Wait v. Leavell Cattle, Inc.
| Decision Date | 26 December 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 26547.,26547. |
| Parties | Janet L. WAIT aka Janet L. Rangel and John W. Anderson, II, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. LEAVELL CATTLE, INC., Alonzo B. Leavell, dba Leavell Cattle, Horseshoe "S" Ranch, Inc., John Does I-X, and John Doe Corporations I-X, Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Pederson & Clark, Twin Falls, for appellants. Eric R. Clark argued.
Merrill & Merrill, Pocatello, for respondents. Stephen S. Dunn argued. EISMANN, Justice.
The plaintiffs appeal from orders granting the motions for summary judgment filed by LeaVell Cattle, Inc., and Alonzo B. LeaVell. We affirm.
On October 10, 1997, at about 12:30 a.m., the plaintiff Janet Wait was driving home from work in a motor vehicle owned by the plaintiff John Anderson, II. As she rounded a curve, she saw several head of cattle on the road, and she swerved to avoid hitting them. She lost control of the vehicle, and it left the road and rolled.
On October 6, 1999, the plaintiffs filed this action seeking to recover damages for the personal injuries suffered by Wait and for the damage to Anderson's vehicle. They named as defendants "LeaVell Cattle, Inc.; Horseshoe "S" Ranch, Inc.;1 John Does I-X; and John Doe Corporations I-X."
On December 9, 1999, the plaintiffs served the summons and complaint upon Alonzo B. LeaVell as the statutory agent of LeaVell Cattle, Inc.2 On January 21, 2000, LeaVell Cattle, Inc., responded to the complaint by filing a motion for summary judgment. It supported the motion with the affidavit of Alonzo B. LeaVell in which he stated that the corporation had been formed for the purpose of owning and operating a truck and horse trailer, that its only assets were a truck and horse trailer, and that it never owned or had control over any cattle or lands upon which the cattle were kept.
On January 28, 2000, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint adding "Alonzo B. LeaVell, dba LeaVell Cattle" (Alonzo) as a defendant. On February 28, 2000, Alonzo also moved for summary judgment on the ground that any claim against him was barred by the statute of limitations. The district court granted both motions for summary judgment, and it awarded attorney fees to LeaVell Cattle, Inc., under Idaho Code § 12-121.
A. Does the phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action" in Rule 15(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure mean before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations or before the expiration of the period for service of process?
Rule 15(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure3 provides that an amendment changing the party against whom a claim is asserted will relate back to the date of the original pleading if: (a) the claim arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading; (b) within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the new party, he received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits; and (c) within the period provided by law for commencing the action against the new party, he knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against him, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.
Here, the issue is whether Alonzo received notice of this lawsuit within the period provided by law for commencing the action. The plaintiffs ask us to hold that the period provided by law for commencing the action includes the six-month period within which a summons must be served after the complaint is filed. If we were to so hold, that period would have ended on April 6, 2000,4 rather than on October 10, 1999.
The phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action" means before the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Hoopes v. Deere & Co., 117 Idaho 386, 788 P.2d 201 (1990). In Hoopes, this Court expressly rejected the argument that the phrase meant the time within which the summons and complaint must be served. A civil action is commenced by the filing of a complaint with the court, IDAHO R. CIV. P. 3(a), not by the service of process. The plaintiffs have not presented any argument that a civil action is commenced at some other time. It is undisputed that Alonzo did not receive notice of the institution of this action until he was served with process on December 9, 1999, which was after the running of the two-year statute of limitations.5 Therefore, the amendment of the complaint to add Alonzo as a defendant would not relate back to the date of the original complaint.
When construing the phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action," the Court in Hoopes relied upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21, 106 S.Ct. 2379, 91 L.Ed.2d 18 (1986), which construed the then identical language in Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Hoopes Court also quoted from Chacon v. Sperry Corporation, 111 Idaho 270, 275, 723 P.2d 814, 819 (1986), as follows:
[P]art of the reason for adopting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Idaho, and interpreting our own rules adopted from the federal courts as uniformly as possible with the federal cases, was to establish a uniform practice and procedure in both the federal and state courts in the State of Idaho.
After Schiavone was decided, Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to provide that an amendment changing or naming the party against whom a claim is asserted can relate back if that party received notice of the action "within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint." Relying upon the above-quoted language from the Chacon case, the plaintiffs argue that we should construe Rule 15(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure to be identical with the current version of the Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. They argue that because the interpretation of the federal rule has changed, and the interpretation of the corresponding Idaho rule was based upon the prior interpretation of the federal rule, the interpretation of the Idaho rule should be changed to correspond to the current interpretation of the federal rule.
It is not the interpretation of the federal rule that has changed since Schiavone was decided. It is the wording of the rule that has changed. Plaintiffs have not presented any reasoned argument as to why a change in the wording of the federal rule should change the Idaho rule. In essence, they ask us to hold that the amendment of the federal rule also amended the corresponding Idaho rule. That we will not do.
The above-quoted language in Chacon stated our preference for interpreting the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure in conformance with the interpretation placed upon the same language in the federal rules. That preference is obviously limited to situations in which our rules and the federal rules contain identical language. The relevant wording of Rule 15(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure now differs from that of the corresponding federal rule, and therefore the interpretations of the two rules will differ. There is no basis for holding that the phrase "within the period provided by law for commencing the action" contained in the Idaho rule should have the same meaning as the phrase "within the period provided by Rule 4(m) for service of the summons and complaint" now contained in the federal rule.
B. Should the statute of limitations be tolled as to Alonzo B. LeaVell because he had not filed a certificate of assumed business name in the county in which the accident occurred?
Alonzo's father conducted a cattle business under the name LeaVell Cattle Co., and Alonzo worked in that business until his father's death in January 1993. Upon inheriting the assets from his father's estate, Alonzo began his own business under the name LeaVell Cattle. Prior to January 1, 1997, Idaho law required a person transacting business under an assumed or fictitious name to file a certificate of assumed business name with the county recorder of each county in which the business was to be conducted or transacted. Ch. 212, § 1, 1921 Idaho Sess. Laws 424. On February 19, 1993, Alonzo filed a certificate of assumed business name in Gooding County, where his primary business was located. It identified his business as "Alonzo B. LeaVell dba LeaVell Cattle." He did not file a certificate of assumed business name in Camas County, however, the county in which the accident occurred and in which he was also pasturing cattle.
Effective January 1, 1997, the former statutes relating to assumed business names were repealed, and "The Assumed Business Names Act of 1997" took effect. Ch. 218, 1996 Idaho Sess. Laws 718. It governs all certificates of assumed business name filed after January 1, 1997, and requires that a certificate of assumed business name be filed with the secretary of state, rather than with the county recorder of each county in which the person was conducting or transacting business. IDAHO CODE §...
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