Evans v. Saar

Decision Date01 February 2006
Docket NumberNo. CIV. L-06-149.,CIV. L-06-149.
Citation412 F.Supp.2d 519
PartiesVernon EVANS, Jr. Plaintiff, v. Mary Ann SAAR, et al. Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Jeffrey B. O'Toole, Julie Sippel Dietrich, O'Toole Rothwell Nassau and Steinbach, A. Stephen Hut, Jr., Todd C. Zubler, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Scott S. Oakley, J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Office of the Attorney General of Maryland, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

LEGG, Chief Judge.

I. Introduction

Now pending are Vernon Evans Jr.'s motion for a temporary restraining order and motion for a preliminary injunction. For the reasons stated herein, the Court will DENY both motions.

II. Maryland's Lethal Injection Protocol

On January 9, 2006, a Maryland judge signed a warrant for the execution of Vernon Evans, Jr. The warrant directs the State to carry out the execution during a five-day span beginning February 6th and ending February 10, 2006.

On January 19th, Evans filed the instant suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Maryland's Lethal Injection Protocol exposes him to a grave and unnecessary risk of cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the federal Constitution.1 The following day, Evans moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction to halt his execution until the merits of his suit can be tested through discovery and trial.

Evans, who was convicted of two first degree murders in 1984, does not challenge in this suit Maryland's right to execute him. Nor does he challenge the constitutionality per se of lethal injection as a method of execution. Instead, his suit attacks the Lethal Injection Protocol ("the protocol") under which Maryland's Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services carries out executions.

Under the protocol, three successive chemicals are injected intravenously through an I.V. hook-up. First, a massive dose (3 grams) of sodium pentothal, an ultrashort-acting barbiturate (also called thiopental), is injected to induce unconsciousness. The parties agree that this dosage, if successfully administered, is enough to drive any human being into deep unconsciousness for hours. The barbiturate is followed by an injection of 50 milligrams of pancuronium bromide (or Pavulon), an agent that paralyzes all voluntary muscles. Although the agent causes paralysis, and in high dosages stops respiration, it has no effect whatsoever on a person's awareness or sensation. Finally, the inmate is injected with a huge dose (50 millequivalents) of potassium chloride, which causes cardiac arrest and death. Apart from its lethality, potassium chloride is an extraordinarily painful chemical that scours the nerve fibers lining a person's veins.

Evans concedes that this protocol, if successfully implemented, will result in a swift, painless, and humane death. He argues, however, that flaws in the protocol create a high risk that the sodium pentothal will not render him completely unconscious. If so, he would suffer excruciating pain from the powerful effects of the other two drugs but be unable to alert anyone to his plight because of the paralyzing effect of the pancuronium bromide.

The State concedes that if an inmate is not adequately anesthetized he will suffer an inhumane death. Defendants emphatically assert, however, that sodium pentothal, when administered by trained personnel in the prodigious quantity specified by the protocol, will unfailingly render anyone, Evans included, unconscious.

III. Evans's Challenges to the Protocol

In support of his claim, Evans raises a number of perceived problems with Maryland's protocol as applied to him. Most importantly, Evans disagrees with the State's plan to access his peripheral veins. He argues that the damage done to these veins by years of chronic intravenous drug abuse have left them frail, clotted, and unsuitable as conduits.

Evans urges other deficiencies, including the following:

i.) The standard of care requires the presence of a trained anesthesiologist, sitting elbow to elbow with the inmate throughout the procedure.

ii.) The protocol fails to require a doctor or other demonstrably qualified person to mix the sodium pentothal.

iii.) The I.V. lines are too long, creating the prospect of a leak.2

iv.) Pancuronium bromide serves no useful purpose and should not be used in the protocol. In support of this proposition, Evans points out that the American Veterinary Medical Association prohibits the use of neuromuscular paralytic agents, such as pancuronium bromide, in animal euthanasia.

v.) A recently executed Maryland inmate, Steven Oken, may not have had enough sodium pentothal in his blood (per the post-mortem blood toxicology report) to keep him unconscious.

vi.) The protocol fails to account for all of the variables that might complicate the preparation and administration of the drugs.

IV. Progress of the Lawsuit

As stated, Evans filed suit only two weeks before the start of his five-day execution window. Although last-minute death penalty filings impose extraordinary time pressures, a Court cannot issue a stay merely to give itself more time. An inmate is entitled to a stay only if he can satisfy the rigorous requirements for obtaining a temporary restraining order. Moreover, unless the inmate can point to a compelling reason for filing his suit at the eleventh hour, his delay counts against him in the Blackwelder calculus.3

Despite the shortness of time, the Court is satisfied that its decision is based on an adequate record. The factors that buttress this conclusion include the following:

i.) Attorneys for both sides have been involved in prior method-of-execution cases. They were able to file comprehensive briefs in a matter of days.

ii.) There is a substantial body of cases involving eleventh hour, Eighth Amendment challenges to the threedrug protocol.

