People v. Williams, Docket No. 91741

Decision Date28 August 1987
Docket NumberDocket No. 91741
Citation408 N.W.2d 415,160 Mich.App. 656
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
PartiesPEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Preston Ronald WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant. 160 Mich.App. 656, 408 N.W.2d 415

[160 MICHAPP 657] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., L. Brooks Patterson, Pros. Atty., Robert C. Williams, Chief, Appellate Division, and Richard H. Browne, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the people.

Michael H. Golob, Farmington Hills, for defendant.

Before MacKENZIE, P.J., and BEASLEY and QUINNELL, * JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a bench trial, defendant, Preston Ronald Williams, was convicted of possession[160 MICHAPP 658] with intent to deliver between 50 and 225 grams of a mixture containing cocaine, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7401(1); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7401)(1), M.C.L. Sec. 333.7401(2)(a) (iii); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iii), and M.C.L. Sec. 333.7214(a)(iv); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7214)(a)(iv), and of possession with intent to deliver less than 50 grams of a mixture containing heroin, M.C.L. Sec. 333.7401(1); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7401)(1), M.C.L. Sec. 333.7401(2)(a)(iv); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7401)(2)(a)(iv), and M.C.L. Sec. 333.7212(1)(b); M.S.A. Sec. 14.15(7212)(1)(b). On March 27, 1986, defendant was sentenced to on life probation the cocaine conviction and to not less than 3 1/2 nor more than 20 years in prison on the heroin conviction. Credit was given for 11 days already served. Defendant appeals as of right.

The sole issue on appeal is whether the evidence of the cocaine and heroin was erroneously admitted because it was allegedly obtained in violation of defendant's right against unreasonable searches and seizures, as provided by U.S. Const., Am. IV and Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 11. This was also defendant's sole defense at the trial level. Indeed, as defendant points out, the trial resembled a suppression hearing.

At approximately 6:00 p.m. on December 19, 1984, Oak Park Police Officers Allen Rubin and Kirk Skarjune received a dispatch over their car radio to investigate reports of burglar alarms going off at two homes. The homes described in the dispatch were 14011 Greenbriar and 14131 Greenbriar. Upon arriving at 14011 Greenbriar, according to Officer Rubin's testimony, there was no audible alarm. Officer Skarjune testified that there was an audible alarm. Both officers testified that the windows and doors to the home all appeared to be secure. They then proceeded to 14131 Greenbriar.

On the way to 14131 Greenbriar, the officers [160 MICHAPP 659] heard an alarm at 14111 Greenbriar, defendant's home, which they stopped to investigate. The house was dark and all the windows and doors were secure except for a crank window at the back of the home which was open and appeared to have been pried. There were footprints in the snow leading up to or away from the window. Officer Skarjune entered through the window, opened the back door and let Officer Rubin in. Both officers had their guns drawn.

According to Officer Rubin, they entered the house because "we had an alarm sounding and we had an open window and we had an alarm that had been tripped and we believed that the perpetrator was still in that house and we went in to see if in fact there was somebody in that house." Officer Rubin further stated, "I know when I find an open window and an alarm going off, that I enter a building." Officer Skarjune also testified that it appeared that the house had been broken into and that he went in to see whether there was somebody inside and, if not, whether there were "things tampered with inside." When asked whether he really believed there might have been a burglar in the house, Skarjune replied, "There's always that possibility."

The officers did not find a burglar. They did find that the basement area appeared to have been ransacked. They also found various narcotics and paraphernalia in the basement, which led to the arrest of defendant.

The parties agree that if the intrusion of the officers into defendant's home was itself constitutionally valid, then the evidence they found therein was properly seized. They also agree that a search without a warrant is unreasonable per se unless there exists both probable cause and circumstances establishing one of the delineated exceptions[160 MICHAPP 660] to the warrant requirement. 1 The only exception the parties believe to be applicable is "exigent circumstances."

