Gonzalez-Bermudez v. Abbott Labs. PR Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2019 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL NO. 14-1620 (PG) |
| Citation | 408 F.Supp.3d 25 |
| Parties | Luz GONZALEZ-BERMUDEZ, Plaintiff, v. ABBOTT LABORATORIES PR INC., et. al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
Carlos M. Vergne-Vargas, Carlos M. Vergne Law Office, Juan C. Nieves-Gonzalez, Casillas, Santiago & Torres, LLC, Juan R. Gonzalez-Munoz Gonzalez Munoz Law Offices, P.S.C., San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.
Alberto Jose Bayouth-Montes, O'Neill & Borges LLC, Jose F. Benitez-Mier, O'Neill & Borges, Ricardo F. Casellas, Casellas, Alcover & Burgos PSC, San Juan, PR, Carla S. Loubriel, Hato Rey, PR, for Defendants.
OMNIBUS OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Luz Gonzalez-Bermudez (hereinafter "Plaintiff" or "Gonzalez") filed this action pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA" or "the Act"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 - 634, against her employer Abbott Laboratories PR Inc. ("Abbott" or "the Company") and her supervisor Kim Perez (hereinafter "Perez"). The Plaintiff also raised supplemental state law claims of age discrimination under Puerto Rico's antidiscrimination statute, Law No. 100 of June 30, 1959 ("Law No. 100"), P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 146, et seq., as well as claims of retaliation under Puerto Rico's anti-retaliation statute, Law No. 115 of December 20, 1991 ("Law No. 115"), P.R. LAWS ANN . tit. 29, § 194a. The case proceeded to trial and the jury found in favor of Plaintiff, awarding her $4,000,000.00 ($3,000,000.00 against Abbott; $1,000,000.00 against Perez) in compensatory damages and $250,000.00 in back pay. See Verdict , Docket No. 138. Pursuant to the doubling provisions of the applicable local statutes, the court entered judgment in the amount of $8,500,000 in both pack-pay and emotional damages, plus an additional $250,000 in liquidated damages. See Docket No. 150.
Defendants filed several post-judgment motions seeking various remedies. The court already denied defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law under Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Opinion and Order , Docket No. 187. Therein, the court held that defendants did not meet their burden of showing that the evidence presented at trial, taken in the light most favorable to Gonzalez, was so overwhelmingly inconsistent with the verdict that no reasonable jury could conclude that defendants discriminated and retaliated against Plaintiff. Id. Pending now before the court are: (1) a motion for new trial or alternatively for remittitur, under Rules 50(b), 59(a) and 59(e) (Docket No. 164); (2) a motion for relief from judgment or order under Rule 60 and/or motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) (Docket No. 165). For the reasons that follow, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the defendants' requests.
Rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made under Rule 50(a), "the movant may file a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law and may include an alternative or joint request for a new trial under Rule 59." Fed. R. Civ. P. 50. Pursuant to Rule 59(a)(1)(A), the court may grant a new trial "after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court; ..." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). "A trial court may ‘set aside a jury's verdict and order a new trial only if the verdict is against the demonstrable weight of the credible evidence or results in a blatant miscarriage of justice.’ " Sindi v. El-Moslimany, 896 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Sanchez v. P.R. Oil Co., 37 F.3d 712, 717 (1st Cir. 1994) ).
Alternatively, Rule 59(e) permits a motion "to alter or amend a judgment[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). "A party may ask a court to amend its judgment under Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on newly discovered material evidence or an intervening change in the law, or because the court committed a manifest error of law or fact." Casco, Inc. v. John Deere Constr. & Forestry Co., No. CV 13-1325 (PAD), 2017 WL 4226367, at *2 (D.P.R. Mar. 30, 2017) (citing Bogosian v. Woloohojian Realty Corp., 323 F.3d 55, 72 (1st Cir. 2003) ; Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) ). When a party moves for remittitur pursuant to Rule 59(e), "[i]t is within the district court's discretion ‘to order a remittitur if such an action is warranted in light of the evidence adduced at trial.’ " Climent-Garcia v. Autoridad de Transporte Maritimo y Las Islas Municipio, 754 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing Trainor v. HEI Hospitality, LLC, 699 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir.2012) ). "When a movant attacks an award of damages as excessive, a court may remit the award only if ‘the award exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before it.’ " Sindi, 896 F.3d at 13 (citing Trainor, 699 F.3d at 29 ).
