Jones v. United States

Decision Date04 February 1980
Docket NumberNo. 11918.,11918.
Citation411 A.2d 624
PartiesMichael A. JONES, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
CourtD.C. Court of Appeals

Silas J. Wasserstrom, Public Defender Service, Washington, D. C., appointed by the court, for appellant.

Cheryl M. Long, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Earl J. Silbert, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry, Oscar Altshuler, and Richard W. Goldman, Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before KELLY, MACK, and FERREN, Associate Judges.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

Michael A. Jones was found not guilty of petit larceny by reason of insanity. Thereafter, the court held a "release hearing" pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 24-301(d), and committed Jones indefinitely to St. Elizabeths Hospital. In our first opinion, reported at D.C.App., 396 A.2d 183 (1978), we rejected Jones' contention that he is entitled, as a matter of equal protection, to release from St. Elizabeths upon expiration of the maximum period for which he could have been imprisoned unless the government carries the burden of proving at a civil commitment hearing that he is still mentally ill and dangerous to self or others. See D.C.Code 1973, § 21-545(b). More specifically, assuming the validity of Jones' confinement after the "release hearing" (which is uncontested here), we held there is

no constitutional requirement that appellant be released or civilly committed at the end of the maximum imprisonment period, for that period bears no relationship to the unchallenged basis for appellant's hospital confinement: that he is mentally ill, is dangerous to self or others, and should receive treatment until he is well enough for release. [Jones, supra at 184.]

After reconsideration, we vacate our first order. We conclude that an acquitee may not be confined for treatment pursuant to § 24-301(d) beyond the maximum period for which he or she could have been imprisoned for the underlying criminal charge. An acquitee is entitled to release at the end of that period unless the government obtains a civil commitment. Accordingly, because that maximum period of one year has expired here, appellant Jones shall be released unless civilly committed forthwith.

I.

Central to the analysis in our first opinion was the following legal premise, based on Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966): if commitment to St. Elizabeths after a § 24-301(d)(2) "release hearing" is to survive an equal protection challenge, it may not be punitive in any respect.1 In other words, the commitment procedure must be wholly rehabilitative — wholly a process for finding someone mentally ill and dangerous to self or others. Jones, supra at 188 & n. 7.2 Consequently, we concluded that appellant's failure to challenge the § 24-301(d) "release hearing" procedure meant that

appellant must be presumed to agree that this confinement is not based, even in part, on punitive considerations; otherwise, it would be unconstitutional under Baxstrom, supra; see Humphrey v. Cady,

405 U.S. 504, 510-11, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 1052-53, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 . . . (1972); Waite v. Jacobs, 154 U.S.App.D.C. 281, 285-86, 475 F.2d 392, 396-97 (1973) . . . Therefore, absent any explanation as to why the § 24-301(d) release hearing results in lesser quality findings of illness and dangerousness than a § 21-545(b) civil commitment hearing, we must conclude that the findings are legally the same. [Jones, supra at 189 (emphasis added).]3

In his petition for rehearing, appellant questions our legal premise. He argues, in effect, that the § 24-301(d) "release hearing" procedure is to some extent punitive, as evidenced by the less-protective procedures afforded acquitees than civil commitees; that Baxstrom, supra, does not necessarily make that procedure unconstitutional as a means for initially confining acquitees; but that the price of constitutionality is release or civil commitment at the end of the hypothetical maximum prison term, since that is the longest an acquitee can be confined for punitive reasons without a denial of equal protection of the laws.

Appellant derives his argument primarily from United States v. Brown, 155 U.S.App. D.C. 402, 407-08, 478 F.2d 606, 611-12 (1973), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acknowledged — and upheld — a partially punitive underpinning to the former § 24-301(d) procedure. Specifically, the Brown court upheld an instruction, based on Bolton v. Harris, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 395 F.2d 642 (1968), that the government had the burden at a "release hearing" of proving respondent mentally ill and dangerous by a preponderance of the evidence, and further held that this instruction would not violate equal protection even if the government, in a civil commitment proceeding, had the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.4 The Brown majority justified this lesser burden of proof in the criminal commitment procedure in the following way:

The difference between the classes [acquitees and commitees] for purposes of burden of proof, is in the extent of possibility and consequence of error. If there is error in a determination of mental illness that results in a civil commitment, a person may be deprived of liberty although he never posed any harm to society. If there is a similar error in confinement of an insanity-acquitted individual, there is not only the fact of harm already done, but the substantial prospect that the same error, ascribing the quality of mental disease to a less extreme deviance, resulted in a legal exculpation where there should have been legal responsibility for the antisocial action.

