U.S. v. Sawyers

• Decision Date: 13 June 2005
• Docket Number: No. 02-5835.,02-5835.
• Citation: 409 F.3d 732
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tyrice L. SAWYERS, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

409 F.3d 732

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Tyrice L. SAWYERS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 02-5835.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Argued: November 3, 2004.

Decided and Filed: June 13, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

ARGUED: Robert D. Little, Law Office of Robert Little, Maplewood, New Jersey, for Appellant. Paul M. O'Brien, Assistant United States Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Robert D. Little, Law Office of Robert Little, Maplewood, New Jersey, for Appellant. J. Gabriel Banks, Assistant United States Attorney, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellee. Tyrice L. Sawyers, Atlanta, Georgia, pro se.

Before: MOORE and GIBBONS, Circuit Judges; EDMUNDS, District Judge.^*

OPINION

EDMUNDS, District Judge.

Defendant-Appellant Tyrice Sawyers appeals his conviction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a), for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and his sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and the sentencing guidelines. For the reasons that follow, the conviction is AFFIRMED. The district court erred, however, by employing the categorical approach when determining whether statutory rape constitutes a predicate "violent felony" under the ACCA. Therefore, the sentence is VACATED and the case is REMANDED for further findings consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

The underlying facts in this case are not in dispute. On November 10, 1999, Tyrice Sawyers ("Sawyers") was indicted for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and 924(a)-i.e., unlawfully possessing a firearm as a previously convicted felon. During trial, the government presented testimony of three police officers who recovered a gun they witnessed Sawyers discard over a fence. Prior to jury deliberations, Sawyers stipulated that (1) he had previously been convicted of a felony punishable by more than one year in prison and (2) the firearm recovered had moved in interstate commerce because it was not manufactured in Tennessee. On February 20, 2000, the jury returned a guilty verdict.

On June 6, 2002, the district court, following the ACCA, sentenced Sawyers to 300 months in prison. The ACCA was applied because the court found that three of Sawyers's previous convictions-facilitation of aggravated burglary, statutory rape, and retaliation for past action-were "violent felonies" as described under the Act. In reaching this conclusion, the district court followed the strict categorical approach set out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990).

Sawyers filed a timely appeal arguing that his conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence, that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him, that he should not have been sentenced under the ACCA, and that, pursuant to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), the sentence violated his constitutional rights. Each argument is addressed in turn.

II. The Conviction

A. Sufficiency

A conviction is supported by sufficient evidence if, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and giving the government the benefit of all inferences reasonably drawn from the testimony, a rational jury could find the elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. M/G Transport Services, Inc., 173 F.3d 584, 589 (6th Cir.1999)(citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). For Sawyers's conviction, the government was required to prove three elements: (1) he was convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) he knowingly possessed a firearm or ammunition; and (3) such possession was in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. United States v. Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 372 n. 1 (6th Cir.1991).

Here, Sawyers argues that the government did not prove the third element beyond a reasonable doubt. In United States v. Chesney, 86 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir.1996), however, this Court held that "[the defendant's] stipulation that the gun had been transported in interstate commerce was sufficient to meet § 922(g)(1)'s `in or affecting commerce' requirement." Therefore, because Sawyers similarly stipulated that the firearm moved in interstate commerce, the third element was proven and Sawyers's conviction was supported by sufficient evidence.

B. Constitutionality

Sawyers's second argument is a reformulated version of his first. Specifically, he contends that § 922(g) is unconstitutional as applied to him because the Government failed to prove any substantial connection to interstate commerce. Questions concerning the constitutionality of a statute are reviewed de novo. United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 397 (6th Cir.2000) (citations omitted).

As noted, the court in Chesney held that the interstate commerce requirement was satisfied when a defendant stipulates that the gun was transported into that state. Chesney, 86 F.3d at 570-72. Sawyers argues, however, that the reasoning and standard set forth in Chesney has been implicitly overruled by the Supreme Court.

Sawyers relies on United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995), United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 146 L.Ed.2d 658 (2000), and Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 120 S.Ct. 1904, 146 L.Ed.2d 902 (2000). Faced with the same argument, however, the Chesney court held that § 922(g) survives constitutional scrutiny under Lopez because, unlike the statute examined there, § 922(g) contains a jurisdictional element. Chesney, 86 F.3d at 569-70. Moreover, as noted in Chesney, the Supreme Court expressed approval of 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a),¹ the predecessor statute to § 922(g)(1), because it explicitly barred only those activities that were "in commerce or affecting commerce." Id.

The decision in Chesney preceded Morrison and Jones. In United States v. Napier, however, this Court found that the reasoning of Chesney has not been overruled. Napier, 233 F.3d at 400-01. Faced with a challenge to § 922(g)(8), a statute that shares § 922(g)(1)'s jurisdictional provision, this Court held that

Jones does not invalidate the Chesney analysis. In contrast to [the statute in Jones], § 922(g) does not contain the "use" requirement that was at the heart of the Jones opinion. Nothing in Jones suggests that the Supreme Court is backing off of its opinion that § 1202(a)... required only "the minimal nexus that the firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce." Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563, 575, 97 S.Ct. 1963, 52 L.Ed.2d 582 (1977).

We accordingly reject [the defendant's] contention that he could not be convicted under § 922(g)(8) unless the government could show that his continued possession of the gun had a substantial connection to interstate commerce. There is no question that the firearm and ammunition possessed by [the defendant] had previously traveled in interstate commerce. That is sufficient to establish the interstate commerce connection.

Id. at 401. In addition, the Napier court rejected the claim that Morrison nullified the Chesney ruling because § 922(g), unlike the statute in Morrison, does contain a jurisdictional element. Id. at 402. Therefore, this Court rejects Sawyers's argument that § 922(g)(1) is not constitutional as applied to him.

III. The Armed Career Criminal Act

This Court renders de novo review of a district court's determination that a defendant should be sentenced as an armed career criminal. United States v. Maness, 23 F.3d 1006, 1008 (6th Cir.1994).

The ACCA provides that

a person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions by any court . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be fined under this title and imprisoned not less than fifteen years. . . .

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The statute goes on to define "violent felony" as

any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that—(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. . . .

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1)(B). In other words, to constitute a "violent felony," it must be shown that the crime is punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; in addition, it must either (a) be specifically enumerated-i.e., burglary, arson, or extortion, (b) involve the use of explosives, (c) contain an element that involves physical force or (d) present a "serious potential risk of physical injury." Crimes in this last category are often said to fall within the "otherwise clause."

In this analysis, courts must generally follow "a formal categorical approach, looking only to the statutory definitions of the prior offenses, and not to the particular facts underlying those convictions." Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Kaplansky, 42 F.3d 320, 322 (6th Cir.1994) (en banc). A narrow exception exists for "cases where a jury ... was actually required to find all the elements of the generic offense." Shepard v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 1258, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)(quoting Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143). In this circuit, the exception has been held to apply "where a statute broadly defines a felony." United States v. Seaton, 45 F.3d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1995)(citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, 110 S.Ct. 2143); see also United States v. Sacko, 247 F.3d 21, 23 (1st Cir.2001)(holding that "when the relevant criminal statute encompasses both violent and non-violent felonies, a sentencing court may go beyond the statutory language").

A. Facilitation of Aggravated Burglary

In 1992, in a Tennessee state court, Sawyers pled guilty to...