Witbeck v. Bill Cody's Ranch Inn

• Decision Date: 24 August 1987
• Docket Number: Docket Nos. 75650,77913
• Parties: Michelle WITBECK, a Minor, Through her Father and Next Friend, Gary Witbeck, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BILL CODY'S RANCH INN, a Wyoming Corporation, Defendant-Appellant, and Best Western International, Inc., an Arizona Corporation; the American Automobile Association, a Virginia Corporation; and the Automobile Club of Michigan, a Michigan Corporation, Jointly and Severally, Defendants. Deann HAPNER and Benjamin Hapner, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SOLIS APPARATUS MANUFACTORIES LTD., a Swiss Corporation, Defendant-Appellee, and Rolf Brauchli, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Defendant. 428 Mich. 659, 411 N.W.2d 439
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 439

411 N.W.2d 439

Michelle WITBECK, a Minor, Through her Father and Next

Friend, Gary Witbeck, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. BILL CODY'S RANCH INN, a Wyoming Corporation,

Defendant-Appellant,

and

Best Western International, Inc., an Arizona Corporation;

the American Automobile Association, a Virginia Corporation;

and the Automobile Club of Michigan, a Michigan

Corporation, Jointly and Severally, Defendants.

Deann HAPNER and Benjamin Hapner, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. SOLIS APPARATUS MANUFACTORIES LTD., a Swiss Corporation,

Defendant-Appellee,

and

Rolf Brauchli, Inc., an Illinois Corporation, Defendant.

Docket Nos. 75650, 77913.

428 Mich. 659, 411 N.W.2d 439

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Jan. 13, 1987.

Decided Aug. 24, 1987.

Kohl, Secrest, Wardle, Lynch, Clark and Hampton by Michael L. Updike, Farmington Hills, for defendant-appellant Bill Cody's Ranch Inn.

Nora, Hemming, Essad & Polaczyk, P.C. by John J. Nora, Geno D. Salomone, Plymouth, for plaintiffs-appellees Witbeck.

Goodman, Eden, Millender & Bedrosian by William H. Goodman, Robert A. Koory, Sharon Mills, Legal Research, Detroit, for plaintiffs-appellants Hapner.

Butzel, Keidan, Simon, Myers & Graham by Richard P. Saslow, Linda G. Burwell, Detroit, for defendant-appellee Solis Apparatus Manufactories, Ltd.

GRIFFIN, Justice.

These cases, one a personal injury action and the other a products liability suit, require that we examine the reach of Michigan's long-arm statute in asserting limited personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporations, M.C.L. Sec. 600.715; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.715.

Because the proofs are inadequate in each instance to demonstrate that the defendant "purposefully availed" itself of the privilege of conducting activities within Michigan, we conclude that exercise of long-arm jurisdiction in these cases would violate protection accorded nonresidents by the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.

I FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A. Witbeck

In August, 1983, Michelle Witbeck, then age twelve, fell from a horse she was riding while on vacation with her parents at a resort in Wyoming operated by Bill Cody's Ranch Inn. An employee of the ranch coaxed Michelle to remount the horse, despite her protest. She fell a second time and sustained injuries for which damages are sought in this action filed in Wayne Circuit Court against the ranch and other defendants not involved in this appeal.

The Witbecks had decided to vacation at the ranch following a visit to the Birmingham, Michigan, office of the American Automobile Association. An agent of the AAA recommended the ranch to the Witbecks after reviewing with them a regional tour book covering western states published by the AAA. The tour book included an advertisement for the ranch and identified the ranch as a participant in the AAA's "official appointment service" with a four-diamond rating. Thereafter, the Witbecks placed a phone call from Michigan to the ranch to make inquiries and arrangements for their stay. The ranch followed up the conversation by mailing a brochure to the Witbecks. There was no other contact between the ranch and the Witbecks until they arrived at the defendant's Wyoming establishment. Following the vacation, the family received a direct mail advertisement from the ranch.

In circuit court, defendant ranch moved for accelerated judgment, claiming lack of personal jurisdiction; the motion was denied. Thereafter, a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, 147 Mich.App. 587, 383 N.W.2d 253; and this Court granted leave to appeal.

B. Hapner

In December, 1970, plaintiff Benjamin Hapner, an Illinois resident, purchased in Chicago from Ralph Teresi, his longtime friend and barber, a portable "professional" hair dryer as a Christmas gift for his daughter, plaintiff DeAnn Hapner. At that time, DeAnn was a high school senior living at home with her parents in Chicago. She used the dryer regularly, and then took it with her in September, 1971, to Ann Arbor where she enrolled and attended the University of Michigan.