Rule 60(b) provides that a court may relieve a party from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 (b). " Rule 60(b) grants federal courts the power to vacate judgments ‘whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.’ " Bouret–Echevarria v. Caribbean Aviation Maint. Corp., 784 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir.2015) (quoting Local No. 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 19 [1st Cir.1992] )). "Success under that rule requires more than merely casting doubt on the correctness of the underlying judgment." Fisher v. Kadant, Inc., 589 F.3d 505, 512 (1st Cir. 2009) (citing Karak v. Bursaw Oil Corp., 288 F.3d 15, 19 (1st Cir.2002) )). Rather, "[r]elief under Rule 60(b) is ‘extraordinary in nature’ and is therefore ‘granted sparingly.’ " Caisse v. DuBois, 346 F.3d 213, 215 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Karak, 288 F.3d at 19 )). A party seeking relief under Rule 60(b) must demonstrate "at a bare minimum, that his motion is timely; that exceptional circumstances exist, favoring extraordinary relief; that if the judgment is set aside, he has the right stuff to mount a potentially meritorious claim or defense; and that no unfair prejudice will accrue to the opposing parties should the motion be granted." Fisher, 589 F.3d at 512.
"A district court's power to grant a motion for a new trial is much broader than its power to grant a [motion for judgment as a matter of law]." Jennings v. Jones, 587 F.3d 430, 436 (1st Cir. 2009). Oliveras-Zapata v. Univision Puerto Rico, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 2d 82, 84 (D.P.R. 2012), (citing Valentin–Almeyda v. Municipality of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 103 (1st Cir.2006) ). Despite this broad authority, the First Circuit Court of Appeals "[has] often emphasized that a ‘district judge cannot displace a jury's verdict merely because he disagrees with it’ or because ‘a contrary verdict may have been equally ... supportable.’ " Jennings, 587 F.3d at 436 (citing Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 780 (1st Cir.1996) ).
In their motion, Defendants move for a new trial claiming the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a verdict of age discrimination and retaliation. See Docket No. 164 at page 24. The court disagrees for the reasons already expressed in the court's Opinion and Order (Docket No. 187), incorporated by reference herein. Contrary to defendants' assertions, the evidence on record strongly supported the jury's verdict. As such, the court declines to set aside the jury's verdict and order a new trial. Defendants' motion for a new trial on insufficiency of the evidence grounds is thus DENIED .
In addition to their claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, defendants also argue that the cumulative effect of the errors committed during trial proceedings mandates a new trial. The court will discuss each alleged error in turn.
During her case in chief, Plaintiff's counsel extensively questioned Luz Miriam Adames ("Adames"), Abbott's Human Resources Director, about an email Plaintiff received on March 19, 2014 regarding her performance. The court also asked Adames some questions about the email. The email in question was sent by Matt Harris ("Harris"), Abbott's General Manager in Puerto Rico and the Caribbean at the time. In this email, Harris told Plaintiff that she had failed to meet the minimum expectations of several key job competencies during the "last three years," even though Plaintiff had been a finalist for promotion just some months before he sent this email. Because of this discrepancy, the court expressed confusion after Adames responded to the questions about the Company's promotion and performance evaluation processes. See Docket No. 126 at pages 69-72; see also Opinion and Order , Docket No. 187 at page 24.
In their motion, defendants complain that the court caused them prejudice by "extensively" asking Adames questions on the subject, by reiterating Plaintiff's counsel's "loaded" questions and by openly...
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