Madison v. Purdy

• Decision Date: 21 April 1969
• Docket Number: No. 26370.,26370.
• Citation: 410 F.2d 99
• Parties: John MADISON and Kim Madison, Appellants, v. E. Wilson PURDY and Richard E. Gerstein, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

410 F.2d 99 (1969)

John MADISON and Kim Madison, Appellants, v. E. Wilson PURDY and Richard E. Gerstein, Appellees.

No. 26370.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

April 21, 1969.

Richard Kanner, Miami, Fla., for appellants.

Joseph W. Womack, Dixon, DeJarnette, Bradford, Williams, McKay & Kimbrell, Thomas C. Britton, County Atty., H. Jackson Dorney, Asst. County Atty., Miami, Fla., for appellees.

Before BROWN, Chief Judge, AINSWORTH, Circuit Judge, and COMISKEY, District Judge.

COMISKEY, District Judge:

This damage suit is the result of an unsuccessful Florida state prosecution against the plaintiffs-appellants. The defendants in this action are the State Attorney for the Eleventh Judicial District of Florida, comprising Dade County, and the Director of Public Safety and Sheriff of Dade County. Plaintiffs state two causes of action in their complaint: the first cause alleges a common law malicious prosecution and false arrest suit, and the second cause is a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1985 and § 1986. Upon motion of the defendant-appellee State Attorney, the suit was dismissed as to him on the ground of official immunity. The suit against the defendant Director of Public Safety and Sheriff of Dade County is still being prosecuted in the district court, and we are concerned only with the appeal from the order dismissing the suit against the State Attorney. For the reasons stated below, we reverse the judgment of dismissal.

A motion to dismiss on the basis of the pleadings alone should rarely be granted. In Barber v. Motor Vessel "Blue Cat", 5 Cir., 1967, 372 F.2d 626, 627, we pointed out that the practice of dismissing claims "on the basis of the barebone pleadings is a precarious one with a high mortality rate." There are certain guidelines which must be followed in considering a motion to dismiss. First, a court must accept as true all facts which are well pleaded in the complaint, and it must view such facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. "It is axiomatic that a motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted admits the facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges plaintiff's rights to relief based upon those facts. Thus, in deciding such a motion, the court views the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting as true all facts well pleaded." Ward v. Hudnell, 5 Cir., 1966, 366 F.2d 247, 249. Second, a complaint should not be dismissed unless there is no possibility that the plaintiff can recover under the allegations of his complaint. "In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). International Erectors v. Wilhoit Steel Erectors & Rental Service, 5 Cir., 1968, 400 F.2d 465, 471; Bobby Jones Garden Apartments, Inc. v. Suleski, 5 Cir., 1968, 391 F.2d 172, 177; Carmack v. Gibson, 5 Cir., 1966, 363 F.2d 862, 864. In Lewis v. Brautigam, 5 Cir., 1955, 227 F.2d 124, 127, 55 A.L.R.2d 505 we said:

"In determining the sufficiency of the complaint, the material facts, but not the unsupported conclusions of the pleader, are considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. * * * Civil proceedings in vindication of civil rights are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure * * *. Under those rules, the theory of the plaintiff in stating his claim is not so important. * * * The complaint should not be dismissed on motion unless, upon any theory, it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief under any state of facts that could be proved in support of his claim."

Assuming all the well pleaded facts in the complaint to be true for the purpose of this decision, and viewing the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs-appellants, we cannot say that it appears beyond doubt that they can prove no set of facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief.

With these principles in mind, we now examine the allegations of the complaint. Appellants allege that an information was filed against them for unlawfully torturing their infant daughter on August 23, 1967. On September 12, 1967, the appellants voluntarily submitted themselves to the defendant sheriff after a writ of capias and arrest warrants had been issued. It is further alleged that the case came on for trial on two separate occasions, but was continued each time upon motion of the State Attorney. On November 27, 1967, the information was dismissed by a criminal court judge for lack of prosecution. The appellants' child who had been declared dependent by the Juvenile Court and placed in a foster home at the commencement of the investigation of the crime, was returned to the appellants by order of the Judge of the Juvenile Court after the termination of the criminal proceedings.

In their complaint appellants are seeking to hold the appellee State Attorney liable in damages, even though he is entitled to the defense of official immunity. The leading case in this circuit on the official immunity of a prosecuting attorney is Lewis v. Brautigam, supra, 5 Cir., 1955, 227 F.2d 124. In that case we recognized that a prosecuting attorney is a quasi-judicial officer and as such generally enjoys official immunity:

"A prosecuting attorney has many duties involving the exercise of grave discretion in the performance of which he is a quasi-judicial officer representing the state. Citing authorities. Ordinarily, when so acting, he cannot be compelled to answer to a private citizen for errors in the determination either of law or of fact." 227 F.2d, at 128.

But we then pointed out that there is an important limitation upon a prosecuting attorney's official immunity: "A quasi-judicial officer, such as a prosecuting attorney, who acts outside the scope of his jurisdiction and without authorization of law, cannot shelter himself from liability by the plea that he is acting under color of office." 227 F.2d, at...