Several months later, when she noticed a noise in the dryer, she took it home with her to Chicago. Her mother returned the dryer to the Chicago barber to have it repaired. In a few days, he brought it back and said that the problem had been "taken care of." DeAnn again took the dryer to Ann Arbor where on January 28, 1972, she was injured by electrical shocks and suffered burns on both hands when the dryer came apart.

In February, 1973, the Hapners brought suit in Washtenaw Circuit Court naming as defendants Ralph Wehr, a Chicago distributor, and Rolf Brauchli, Inc., an Illinois importer-wholesaler of hair dryers. The Hapners did not sue their barber friend, from whom the dryer had been purchased. The case against Ralph Wehr, the distributor from whom the barber obtained the dryer, was dismissed by the trial court for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Thereafter, on October 11, 1974, plaintiffs amended their complaint and added as defendant, Solis Apparatus Manufactories Ltd., the Swiss manufacturer of the hair dryer.

Solis moved for accelerated judgment, asserting that the Michigan court lacked personal jurisdiction. The motion was granted by the trial court in an opinion dated September 12, 1975. However, the Court of Appeals reversed. 71 Mich.App. 263, 247 N.W.2d 375 (1976). On appeal, a majority of this Court concluded that jurisdiction over Solis was lacking on the facts that had been adduced. However, the Court remanded the case to the trial court for "further proceedings with leave to the plaintiff to adduce further proofs regarding the extent of Solis' availment of the privilege of conducting its activities in this state." 404 Mich. 160, 170, 273 N.W.2d 822 (1978) (opinion of Levin, J.).

On remand, plaintiffs offered for the trial court's consideration the following additional items of evidence: (1) a deposition taken March 24, 1980, of Alfred Schibli, who was hired as marketing director of Solis in June, 1972, approximately five months after plaintiff DeAnn was injured; (2) a deposition taken December 8, 1980, of William Kraft, an investigator employed by the law firm representing plaintiffs; (3) an affidavit dated February 3, 1976, by Lorraine Kolton, an investigator employed by the law firm representing plaintiffs; and (4) written answers to interrogatories, dated February 4, 1976, which were given by defendant Brauchli, the Illinois importer-wholesaler.

Once more, the trial court found that contacts of the Swiss manufacturer with Michigan were insufficient to support personal jurisdiction, and the case was again dismissed as to Solis. This time the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendant Solis. ¹

Now, more than fifteen years after the case was commenced, it is here again for review. The issue this time, as before, is whether the Michigan trial court has personal jurisdiction over Solis. The other defendant, Brauchli, is not involved in this appeal.

II

There is no claim that the defendants in these appeals, one a Swiss corporation and the other a Wyoming corporation, are subject to general personal jurisdiction in Michigan. The assertion of general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is authorized by statute if the corporation consents thereto, if it is incorporated under the laws of Michigan, or if it carries on a continuous and systematic part of its general business within the state. M.C.L. Sec. 600.711; M.S.A. Sec. 27A.711.

Plaintiffs, however, contend that jurisdiction exists pursuant to Michigan's long-arm statute which extends limited personal jurisdiction to out-of-state defendants on the basis of specific acts or contacts with Michigan. ²

We find it unnecessary to consider questions of statutory construction because we conclude that under the circumstances of each of these cases the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction would violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal constitution. ³

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment "does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment in personam against an individual or a corporate defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319, 66 S.Ct. 154, 159-60, 90 L.Ed. 95; 161 A.L.R. 1057 (1945). The "constitutional touchstone" is whether the defendant purposefully established "minimum contacts" in the forum state "such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id., 316, 66 S.Ct. at 158. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 2183, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985).

The foreseeability of causing injury in another state is not a "sufficient benchmark" for exercising personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has not consented to suit there. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295, 566, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Khalaf v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 404 Mich. 134, 145, 273 N.W.2d 811 (1978). Rather, "the foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into Court there." World-Wide Volkswagen Corp, supra, 297, 100 S.Ct. at 567.

In determining when a foreign defendant should reasonably anticipate being "haled into court" in the forum state, the Supreme Court has provided this guidance:

"The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State. The application of that rule will vary with the quality and nature of the defendant's activity, but it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of...