Ates, P.C., Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Rodney Gregory Moore, Kimberly N. Royal, Atlanta Pub. Schools, Legal Dept., Atlanta, GA, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before BARKETT, KRAVITCH and FARRIS*, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Gordon Vessels ("Vessels") appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment to his employer, the Atlanta Independent School System ("AISS"), on his claims that AISS failed to promote him on the basis of his race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2005) ("Title VII"). Vessels asserts separate claims based on two independent employment actions: (i) AISS's decision not to promote him on an interim basis to the Coordinator of Psychological Services position; and (ii) AISS's decision not to promote him to that same position on a permanent basis. While the district court conceded that he had made out his prima facie case as to both claims, it found that AISS proffered race-neutral justifications for its employment actions, which Vessels failed to show were pretextual.

On appeal, Vessels argues that genuine issues of material fact remain as to whether AISS has even discharged its burden to assert a race-neutral justification, as well as whether any legitimate grounds AISS has asserted to support its decision were in fact a pretext for racial preference. Although we agree that AISS was entitled to summary judgment on Vessels' claims relating to the permanent position, material issues of disputed fact remain as to whether AISS's articulated reasons for failing to promote Vessels to the interim position were pretextual. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to Vessels' permanent position claim, and remand for further proceedings solely on Vessels' claim relating to the interim position.

BACKGROUND

In June of 1999, Dr. Arletta Brinson ("Brinson") announced that she was leaving her position as the Coordinator of Psychological Services for AISS. When Brinson was asked to recommend someone to fill the position on an interim basis, she chose Jill Fields ("Fields"), an AISS school psychologist who was black. Brinson asserts several reasons why she chose to recommend Fields: (i) Fields had occasionally filled in for Brinson's predecessor, and thus had a working knowledge of operational procedures that could help provide continuity during the search for a permanent replacement; (ii) Fields had experience as part of the Office of Youth Services' Leadership Team; and (iii) Fields had assisted with Brinson's processing of referrals and communication with other departments, and had represented her at various meetings. While Brinson considered Vessels for the interim position, she claims she found that: (i) his experience with the AISS system and chains of command was inferior to Fields' experience; (ii) Vessels lacked experience relative to Fields' in interfacing with the human resources department; and (iii) Vessels' leadership style tended to be too unilateral and potentially disrespectful of the schools the department served. Brinson also asserts that she took into account past incidents in which Vessels conducted an unauthorized survey of staff members' reports. Brinson conceded that Vessels had more education, theoretical knowledge, and state certifications than Fields. While AISS regulations would require someone with Vessels' level of qualification for the position on a permanent basis, those regulations only deemed it "desirable" that an interim appointee met those criteria. Those regulations also limited interim appointments to 60 days, absent action by the school board. Brinson ultimately considered Fields to be the best recommendation.

Brinson's supervisor, also hoping for a seamless transition, approved Brinson's recommendation of Fields for the interim position and forwarded the recommendation to the deputy superintendent, Gloria Patterson ("Patterson"). Patterson approved the recommendation, placing Fields in the Coordinator of Psychological Services position on an interim basis until such time as the position could be filled permanently. Patterson's actions contravened AISS regulations allowing interim appointments for a maximum of only 60 days, unless the school board took action. While Patterson cannot recall the exact circumstances surrounding her approval of Fields, she attests that she generally does not blindly accept recommendations, but rather asks about the recommended candidate to ensure the best person has been put forward.

After Fields began serving in the coordinator position on an interim basis, AISS posted the vacancy announcement for a permanent position three times: in October of 1999, August of 2000, and September of 2001. The announcement was reposted because both the first and second announcements yielded a small applicant pool, and AISS regulations required that three applicants be interviewed. Ultimately, AISS human resources administrators identified three applicants who would be interviewed by a panel of AISS personnel: Vessels; Fields; and Dr. Gwendolyn Jones ("Jones"), who like Fields, was also a black woman.

Dr. Lucinda Sullivan ("Sullivan"), Executive Director of the Office of Student Programs and Services, oversaw the interview process. Sullivan assembled a panel of six interviewers, and provided them with a job description, the candidates' resumes, and interview questions she had developed.1 She did not provide them with model answers or instructions on how to rate the candidates. Instead they were to draw on their experience and understanding of the job description. The panel consisted of one white man, one white woman, and four black women. Sullivan asserts that the panel's racial and gender diversity was representative of a cross-section of the AISS departments that work with the psychological services department. One of the panelists was chosen by lottery to ensure that no preference was given to any candidate.

The panel's aggregate scores placed Jones at 124, Vessels at 106, and Fields at 86. The panelists' written evaluations, which they prepared without consulting one another, reflected a shared concern that Vessels was overly negative and too focused on AISS's problems. Sullivan accepted the panel's recommendation of Jones, and passed it along to the deputy superintendent, who in turn approved Jones and recommended her to the superintendent and school board. Jones replaced Fields on a permanent basis in January 2002. Vessels voluntarily resigned effective January 1, 2003.

The district court, adopting the magistrate's report and recommendation, found that while Vessels made out a prima facie case of race discrimination, AISS had proffered legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for its employment decisions. The district court rejected Vessels' contention that because several of the individuals in the decision-making chain had no independent recollection of the specific reasons for their decision when they were deposed, AISS had not successfully asserted race-neutral reasons for its actions. Furthermore, the district court found that Vessels had not shown AISS's reasons to be pretextual. The district court held that while Vessels may have presented evidence to question whether AISS's decision was correct, there was no dispute as to whether AISS's proffered reasons were sincerely held.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment, viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of the non-moving party. Hulsey v. Pride Restaurants, LLC, 367 F.3d 1238, 1243 (11th Cir.2004). We will affirm the grant of summary judgment only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c).

DISCUSSION

Vessels' disparate treatment claims, brought under Title VII, § 1981, and § 1983, all require proof of discriminatory intent. As Vessels attempts to prove discriminatory intent by circumstantial evidence, his claims are subject to the McDonnell Douglas methods of proof.2 Richardson v. Leeds Police Dep't, 71 F.3d 801, 805 (11th Cir.1995); Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir.1998).

Under the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework, the plaintiff must first create an inference of discrimination through his prima facie case. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Once the plaintiff has made out the elements of the prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a non-discriminatory basis for its employment action. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981). If the employer meets this burden, the inference of discrimination drops out of the case entirely, and the plaintiff has the opportunity to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reasons were pretextual. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). Where the plaintiff succeeds in discrediting the employer's proffered reasons, the trier of fact may conclude that the employer intentionally discriminated. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

VESSELS' PRIMA FACIE CASE

In order to establish a prima facie case, and thus raise an inference of discriminatory intent, the plaintiff must demonstrate only that: (i) he or she belonged to a protected class; (ii) he or she was qualified for and applied for a position that the employer was seeking to fill; (iii) despite qualifications, he or she was...

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