Felder v. Casey, 85-1344

• Decision Date: 24 June 1987
• Docket Number: No. 85-1344,85-1344
• Citation: 139 Wis.2d 614,408 N.W.2d 19
• Parties: Bobby FELDER, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent and Cross-Petitioner, v. Duane CASEY, Patrick Eaton, Robert Farkas, Peter Pochowski, Robert Connolly, Edward Heideman, Stanley Olsen, Roger Weber, Michael Kempfer and Gary Hoffman, Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants-Petitioners.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 19

408 N.W.2d 19

139 Wis.2d 614

Bobby FELDER, Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Respondent and Cross-Petitioner, v. Duane CASEY, Patrick Eaton, Robert Farkas, Peter Pochowski, Robert Connolly, Edward Heideman, Stanley Olsen, Roger

Weber, Michael Kempfer and Gary Hoffman,

Defendants-Respondents and Cross-Appellants-Petitioners.

No. 85-1344.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued April 29, 1987.

Decided June 24, 1987.

Curry First, argued Barbara Zack Quindel and Perry, First, Lerner & Quindel, S.C., Milwaukee, for plaintiff-appellant and cross-respondent and cross-petitioner.

Reynold Scott Ritter, Asst. City Atty., argued, with whom on the briefs was Grant F. Lanley, City Atty., for defendants-respondents and cross-appellants-petitioners.

CECI, Justice.

This is a review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals, dated April 24, 1986, which reversed in part and affirmed in part a judgment by the circuit court for Milwaukee county, Circuit Judge Robert W. Landry. Specifically, the appeals court reversed the trial court's determination that the two-year statute of limitations period under section 893.57, Stats., was to be applied retroactively to the civil rights claims brought by Bobby Felder (Felder) under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985, against several city of Milwaukee police officers. The appeals court decided that the three-year statute of limitations, section 893.54(1), should apply to Felder's claim instead of the two-year period. Second, the appeals court affirmed the trial court's holding that section 893.80, the notice of claim statute, was inapplicable to section 1983 actions brought in state court. Finally, the appeals court affirmed the trial court's decision that the mere existence of state tort remedies, under which Felder might have recovered, should not operate to preclude the institution of an action based on section 1983. While the issue of the applicability of section 893.80 to section 1983 actions brought in state court against municipalities and municipal employees presents a question of first impression, we believe that this case may be disposed of on the basis of section 893.80 alone. ¹ Because we believe that section 893.80 does apply to federal civil rights actions which are brought in state court and because Felder has not satisfied the requirements of that statute, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals. Since our holding operates to bar Felder from proceeding further, we need not, under these facts, consider the remaining issues posed by the parties.

I.

Bobby Felder was stopped by Milwaukee police officers during the early evening hours of July 4, 1981, outside his home in Milwaukee. Police were combing the neighborhood, looking for an armed individual who was reported to be in the area. The police stopped Felder to question him, but according to police reports, Felder was uncooperative and began to yell and shout profanities, thereby attracting neighborhood attention. Neighbors' attempts to exonerate him were successful, as the police reportedly told Felder to leave the scene and go home. However, Felder continued to be loud and abusive and reportedly pushed an officer. Minutes later, members of the Milwaukee Police Department Tactical Enforcement Unit (TEU officers) arrived on the scene. The TEU officers proceeded to arrest Felder on charges of disorderly conduct. Felder alleges that the officers "beat [him] with batons, carried him to a paddy wagon while he was partially unconscious, and threw him through the air and into the paddy wagon." The charges against Felder, who is black, were ultimately dropped. The officers present at the scene of the arrest were all white. An armed individual was later apprehended and arrested pursuant to the officers' initial investigation.

On April 2, 1982, Bobby Felder commenced a lawsuit in Milwaukee county circuit court, naming two Milwaukee police officers as defendants. Two amended complaints (one filed in January, 1983, and the other in March, 1984) named additional police officers as defendants, as well as the city of Milwaukee and the chief of police for the Milwaukee police department. The complaint alleged that the defendants acted under color of law to intentionally deprive Felder of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985(2). Felder also advanced state law tort and conspiracy claims. Felder sought compensatory and punitive damages in an amount totaling $2.3 million, plus costs and attorney fees, as provided for under 42 U.S.C. section 1988.