iii.) Thirty-eight states impose the death penalty. Of these, thirty-seven use lethal injection as the means of execution. Thirty-five of those states use the same three-drug protocol as Maryland. Circuit after Circuit (including the Fourth) has ruled that the protocol does not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment.

iv.) Since 2004, Maryland has executed two inmates (Steven Oken and Wesley Baker)4 by lethal injection. Both inmates filed a § 1983 suit challenging the constitutionality of the protocol. In each case, the inmate's motion for a temporary restraining order was ultimately denied and the executions were carried out.

v.) In the litigation that preceded Oken's execution, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled, albeit in a per curiam opinion, that the three-drug protocol violated neither the Maryland death penalty statute nor the Maryland Constitution. The Court, which is Maryland's highest, specifically decided that "the method of execution intended to be implemented by the Division of Correction does not violate the provisions of the Maryland Code ... or constitute a cruel or unusual punishment as argued by petitioner."5

vi.) This Court ordered expedited discovery and reviewed in camera the voluminous execution notebooks that the State compiled for Maryland's last three executions.6 The Court culled the pages pertinent to the protocol and produced them (slightly redacted) to Evans's counsel.

vii.) The Court signed an order requiring the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner to produce post-mortem reports prepared following the Gilliam, Oken, and Baker executions.

viii.) The Court conducted hearings on three different days. The hearings included live testimony from Evans's medical expert, Dr. Mark Heath, a board certified anesthesiologist who is a national authority on the three-drug protocol. Evans also called a trauma specialist, Dr. Thomas Scalea, who examined Evans's veins.7 The State submitted a lengthy affidavit from Dr. Mark Dershwitz, a board certified anesthesiologist, who is also a national authority on the three-drug protocol.8

The factual record is, therefore, adequate. The legal standards are also well developed. Section 1983 does not empower this Court to "micromanage" Maryland's execution procedures. What might be done to improve the three-drug protocol is not the appropriate inquiry.9 A federal court must pay deference to the judgment of the state government, which, in the words of the Supreme Court, is presumed to have acted in "a careful and humane manner."10

V. Test for Injunctive Relief

Evans bears an added burden because he seeks emergency injunctive relief. In the context of a stay of execution, "last minute stays on the part of federal courts represent an interference with the orderly process of justice which should be avoided in all but the most extraordinary circumstances."11 Furthermore, "the court may consider the last minute nature of an application to stay execution in deciding whether to grant equitable relief."12

Preliminary injunctions are extraordinary remedies to be granted when the moving party has demonstrated a need to preserve the status quo and prevent irreparable harm during the pendency of litigation.13 To earn a stay, Evans must satisfy the test articulated in Blackwelder and succeeding cases. Under Blackwelder, a court considers (i) the harm to the plaintiff if the injunction is denied; (ii) the harm to the defendant if the injunction is granted; (iii) the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits, and (iv) the public interest.14 The Fourth Circuit does not, however, weigh these factors equally.15 "The irreparable harm to the plaintiff and the harm to the defendant are the two most important factors."16

In the context of method-of-execution cases, both sides agree that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has appropriately distilled the Blackwelder test into a single inquiry. A court must inquire whether an inmate facing execution has shown "that he is subject to an unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering such that his execution...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Workman v. Bredesen
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • May 7, 2007
    ...cert. denied, [___ U.S.____] 126 S.Ct. 1314, 163 L.Ed.2d 1148 (2006) Morales v. Tilton, 465 F.Supp.2d 972 (N.D.Cal.2006) Evans v. Saar, 412 F.Supp.2d 519 (D.Md. 2006) Reid v. Johnson, 333 F.Supp.2d 543 (E.D.Va.2004) Blaze [Baze] v. Rees, , 2006 WL 3386544 (Ky.2006) Abdur'Rahman v. Bredesen,......
  • Fulks v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina
    • August 20, 2010
    ...a State's chosen procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.”); Evans v. Saar, 412 F.Supp.2d 519, 522 (D.Md.2006) (“Circuit after circuit (including the Fourth) has ruled that the [3–drug] protocol does not run afoul of the Eighth Amendm......
  • Lightbourne v. McCollum
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • November 1, 2007
    ...an undue and unnecessary risk that an inmate will suffer pain so extreme that it offends the Eighth Amendment?"); Evans v. Saar, 412 F.Supp.2d 519, 524 (D.Md.2006) (holding that an inmate must show "that he is subject to an unnecessary risk of unconstitutional pain or suffering.... Inherent......
  • Ex Parte O'Brien
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
    • May 17, 2006
    ...executions "would be sufficient to induce unconsciousness, and even cause death itself, if administered properly"); Evans v. Saar, 412 F.Supp.2d 519, 521 (D.Md.2006) ("The parties agree that this dosage [3 grams of sodium pentothal], if successfully administered, is enough to drive any huma......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT