Jent v. State

• Decision Date: 03 December 1981
• Docket Number: No. 58744,58744
• Citation: 408 So.2d 1024
• Parties: William Riley JENT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 1024

408 So.2d 1024

William Riley JENT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 58744.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 3, 1981.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 15, 1982.

Leonard J. Holton, Dade City, and Jerry Hill, Public Defender, and David A. Davis, Asst. Public Defender, Bartow, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

William Jent appeals his conviction of first-degree murder and sentence of death. We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution, and affirm both his conviction and sentence.

On July 13, 1979 four men rode on horseback through the Richloam Game Preserve in Pasco County looking for some stray cattle. Instead of the cattle, they found the badly burned body of a young woman. Six weeks later an indictment issued, charging Jent and his stepbrother Ernest Miller ¹ with the premeditated murder of a woman named "Tammy." ²

At trial three eyewitnesses presented an ugly, confused story-a drunken swimming party, the beating of the unknown woman by Jent and his stepbrother, transporting her in the trunk of a car to Miller's home where four men raped her, and placing the woman back in the car trunk and taking her to the game preserve where Jent and Miller poured gasoline on the woman and set her on fire. The medical examiner testified that the victim had been alive when ignited and that burns were the cause of death. The jury convicted Jent as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to death. This appeal followed.

Jent alleges that the trial court erred by failing to provide him with transcripts of the grand jury testimony of three eyewitnesses. Just prior to trial Jent's attorney requested access to this testimony, claiming that the three witnesses' testimony at trial would be inconsistent with what they had told the grand jury. ³ Counsel claimed that the prior testimony would provide impeachment material, to which Jent was entitled under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). After hearing argument, the court found that the defense had not laid a proper predicate for disclosure of grand jury testimony under the exceptions to section 905.27, Florida Statutes (1979). ⁴

There is no pretrial right to inspect grand jury testimony as an aid in preparing one's defense and holding an in camera inspection of such testimony is a matter within the trial court's discretion. Minton v. State, 113 So.2d 361 (Fla.1959). To obtain access to grand jury testimony, a proper predicate must be laid. Mere surmise or speculation regarding possible inconsistencies in testimony is not a proper predicate. Id.

The three eyewitnesses testified at Jent's trial. Through cross-examination, defense counsel drew attention to inconsistencies between each one's trial testimony and her previously given depositions. ⁵ If, as defense counsel stated, he sought the grand jury testimony in order to attack these witnesses' credibility, the cross-examination obviated that need for their prior testimony. We agree that the defense failed to present a sufficient predicate and find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the request for access to grand jury testimony.

A few days prior to Jent's trial Samantha Carver, an eyewitness, pled nolo contendere to a charge, arising from the instant homicide, of accessory after the fact. Jent sought to depose Carver, but, on advice of counsel, she invoked her fifth amendment right to remain silent. Jent then moved for a continuance and an order requiring Carver to submit to a deposition. ⁶ After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion, finding that Carver still had a fifth amendment privilege, that if her testimony were personally inculpatory she could face other criminal charges, ⁷ and that the defense had no reasonable grounds to believe that her testimony would exculpate Jent. Jent now claims that the court erred in denying his motion for a continuance, thereby denying him effective assistance of counsel.

We find no merit to this claim. A continuance may be granted in a trial court's discretion, but only for good cause shown by the party seeking the continuance. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.190(g)(2). The trial court's ruling will not be disturbed unless a palpable abuse of discretion is demonstrated to the reviewing court. Magill v. State, 386 So.2d 1188 (Fla.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 927, 101 S.Ct. 1384, 67 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981). No such showing has been made in the instant case. Additionally, Jent's counsel diligently pursued the matter, and his suffering an adverse ruling does not rise to the level of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Jent also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of murder. He alleges that the quality of the evidence is so poor that it fails to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and asks this Court to reweigh the evidence as it did in Tibbs v. State, 337 So.2d 788 (Fla.1976). In making this claim Jent did not have the benefit of our second Tibbs opinion in which we receded from the case on which he relies. Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1981). In the latter Tibbs we reaffirmed this Court's previous conclusion in State v. Smith, 249 So.2d 16 (Fla.1971), that, when a jury properly performs its duty, a reviewing court should not reweigh the evidence.