Probable cause has been defined as a state of mind which stems from some fact, circumstance or information which would create an honest belief in the mind of a reasonably prudent person. 2 More specifically, probable cause to search exists where facts and circumstances would warrant a person of reasonable prudence to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that the evidence sought will be found in the stated place. In assessing whether probable cause exists, the facts, circumstances and information known to the officers at the time of the search must be examined. 3

Defendant points out that, although the trial court specifically found exigent circumstances, it did not explicitly say that it found probable cause. The court did, however, make plentiful findings of fact, supported by the record, about what occurred on the night in question sufficient for us to determine whether there was probable cause. Here are the trial judge's factual findings:

"It's true that there were some minor discrepancies in the two officers' testimony, the first two. However, the Court is satisfied that there [were] exigent circumstances and the Court is going to find that on December 19, 1984, the officers were dispatched to investigate an alarm at 14011 Greenbriar in Oak Park and while there, they heard another alarm down the street and they were directed to go to 14131 Greenbriar to check out what had been reported as an alarm in operation there.

[160 MICHAPP 661] "Before they got there, and while in close proximity to 14111 Greenbriar, they heard an alarm coming from that house and they checked it out and found the doors and windows on the--the door on the front and the windows on the front and on the sides were secure but when they went into the backyard, they observed this window open at least three quarters of the way open, that the venetian blinds were askew and that there were pry marks visible and that footprints were observed in the snow between the fence where there was a hole and this window. That it was just getting dark and that it was raining and that they also observed the tape wire had been separated; this wire being used in the alarm system.

"Officer Skarjune went through the window and let Officer Rubin in the door. I find that the officers believed that the perpetrator was still in the house and that they were so concerned, they went with their guns drawn and found no one inside.

"I also find that the officer testified, Officer Rubin, and the Court so finds that the pry marks appeared to be fresh and that the alarm was in fact in operation at the time these officers were at that house and going in the window. And that the officers [sic] purpose in going in was to determine whether anybody was inside who should not be there or whether items had been taken."

These findings of fact justify a holding that the officers had probable cause to believe that a crime had just been committed and that evidence of that crime could be found within. There was an alarm going off, a window which appeared to have been pried open and footprints leading up to the window. A reasonably prudent person, in those circumstances, would believe that a burglary had been committed on the premises. It follows that the premises would contain evidence of that burglary. Defendant points to Officer Skarjune's admission[160 MICHAPP 662] that the intruder possibly would have been long gone in light of the fact that the alarm was very loud and had been ringing for a while. What was possible is not at issue here, however. We are concerned with what a person in the officers' position would have believed was probable. Further, such an admission does not affect the reasonableness of the officer's belief that a crime had been committed.

Exigent circumstances are present where immediate action is necessary to: (1) protect the police officers or other persons; (2) prevent the loss or destruction of evidence; or (3) prevent the escape of the suspect. 4 In People v. Anthony, 5 a witness had seen the defendant at the scene of an armed robbery and led the police to the defendant's home. The witness did not say (or, apparently, know) whether defendant was at home. This Court held that "the term exigent does not mean expedient." Because the officers had the house under control, they were in no danger and there was no testimony that they believed that defendant could escape or would destroy valuable evidence, exigent circumstances were found to be lacking. The Anthony Court specifically distinguished...

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11 cases
  • People v. Armendarez
    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 18 March 1991
    ...Whether probable cause exists depends on the information known to the officers at the time of the search. People v. Preston Williams, 160 Mich.App. 656, 660, 408 N.W.2d 415 (1987). Here, the corroborated information provided by the citizen-informant, particularly the fact that two of the su......
  • People v. Snider, Docket No. 203328.
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    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 4 April 2000
    ...id., n. 7, quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). See also People v. Williams, 160 Mich.App. 656, 664-665, 408 N.W.2d 415 (1987), where this Court found that there were exigent circumstances justifying the police entry into the defendant's home i......
  • Forfeiture of $176,598, In re, Docket No. 93248
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    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • 17 August 1993
    ...been addressed by the Court of Appeals under similar facts, and the approach taken is particularly instructive. In People v. Williams, 160 Mich.App. 656, 408 N.W.2d 415 (1987), two police officers heard an activated residential alarm and observed a pried-open window. Footprints in the snow ......
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    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • 10 July 2001
    ...to believe that a crime has been or is being committed and that evidence will be found in a particular place. People v. Williams, 160 Mich.App. 656, 660, 408 N.W.2d 415 (1987). See also Borchard Ruhland, supra at 293-294, 597 N.W.2d 1; Davis, supra at 10, 497 N.W.2d In the instant case, def......
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