The matter now being discussed is suffused with the broad consideration that modern standards of the insanity defense, not restricted to those who do not know right from wrong, call for the acquittal of persons who "may have meaningful elements of responsibility." And over and above the difficulty of situations where the issue of mental responsibility is doubtful, we cannot wholly ignore the danger of calculated abuse of the insanity defense, referred to in Lynch v. Overholser [, 369 U.S. 705, 82 S.Ct. 1063, 8 L.Ed.2d 211 (1962)]. [Brown, supra, 155 U.S.App.D.C. at 407, 478 F.2d at 611 (footnote omitted).]

Appellant points out that Brown went on to suggest, on the basis of Baxstrom, supra, that there is a quid pro quo for this weaker insanity commitment standard, namely, that an acquitee is constitutionally entitled as of the end of the maximum prison term to release or, at worst, to civil commitment:

The clear implications of the foregoing analysis, and Baxstrom, require, however, that when the individual has been in detention for a considerable period of time, his continued detention vel non should be governed by the same standard of burden of proof as applies to civil commitments. The extent of that period calls for sound discretion, would take into account e. g., the nature of the crime (violent or not), nature of treatment given and response of the person, would generally not exceed five years, and should, of course, never exceed the maximum sentence for the offense, less mandatory release time. [Brown, supra at 408, 478 F.2d at 612 (footnote omitted).]

In summary, appellant argues that he had been led down the road by the United States Court of Appeals in Brown, supra, to a point beyond which he thought he would be taken seriously in a constitutional challenge to § 24-301(d).5 That court had told him, in essence, not to bother challenging the release-hearing procedure but instead to assume that a partially-punitive commitment is valid under Baxstrom, supra. Thus, he asserted the right to release or civil commitment as of the end of the maximum prison term — at the point where society's right to any punitive gloss on confinement ends. Accordingly, he says, our first opinion in this case viewed his failure to attack § 24-301(d) incorrectly — and unfairly — by concluding that it could only have one meaning: tacit acceptance of a wholly rehabilitative underpinning to the commitment procedure, which justifies confinement beyond the maximum prison sentence.6 We turn to this argument.

II.

In reconsidering appellant's assumption, solely for the sake of argument, that § 24-301(d) is valid, we must put the question in perspective by outlining the differences between the civil and criminal commitment schemes. Appellant, as an acquitee, carried the burden of proving his insanity at the time of the charged offense by a preponderance of the evidence. He had the right to a jury if he had wanted one. Upon a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity, the District, like many states, permits continued confinement for a prescribed, relatively brief period of observation.7 The courts have justified this confinement, which is not required in cases of civil commitment,8 on at least two grounds. Some have stressed the continuing presumption of insanity once established by the acquitee — an evidentiary emphasis. See, e. g., In re Franklin, 7 Ca1.3d 126, 136, 496 P.2d 465, 470, 101 Cal.Rptr. 553, 558 (1972) (en banc). Others have emphasized the dangerousness inherent in the offense excused by insanity, and the need for protection of the public while psychiatric observation takes place — arguably a punitive emphasis. See, e. g., Chase v. Kearns, 278 A.2d 132, 135 (Me. 1971) (en banc).

These same courts, moreover, commonly justify statutory confinement beyond the observation period if, after a review proceeding (akin to a § 24-301(d)(2) "release hearing"), the acquitee fails to sustain the burden of persuading the court that he or she has recovered. Their reasoning reflects an extension of the justification for the observation period. First, apropos of the evidentiary emphasis, the courts note that the acquitee has...

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4 cases
  • Benham v. Edwards, Civ. A. No. C80-78R.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Georgia
    • November 14, 1980
    ...relevant distinction. Similarly, in Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183 (D.C. 1978) vac. on rehearing en banc on other grounds, D.C.App., 411 A.2d 624 (1980), the Court compared an M.H.C. committee's hearing to a de novo determination of mental illness, in contrast to an insanity-acquitee'......
  • Jones v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1983
    ...Court of Appeals. A panel of the court affirmed the Superior Court, 396 A.2d 183 (1978), but then granted rehearing and reversed, 411 A.2d 624 (1980). Finally, the court heard the case en banc and affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court. 432 A.2d 364 (1981). The Court of Appeals rejecte......
  • Jones v. United States
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • May 29, 1981
    ...protection to confine appellant under criminal commitment procedures beyond his hypothetical maximum prison sentence. Jones v. United States, D.C.App., 411 A.2d 624 (1980). The government petitioned for rehearing en banc, disputing the that the District of Columbia commitment scheme for ins......
  • Thompson v. Yuen, 6498
    • United States
    • Hawaii Supreme Court
    • February 12, 1981
    ...A.2d 91 (1975); State v. Wilcox, 92 Wash.2d 610, 600 P.2d 561 (1979); State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975); Jones v. United States, 411 A.2d 624 (D.C.App.1980). These are cases holding that different standards of proof for civil commitment and commitment of one acquitted by reaso......

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