Steele v. Empson

• Decision Date: 30 October 1895
• Citation: 142 Ind. 397,41 N.E. 822
• Parties: STEELE v. EMPSON.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

142 Ind. 397

41 N.E. 822

STEELE

v.EMPSON.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Oct. 30, 1895.

Appeal from circuit court, Jackson county; S. B. Voyles, Judge.

Petition by Azariah Empson against Beldora Steele and others for construction of a drain. From a judgment affirming the order of the board of commissioners establishing the drain, defendant Beldora Steele appeals. Affirmed.Burrell & Branaman, for appellant. Applewhite & Applewhite and W. K. Marshall, for appellee.

MONKS, J.

On the 14th day of December, 1892, appellee filed his petition before the board of commissioners of Jackson county, praying for the establishment of a drain, under the provisions of the act approved April 21, 1881 (Acts 1881, p. 410; Rev. St. 1881, §§ 4285-4317; Rev. St. 1894, §§ 5655-5688). Viewers were appointed by the board on the same day, to report before the next term. At the March term, 1893, of the board, the viewers not having filed any report, the case was continued until the next term. Sections 2, 8, and 9 (being sections 4286, 4292, and 4293, Rev. St. 1881), of the drainage act, under which this proceeding was brought, were amended by an act which took effect March 4, 1893 (Acts 1893, p. 329; Rev. St. 1894, §§ 5656, 5662, 5663). By the amended sections it was provided that the benefits to public highways should be assessed to the township and paid out of the road fund, while the original section provided the benefits should be assessed to the county. The amendatory section provided that the notice given should be by publication, while the section amended provided that it should be by posting. On April 8, 1893, the viewers filed their report, and at the June term of the board appellant filed a motion to continue the cause, for the reason that proper notice had not been given to the owners of the land assessed for benefits, which motion the board sustained, and continued the case “for publication of the notice as the law now requires.” At the next term of the board, in September, proof of publication of notice in a newspaper was made, and thereupon appellant filed her remonstrance, and reviewers were appointed, who reported at the December term, 1893, approving the action of the viewers in all things, and the board entered an order establishing the ditch. Appellant appealed to the circuit court, and there filed a plea in abatement in which it was alleged “that the court had no jurisdiction, for the reason that this proceeding was commenced under the old law, and since that the statute has been amended by the legislature of 1893, changing the liability of certain parties to the assessment, and there is no provision saving pending cases.” A demurrer for want of facts was sustained to this plea. Appellant then orally moved the court to strike out the report of the viewers, for the reason, stated by appellant, “that Morris B. Singer, after his appointment as such viewer by the board, and before the report was filed, became one of the sureties on the bond of the petitioner for the payment of the costs and expenses in said proceeding, and thereby became interested, and not competent to act as viewer,” which motion the court overruled. Thereupon appellant filed his written motion to dismiss the cause. This motion was also overruled. The cause was tried by a jury, a verdict returned, and, over a motion for a venire de novo, and a motion for a new trial, judgment was rendered establishing the proposed work. Appellant also moved the court to modify the judgment, which was overruled. Exceptions were properly reserved to all the rulings of the court.

The first error assigned is “that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the answer in abatement.” Appellant contends that, when the act of 1893 (Acts 1893, p. 329; Rev. St. 1894, §§ 5656, 5662, 5663; Rev. St. 1881, §§ 4286, 4292, 4293) took effect, the jurisdiction of the board of commissioners was ousted, for the reason that said act contained no provision saving pending cases, and that therefore the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the plea in abatement. The act of 1893, supra, did not oust the jurisdiction of the board of commissioners over said cause, but the same, from the time said act took effect, was governed by its provisions, and it was necessary that all steps taken and proceedings had after that time should comply with the requirements of said act. The report of the viewers was filed April 8th, after said act was in force, and should have conformed to all the requirements thereof. At the June term of the board of commissioners, on motion of appellant, the case was continued, that notice might be given as required by said act. At the September term of the board proof was made, and the board found that notice had been given as required by said act, and thereupon appellant filed her remonstrance. It is not shown that any provision of the amendatory act was not complied with. There was no error in sustaining said demurrer.

The second error assigned is that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion to reject and strike out the report of the viewers. The reasons assigned for the motion have been heretofore stated. At the time the viewers were appointed Singer was not on the bond named, and it is not claimed that he was not then a disinterested person. The report was filed April 8th, and on the same day the bond was filed. This court cannot say, from the record, which was filed first, or that the bond was not signed and filed after the report was signed and filed. No motion was made by appellant to reject or strike out the report before the board of commissioners for this cause. The objection, therefore, if tenable when properly raised, was waived. It is a well-settled rule that questions not properly presented to the board of commissioners, except such as go to jurisdiction over the subject-matter, cannot be made for the first time in the circuit court. Budd v. Reidelbach, 128 Ind. 145, and cases cited on page 147, 27 N. E. 349;Metty v. Marsh, 124 Ind. 18, and cases cited on page 24, 23 N. E. 702. The motion was properly overruled.

The third error assigned calls in question the action of the court in refusing to sustain appellant's motion to dismiss the cause. This motion sets out six reasons why said motion should be sustained. None of them are jurisdictional, but, if true, are mere irregularities, which would not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject-matter. Updegraff v. Palmer, 107 Ind. 181, and cases cited on page 185, 6 N. E. 353. Besides, no such motion was made before the board of commissioners, and the same could not, therefore, be made in the circuit court. Budd v. Reidelbach, and authorities cited, supra. There was no error in overruling this motion.

The fourth error assigned is “that the court erred in indicating, on appellant's remonstrance, at the suggestion of appellee, on which items therein he would permit appellant to give evidence to the jury.” It is set forth, in the bill of exceptions, “that, after the jury had been sworn, and before any evidence had been given, appellee moved the court to indicate what items of the remonstrance evidence would be submitted to the jury upon, and to the motion of appellee, appellant objected, and over the objections of appellant the court indicated and said he would not permit evidence to be introduced to the jury to support items numbered 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, to which appellant excepted.” No question is presented by this assignment of error. The items of the remonstrance were not stricken out. They remained a part of the remonstrance, after the statement of the court, the same as before. The statement of the court that evidence would not be admitted under the items named was not a ruling to which an available exception could be taken. It amounted to no more than an announcement in advance of what his ruling would be if such evidence were offered. None was offered. The question could only be presented by an offer to prove facts in support of said items. If such evidence had been excluded by the court when properly offered, an exception could then be taken to the ruling of the court, and not before. We have carefully examined said items, however, and think it would have been proper to have excluded such evidence if it had been offered. Said items either presented questions already determined by the court, and not triable by jury, or were causes of...