408 U.S. 606 (1972), 71-1017, Gravel v. United States
|Docket Nº:||No. 71-1017|
|Citation:||408 U.S. 606, 92 S.Ct. 2614, 33 L.Ed.2d 583|
|Party Name:||Gravel v. United States|
|Case Date:||June 29, 1972|
|Court:||United States Supreme Court|
Argued April 19-20, 1972
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
A United States Senator read to a subcommittee from classified documents (the Pentagon Papers), which he then placed in the public record. The press reported that the Senator had arranged for private publication of the Papers. A grand jury investigating whether violations of federal law were implicated subpoenaed an aide to the Senator. The Senator, as an intervenor, moved to quash the subpoena, contending that it would violate the Speech or Debate Clause to compel the aide to testify. The District Court denied the motion, but limited the questioning of the aide. The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial, but modified the protective order, ruling that congressional aides and other persons may not be questioned regarding legislative acts, and that, though the [92 S.Ct. 2618] private publication was not constitutionally protected, a common law privilege similar to the privilege of protecting executive officials from liability for libel, see Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, barred questioning the aide concerning such publication.
1. The Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member of Congress but also to his aide, insofar as the aide's conduct would be a protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168; Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82; and Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, distinguished. Pp. 613-622.
2. The Speech or Debate Clause does not extend immunity to the Senator's aide from testifying before the grand jury about the alleged arrangement for private publication of the Pentagon Papers, as such publication had no connection with the legislative process. Pp. 622-627.
3. The aide, similarly, had no nonconstitutional testimonial privilege from being questioned by the grand jury in connection with its inquiry into whether private publication of the Papers violated federal law. P. 627.
4. The Court of Appeals' protective order was overly broad in enjoining interrogation of the aide with respect to any act, "in the broadest sense," that he performed within the cope of his employment, since the aide's immunity extended only to legislative acts as to which the Senator would be immune. And the aide may be questioned by the grand jury about the source of classified documents in the Senator's possession, as long as the questioning implicates no legislative act. The order in other respects would suffice if it forbade questioning the aide or others about the conduct or motives of the Senator or his aides at the subcommittee meeting; communications between the Senator and his aides relating to that meeting or any legislative act of the Senator; or steps of the Senator or his aides preparatory for the meeting, if not relevant to third-party crimes. Pp. 627-629.
455 F.2d 753, vacated and remanded.
WHITE, J., wrote the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. STEWART, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, post, p. 629. DOUGLAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 633. BRENNAN, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which DOUGLAS and MARSHALL, JJ., joined, post, p. 648.
WHITE, J., lead opinion
Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE WHITE, announced by MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN.
These cases arise out of the investigation by a federal grand jury into possible criminal conduct with respect to the release and publication of a classified Defense Department study entitled History of the United States Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy. This document, popularly known as the Pentagon Papers, bore a Defense security classification of Top Secret-Sensitive. The crimes being investigated included the retention of public property or records with intent to convert (18 U.S.C. § 641), the gathering and transmitting of national defense information (18 U.S.C. § 73), the concealment or removal of public records or documents (18 U.S.C. § 2071), and conspiracy to commit such offenses and to defraud the United States (18 U.S.C. § 371).
Among the witnesses subpoenaed were Leonard S. Rodberg, an assistant to Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska and a resident fellow at the Institute of Policy Studies, and Howard Webber, Director of M. I.T. Press. Senator Gravel, as intervenor,1 [92 S.Ct. 2619] filed motions to quash the
subpoenas and to require the Government to specify the particular questions to be addressed to Rodberg.2 He asserted that requiring these witnesses to appear and testify would violate his privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause of the United States Constitution, Art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
It appeared that, on the night of June 29, 1971, Senator Gravel, as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Buildings and Grounds of the Senate Public Works Committee, convened a meeting of the subcommittee and there read extensively from a copy of the Pentagon Papers. He then placed the entire 47 volumes of the study in the public record. Rodberg had been added to the Senator's staff earlier in the day and assisted Gravel in preparing for and conducting the hearing.3 Some weeks later there were press reports that Gravel had arranged for the papers to be published by Beacon
Press4 and that members of Gravel's staff had talked with Webber as editor of M.I.T. Press.5
The District Court overruled the motions to quash and to specify questions but entered an order proscribing certain categories of questions. United States v. Doe, 332 F.Supp. 930 (Mass.1971). The Government's contention that, for purposes of applying the Speech or Debate Clause the courts were free to inquire into the regularity of the subcommittee meeting was rejected.6 Because [92 S.Ct. 2620] the Clause protected all legislative
acts, it was held to shield from inquiry anything the Senator did at the subcommittee meeting and "certain acts done in preparation therefor." Id. at 935. The Senator's privilege also prohibited
inquiry into things done by Dr. Rodberg as the Senator's agent or assistant which would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged, if performed by the Senator personally.
Id. at 937-938.7 The trial court, however, held the private publication of the documents was not privileged by the Speech or Debate Clause. Id. at 936.8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of the motions to quash but modified the protective order to reflect its own views of the scope of the congressional privilege. United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753 (CA1 1972). Agreeing that Senator and aide were one for
the purposes of the Speech or Debate Clause, and that the Clause foreclosed inquiry of both Senator and aide with respect to legislative acts, the Court of Appeals also viewed the privilege as barring direct inquiry of the Senator or his aide, but not of third parties, as to the sources of the Senator's information used in performing legislative duties.9 Although it did not consider private publication by the Senator or Beacon Press to be protected by the Constitution, the Court of Appeals apparently held that neither Senator nor aide could be questioned about it because of a common law privilege akin to the judicially created immunity of executive officers from [92 S.Ct. 2621] liability for libel contained in a news release issued in the course of their normal duties. See Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). This privilege, fashioned by the Court of Appeals, would not protect third parties from similar inquiries before the grand jury. As modified by the Court of Appeals, the protective order to be observed by prosecution and grand jury was:
(1) No witness before the grand jury currently investigating the release of the Pentagon Papers may be questioned about Senator Mike Gravel's conduct at a meeting of the Subcommittee on Public Buildings and Grounds on June 29, 1971, nor, if the questions are directed to the motives or purposes behind the Senator's conduct at that meeting, about any communications with him or with
his aides regarding the activities of the Senator or his aides during the period of their employment, in preparation for and related to said meeting.
(2) Dr. Leonard S. Rodberg may not be questioned about his own actions in the broadest sense, including observations and communications, oral or written, by or to him or coming to his attention while being interviewed for, or after having been engaged as a member of Senator Gravel's personal staff to the extent that they were in the course of his employment.
The United States petitioned for certiorari challenging the ruling that aides and other persons may not be questioned with respect to legislative acts and that an aide to a Member of Congress has a common law privilege not to testify before a grand jury with respect to private publication of materials introduced into a subcommittee record. Senator Gravel also petitioned for certiorari seeking reversal of the Court of Appeals insofar as it held private publication unprotected by the Speech or Debate Clause and asserting that the protective order of the Court of Appeals too narrowly protected against inquiries that a grand jury could direct to third parties. We granted both petitions. 405 U.S. 916 (1972).
Because the claim is that a Member's aide shares the Member's constitutional privilege, we consider first whether and to what extent Senator Gravel himself is exempt from process or inquiry by a grand jury investigating the commission of a crime. Our frame of reference is Art. I, § 6, cl. 1, of the Constitution:
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