The state concedes that its witnesses were not pillars of the community. Determining the credibility of witnesses, however, is within the province of the jury. It is the jury's duty to resolve factual conflicts, and, absent a clear showing of error, its findings will not be disturbed. Alvord v. State, 322 So.2d 533 (Fla.1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 923, 96 S.Ct. 3234, 49 L.Ed.2d 1229 (1976); Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla.1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 911, 96 S.Ct. 3227, 49 L.Ed.2d 1221 (1976). Our review of the record convinces us that the jury performed its function properly and that its verdict is supported by competent, substantial evidence. ⁸

When the body was found, the victim's head was resting against a small stump, which a detective uprooted and had examined. Laboratory technicians found several hairs on the stump, some of which came from the victim and one of unknown origin. The technician who performed a microanalysis of the hairs testified at trial. During the proffer of her testimony, as well as during direct and cross-examination, she testified that the unknown hair was microscopically the same as Jent's and that it was "highly likely" that the unknown hair and the samples of Jent's hair that she had examined had come from the same source. In response to questions from both sides regarding positive identification, however, she repeatedly stated that the unknown hair could not positively be identified as having come from Jent. ⁹

Defense counsel objected to testimony regarding hair analysis on the ground that such analysis is not sufficiently reliable or exact to be allowed into evidence. The state countered the objection by claiming that hair analysis is a recognized scientific procedure and that the defense's argument went to the weight to be given the testimony, not to its admissibility. The trial judge stated that the reliability of microanalysis was a determination for the court to make. After the proffer of the technician's testimony and argument by both sides, the court overruled the defense's objection and allowed the testimony into evidence.

As a general rule, the problem presented to a trial court is whether scientific tests are so unreliable and scientifically unacceptable that admission of those test results constitutes error. Coppolino v. State, 223 So.2d 68 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927, 90 S.Ct. 2242, 26 L.Ed.2d 794 (1970). This Court has recognized that testimony regarding hair analysis can be admitted into evidence in a criminal trial. Peek v. State, 395 So.2d 492 (Fla.1980). A trial court has wide discretion concerning the admissibility of evidence, and, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, a ruling regarding admissibility will not be disturbed. See Mikenas v. State, 367 So.2d 606 (Fla.1978); Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Coppolino v. State. We find no abuse of discretion in regards to allowing hair analysis testimony in the instant case, nor do we find the substance of that testimony out of order. The technician repeatedly stated that she could not positively identify the unknown hair as being Jent's. Determining what weight to accord this testimony was within the jury's province, and no error occurred in permitting the jury to hear this testimony.

Jent claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude cameras from the courtroom during his trial. Neither the United States Supreme Court nor this Court has found the presence of cameras in a courtroom to constitute a per se denial of due process. Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560, 101 S.Ct. 802, 66 L.Ed.2d 740 (1981); In Re Petition of Post-Newsweek Stations, Florida, Inc., 370 So.2d 764 (Fla.), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 976, 100 S.Ct. 476, 62 L.Ed.2d 403 (1979). In order to have cameras excluded from a courtroom during trial, a defendant must show prejudice of constitutional dimensions. Compare Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 97 (Fla.1979), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936, 101 S.Ct. 1402, 67 L.Ed.2d 371 (1981), with State v. Green, 395 So.2d 532 (Fla.1981).

Jent's only allegation regarding this claim is that the clicking of the camera distracted his attorney, thereby denying him the effective assistance of counsel. The trial judge, while expressing his dislike for the presence of cameras, stated that he could not hear any such clicking. He also stated that he would grant the motion if, at any time, he found the camera distracting. The motion was never granted, so, obviously, the court never found the camera so distracting as to necessitate its removal. We find that Jent has not shown...