In each of their answers, including the answers to the first and second amended complaints, defendants raised the affirmative defense of noncompliance with section 893.80, Stats.

Following the voluntary dismissal of the action as to several of the defendants and the dismissal of some of the claims, trial proceeded on March 4, 1985, on four remaining claims: (1) false arrest, in violation of federal and state law; (2) use of excessive force, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and assault and battery, in violation of state law; (3) false imprisonment, in violation of federal and state law; and (4) conspiracy, in violation of the fourteenth amendment and state law.

After the defense rested its case, the trial court entertained several motions. Defendants first moved for dismissal on the basis of plaintiff's alleged failure to comply with section 893.80, Stats. The court granted defendants' motions with respect to each of the claims which were based on state tort law principles, but denied the motion with respect to the remaining civil rights claims which were based on federal law. The court reasoned that section 893.80 was not intended to bar the institution of a lawsuit based on federal civil rights laws. The court heard and decided other motions. In the most significant of these rulings, the trial court held that the two-year statute of limitations for intentional torts, section 893.57, applied to Felder's civil rights claims, rather than the three-year statute of limitations contained in section 893.54(1), applicable generally to "injuries to the person." This holding operated to dismiss Felder's civil rights claims with respect to those defendants who were added to the lawsuit by the amended complaint, which was filed after the two-year limitations period had expired.

Felder appealed the statute of limitations question to the court of appeals. The ten remaining defendants cross-appealed, asserting that the civil rights claims should never have been brought because a notice of claim under section 893.80 had never been filed. The appeals court first reversed the trial court on the statute of limitations issue, holding that the three-year period under section 893.54(1) was applicable, citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), for support. The appeals court next addressed defendants' arguments on cross-appeal, holding that section 893.80 was inapplicable to sections 1983 and 1985 actions, citing Doe v. Ellis, 103 Wis.2d 581, 587-88, 309 N.W.2d 375 (Ct.App.1981). The court addressed other arguments raised by defendants in their cross-appeal and summarily affirmed the trial court on those issues. A petition for review was filed on behalf of the police officer defendants by the city attorney of the city of Milwaukee. The city sought review of three issues, including the appeals court's disposition of the statute of limitations question and its summary affirmance of the trial court's ruling which was based on section 893.80, Stats. Felder filed a cross-petition for review, arguing a violation of his constitutional rights based on actions taken by the court during the course of trial, primarily relating to the dismissal of certain defendants from the lawsuit. This court granted both the petition for review and the cross-petition for review on September 16, 1986.

II.

The issues which we believe to be dispositive in this case may be posed as follows: Do the notice of claim provisions contained in section 893.80, Stats., apply to federal civil rights actions brought in state court? And, if so, were the statutory requirements enumerated therein complied with in this case?

The city argues that compliance with section 893.80 is a condition precedent to the institution of any lawsuit commenced in state court against a municipality or its employees, including a lawsuit which is based on federal civil rights laws. Felder made the choice to proceed in state court and should be bound by state procedures. Section 893.80, the city further argues, is not inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution or federal law. The city argues that states are free to regulate the manner in which cases may be prosecuted in their courts provided that those regulations fall within constitutional limits, citing Kramer v. Horton, 128 Wis.2d 404, 383 N.W.2d 54, cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 324, 93 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986), in support. ² The city also cites cases in other jurisdictions where courts have upheld the application of state notice statutes to federal civil rights claims and have stated that those statutes do not offend federal policy. The city states that the purpose of the statute is to enable a municipality to "compromise the claim and settle it without a costly and expensive lawsuit," quoting Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis.2d 1, 9, 308 N.W.2d 403 (1981). This statutory purpose does not frustrate federal law because a plaintiff who complies with the notice requirements retains the opportunity to negotiate and pursue the section 1983 claim. The right to go forward with the civil rights claim remains unaffected. And the municipality, due to the notice requirement, is given the opportunity to investigate the claim and attempt to settle it, if desired, without being forced to proceed immediately to the adversarial setting in the courtroom. Finally, the city reiterates that it is not seeking to enforce the...