People v. Broden
| Decision Date | 13 July 1987 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. 77743,77795 |
| Citation | 428 Mich. 343,408 N.W.2d 789 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lora BRODEN, Defendant-Appellee. PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robert Lavert MURRAY, Defendant-Appellant. 428 Mich. 343, 408 N.W.2d 789 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Wayne County, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of the Criminal Div. Research, Training and Appeals, Detroit, for the People.
Thomas E. Betz, Champaign, for Broden.
Elizabeth L. Jacobs, Detroit, for Murray.
Before the entire bench.
In People v. Coles, 417 Mich. 523, 549-550, 339 N.W.2d 440 (1983), we held that a trial court must articulate on the record its reasons for imposing a sentence at the time of sentencing. We have also directed, through a series of administrative orders, 1 that all sentencing judges of this state's circuit courts and of the Recorder's Court of the City of Detroit employ the sentencing guidelines that were established by the Sentencing Guidelines Advisory Committee. The two cases now before us present the question whether it is sufficient, under Coles, for a sentencing judge who follows the sentencing guidelines recommendation to refer only to the guidelines when giving reasons for the sentence imposed. We hold that a sentencing judge's reference to the sentencing guidelines, as the only reason for imposing a particular sentence, is a sufficient explanation under Coles when the guidelines recommendation is followed.
The defendant, Robert L. Murray, was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, M.C.L. Sec. 750.520b(1)(e); M.S.A. Sec. 28.788(2)(1)(e), and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. Sec. 750.227b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.424(2). Following a bench trial on October 24, 1984, Murray was found guilty as charged.
Sentencing took place on November 16, 1984. The sentencing information report indicated that the sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum sentence range of eight to fifteen years. 2 The judge chose to impose a sentence within the recommended range, sentencing Murray to concurrent terms of fifteen to thirty years in prison on the first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions, and to the mandatory two-year term of imprisonment on the felony-firearm conviction. The sentencing judge explained these sentences as follows:
Murray filed a claim of appeal in the Court of Appeals alleging, inter alia, that the term of his sentence was shocking to the judicial conscience and that the trial court failed to articulate its reasons for imposing the sentence as required by Coles, supra. 3 The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge's statement that she was sentencing defendant pursuant to the sentencing guidelines was sufficient to meet the Coles requirement to articulate the reasons for the sentence imposed and that any sentence falling within the sentencing guidelines was not shocking to the Court's conscience. 4
The defendant then requested this Court to review the matter pursuant to MCR 7.303. The letter request was treated as an application for leave to appeal and was granted pursuant to this Court's order of June 24, 1986. 5
The defendant, Lora Broden, was charged with second-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549. On March 23, 1984, Broden pled guilty to the charged offense and admitted to fatally stabbing the victim during an argument on February 10, 1984. Broden was on parole for manslaughter at the time of the offense.
Broden was sentenced on April 4, 1984, to a term of imprisonment of not less than sixteen years or more than thirty years. This too was a sentence within the guidelines which recommended a minimum sentence range of sixteen years to life imprisonment. With the exception of a stray comment early in the sentencing proceeding ("we've got to protect ourselves"), the sentencing judge's only explanation for this sentence was the brief statement, "I'm following the guidelines."
Broden filed a claim of appeal in the Court of Appeals. The prosecutor answered with a motion to affirm. In response to that motion, the Court of Appeals issued an order remanding the case to the trial court, directing the trial judge to state on the record his reasons for imposing the sentence. At a hearing which took place in the trial court on September 6, 1984, the sentencing judge stated:
The Court of Appeals then decided the merits of Broden's appeal and affirmed her conviction, but again remanded the matter to the trial court, directing it to explain the reasons for the sentence in terms other than a mere reference to the guidelines. The Court of Appeals then certified that its decision in Broden conflicted with its prior decision in Murray. 6 We granted the prosecutor's application for leave to appeal before the matter was remanded. 7
Under this state's system of indeterminate sentencing, trial courts are vested with a great deal of discretion in sentencing criminal defendants. In Coles, supra, this Court expanded the scope of appellate review of sentencing to include review of the trial court's exercise of that discretion, and held that an appellate court may remand a case for resentencing if it finds that the trial court, in imposing the sentence, abused its discretion to the extent that it shocks the appellate court's conscience. 8 8] An abuse of discretion in sentencing occurs when the sentence imposed is either excessively severe or excessively disparate. An excessively severe sentence is one which all reasonable persons would perceive to be an inappropriate social response to the crime committed, and the person who committed it. 9 An excessively disparate sentence is one that is unusually disproportionate to the type of sentence normally imposed upon similarly situated defendants who have committed similar crimes, due to improper considerations such as race, economic status, or the sentencing judge's personal bias or attitude. 10
In Coles, we noted that among the proper criteria for determining an appropriate sentence are:
(3) the potential for reformation of the offender, and
(4) the deterring of others from committing like offenses. 11
We further noted that these are not the only relevant criteria and that we were not instructing the trial courts on every factor they must consider when imposing sentence. 12
In order to aid the appellate review process in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, we further held in Coles that the trial court must, at the time of sentencing, articulate on the record its reasons for imposing the sentence given. 13 A silent record precludes the appellate court from determining whether the trial court considered impermissible factors or whether an ostensibly harsh or disparate sentence is justified by permissible considerations. The articulation-of-reasons requirement further acts as a safeguard against rash and arbitrary decisions by forcing the sentencing judge to focus on relevant factors, and it also reduces the risk that inaccurate information will be considered. 14 If the sentencing judge is relying on misinformation, disclosure will give the defendant an opportunity to correct the error.
In the instant case, we must decide whether the articulation-of-reasons requirement established in Coles is satisfied when the trial court merely states that it is following the sentencing guidelines recommendation as the reason for imposing the sentence.
In 1979, this Court appointed a sentencing guidelines advisory committee to draft sentencing guidelines. 15 The establishment of the committee was prompted by a study which disclosed considerable disparity and discrimination in Michigan's sentencing practices. 16 It was the advisory committee's objective to develop guidelines that would eliminate unjustifiable disparity and achieve greater uniformity in sentencing.
Although Coles was decided approximately five months before use of the guidelines was made mandatory, the Coles Court recognized that the purpose of the sentencing guidelines was to
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People v. Fisher
...the twenty-five-year minimum sentence is within the revised guidelines and is therefore presumptively valid. People v. Broden, 428 Mich. 343, 354-355, 408 N.W.2d 789 (1987). We find no basis in the record to conclude that the defendant should be resentenced yet another time. IV For the reas......
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People v. Lockridge
...could only depart outside this range if he or she articulated specific reasons for the departure on the record. People v. Broden, 428 Mich. 343, 352, 408 N.W.2d 789 (1987). A second edition of the judicial guidelines was issued in 1988, and application of these modified guidelines was requi......
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People v. Adams, Docket No. 125921
...is within the recommended guidelines range, reference to the guidelines alone constitutes sufficient explanation. People v. Broden, 428 Mich. 343, 354, 408 N.W.2d 789 (1987); People v. Dukes, 189 Mich.App. 262, 266, 471 N.W.2d 651 (1991). However, where the sentence imposed exceeds the reco......
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People v. Wybrecht
...were within the correctly scored guidelines' range. Accordingly, the sentences are presumptively proportionate. People v. Broden, 428 Mich. 343, 354-355, 408 N.W.2d 789 (1987); People v. Cutchall, 200 Mich.App. 396, 410, 504 N.W.2d 666 Defendant has not overcome the presumption of proportio......