U.S. v. Myers, 93-30201
Decision Date | 01 December 1994 |
Docket Number | No. 93-30201,93-30201 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Becky Ann MYERS, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Nancy Bergeson, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Eugene, OR, for defendant-appellant.
Frank R. Papagni, Asst. U.S. Atty., Eugene, OR, for plaintiff-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.
Before: ALARCON, NORRIS, and LEAVY, Circuit Judges.
In this appeal we are called upon to determine whether a district court may consider a defendant's post-offense conduct as a ground for departing upward in imposing sentence under section 4A1.3 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("U.S.S.G." or "Guidelines"). For the reasons which follow, we hold that the district court in the instant case did not err by taking such conduct into consideration at sentencing.
Between November 1990 and July 1992, Becky Ann Myers fraudulently obtained more than $144,000 from Donald and Evelyn Marshall and members of the Marshall family. The FBI arrested Myers in August 1992 on a charge of wire fraud, and Myers was later released on her own recognizance to a halfway house. In November 1992 a federal grand jury handed down a two-count indictment charging Myers with having committed mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. Secs. 1341 and 1343. Myers, still on release, entered a plea of not guilty to both counts. Myers was subsequently discharged from the halfway house but continued on release pending trial.
Pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement, Myers entered a change of plea in February 1993 in which she admitted her guilt on both counts of the indictment. The district court continued Myers' release pending sentencing. The following month, and while still awaiting sentencing, Myers was rearrested on a charge of having obtained another $1,690 by wire fraud.
At the sentencing hearing on May 10, 1993, the district court heard evidence concerning Myers' post-offense act of wire fraud. The court then rejected Myers' contention that her post-offense conduct could not be used as a basis for an upward departure under U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3 and sentenced Myers to thirty-seven months imprisonment, to be followed by three years of supervised release and the payment of partial restitution to the Marshalls. Myers has timely appealed, challenging (1) the district court's upward departure based on post-offense conduct; (2) the amount of restitution ordered; and (3) the calculation of her criminal history category, based on (a) the inclusion of two allegedly constitutionally infirm convictions, and (b) the finding that she was on probation at the time she committed the charged offense. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(a)(2) and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291, and we affirm all but the restitution order.
Myers' first and principal argument on appeal is that the district court erred by considering her post-offense criminal conduct while on release as a justification for departing upward at sentencing. We reject this contention.
In imposing sentence, a district court may only depart upward from the applicable Guidelines range if the court identifies an "aggravating ... circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines[.]" 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b). We review the decision to depart upward under the three-part test of United States v. Lira-Barraza, 941 F.2d 745, 746-47 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc). First, we examine de novo whether the court had legal authority to depart upward; second, we review for clear error the factual findings offered as support for the upward departure; and third, we examine the reasonableness of the extent of the upward departure. United States v. Smallwood, 35 F.3d 414, 416 (9th Cir.1994).
A sentencing court may depart upward from the applicable Guidelines range "[i]f reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the ... likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes[.]" U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3, p.s. Put somewhat differently, "[a] departure under this provision is warranted when the criminal history category significantly under-represents ... the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes." Id. Citing United States v. Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d 316 (9th Cir.1993), Myers argues, inter alia, that the district court erred by considering anything other than her prior (i.e., pre-offense) criminal conduct as a basis for upward departure under section 4A1.3.
Although this Circuit has not previously faced this precise question, every other Circuit that has done so has held that section 4A1.3 authorizes a court to take into consideration a defendant's post-offense, pre-sentence conduct as a possible ground for departing upward in imposing sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Yates, 22 F.3d 981, 987 (10th Cir.1994) () (citation omitted); United States v. Fahm, 13 F.3d 447, 450 n. 3, 451 (1st Cir.1994) ( )(citations omitted); United States v. Keats, 937 F.2d 58, 66-67 (2d Cir.) ("[a]n upward departure in the criminal history category can be based on post-arrest conduct") (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 399, 116 L.Ed.2d 348 (1991); United States v. Fayette, 895 F.2d 1375, 1380 (11th Cir.1990) (); United States v. Sanchez, 893 F.2d 679, 681-82 (5th Cir.1990) ( ); United States v. Jordan, 890 F.2d 968, 976-77 (7th Cir.1989) ( ).
Myers' reliance on Carrillo-Alvarez is clearly misplaced. Unlike the cases cited above, Carrillo-Alvarez dealt solely with the type of prior (i.e., pre-offense) criminal conduct that already had been "adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the [G]uidelines[.]" See 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3553(b). Nothing in the Guidelines indicates that the Sentencing Commission adequately considered a defendant's post-offense conduct as an aggravating circumstance warranting an upward departure. Accordingly, and in the light of the above authorities, we agree with our sister Circuits and hold that U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3 constitutes legal authority for a district court to depart upward in imposing sentence, based on a defendant's post-offense criminal conduct.
We find no clear error in the district court's factual findings in support of its decision to depart upward, and disagree with Myers' contention that these facts are not serious enough to warrant an upward departure. Regardless whether viewed in isolation or in comparison with others in the same criminal history category, see Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d at 320-23, Myers' post-offense criminal conduct is not only serious; it constitutes the strongest possible evidence of a likelihood that she will continue to commit similar crimes in the future. See U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3, p.s. Accordingly, we find that "reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect ... the likelihood that [she] will commit other crimes," see id., and that the district court's statement of reasons in support of departure was adequate. Cf. Carrillo-Alvarez, 3 F.3d at 323-25.
We also find the degree of departure to have...
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