Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n
| Decision Date | 09 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | SCAP-16-0000496 |
| Citation | 412 P.3d 917,141 Hawai'i 411 |
| Parties | Richard NELSON III, Kaliko Chun, James Akiona, Sr., Sherilyn Adams, Kelii Ioane, Jr., and Charles Aipia, Plaintiffs-Appellees-Cross-Appellants, v. HAWAIIAN HOMES COMMISSION, The Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, Jobie Masagatani, in her official capacity as Chair of the Hawaiian Homes Commission, William K. Richardson, Michael P. Kahikina, Doreen Napua Gomes, Gene Ross Davis, Wallace A. Ishibashi, David B. Kaapu, and Wren Wescoatt, in their official capacities as members of the Hawaiian Homes Commission, Defendants-Appellees-Cross-Appellees, and Wesley Machida, in his official capacity as the State Director of Finance, and the State of Hawai'i, Defendants-Appellants-Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | Hawaii Supreme Court |
Sharla Ann Manley and Summer L.H. Sylva for plaintiffs-appellees/cross-appellants.
Charleen M. Aina, Honolulu, for defendants-appellants/cross-appellees.
Melvyn M. Miyagi, Brian A. Kang, and Ross T. Shinyama, Honolulu, for defendants-appellees/cross-appellees.
Mark J. Bennett, Honolulu, for amicus curiae Hawai'i State Legislature.
This case is on appeal before this court for the second time. In the first appeal, we determined that the political question doctrine2 did not bar a judicial interpretation of the meaning of "sufficient sums" for the Department of Hawaiian Home Lands' ("DHHL") administrative and operating expenses, pursuant to Article XII, Section 1 of the Hawai'i Constitution. Limited judicially discoverable and manageable standards existed to interpret the term "sufficient sums," based on the 1978 Constitutional Convention delegates' estimate that DHHL's administrative and operating costs were $1.3 to 1.6 million at that time, and, going forward, that figure could be adjusted for inflation. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 127 Hawai'i 185, 277 P.3d 279 (2012) ("Nelson I").
On remand to the Circuit Court of the First Circuit ("circuit court"),3 the circuit court held a bench trial and found, however, that DHHL's actual need for its administrative and operating expenses was over $28 million. It then concluded that the legislature was constitutionally obligated to make such an appropriation to DHHL for fiscal year 2015-16. The circuit court also enjoined the defendants (the State of Hawai'i and its Director of Finance, collectively the ) from violating the constitution or breaching their fiduciary duties to the Hawaiian Homelands trust beneficiaries.
The State Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration, which the circuit court granted in part and denied in part. The circuit court granted the motion in part to modify those portions of the order that (1) called for the over $28 million appropriation and (2) enjoined the defendants from violating the constitution or breaching their fiduciary duties to Hawaiian Homelands trust beneficiaries. In its amended order, the circuit court simply declared that (1) the State of Hawai'i did not provide sufficient sums to DHHL, and (2) that the defendants must fulfill their constitutional and trust responsibilities.
This court accepted transfer of this appeal from the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA"). On appeal, the State Defendants argue that (1) the circuit court erred in declining to use the 1978 baseline of $1.3 to 1.6 million, adjusted for inflation, to calculate "sufficient sums" for DHHL's administrative and operating expenses; and (2) the circuit court erred in ordering the State Defendants to fulfill their constitutional obligations under Article XII, Section 1. The Hawai'i State Legislature, as amicus curiae, filed a brief in support of the State Defendants.
We hold that the circuit court erred by engaging in a comprehensive inquiry into the amount DHHL actually needed for its administrative and operating expenses. Under Nelson I, the only judicially discoverable and manageable standard for determining "sufficient sums" for DHHL's administrative and operating budget was established by the delegates of the 1978 Constitutional Convention as $1.3 to 1.6 million, adjusted for inflation. 127 Hawai'i at 202-03, 277 P.3d at 296-97. We observed that "consideration of [how many lots, loans, and rehabilitation projects (and their scope) ] could provide the basis for increasing the required administrative funding above the 1978 baseline identified by the delegates"; however, we cautioned that such consideration "could also involve the courts in addressing issues ... that involve political
questions." 127 Hawai'i at 203, 277 P.3d at 297.
In this case, the circuit court exceeded our mandate in Nelson I when it determined the amount DHHL actually needed for its administrative and operating expenses. Accordingly, we vacate the circuit court's First Amended Final Judgment, Final Judgment, and underlying orders, and remand this case to the circuit court to determine the current value of $1.3 to 1.6 million (in 1978 dollars), adjusted for inflation.
In Nelson I, six individual plaintiffs (Richard Nelson III; Kaliko Chun; James Akiona, Sr.; Sherilyn Adams; Kelii Ioane, Jr.; and Charles Aipia; collectively, "the Plaintiffs") filed a first amended complaint alleging that the State Defendants and DHHL had violated Article XII, Section 1 of the Hawai'i State Constitution. That constitutional provision states the following:
The legislature shall make sufficient sums available for the following purposes: (1) development of home, agriculture, farm and ranch lots; (2) home, agriculture, aquaculture, farm and ranch loans; (3) rehabilitation projects to include, but not limited to, educational, economic, political, social and cultural processes by which the general welfare and conditions of native Hawaiians are thereby improved; (4) the administration and operating budget of the department of Hawaiian home lands; in furtherance of (1), (2), (3) and (4) herein, by appropriating the same in the manner provided by law.
Hawai'i State Constitution, Article XII, Section 1. In Count 1, the Plaintiffs alleged that the State had failed to make sufficient sums available to DHHL for the four purposes enumerated above. In Count 2, the Plaintiffs alleged that DHHL breached its trust duties to its beneficiaries by failing to request sufficient sums from the State. In Count 3, the Plaintiffs alleged that the DHHL Defendants breached their trust obligation to beneficiaries by leasing DHHL lands for commercial purposes to raise funds. Lastly, in Count 4, the Plaintiffs alleged that the DHHL Defendants breached their obligation to trust beneficiaries by failing to ascertain whether trust lands were necessary for general homestead purposes before offering them for commercial lease. The parties stipulated to dismiss Counts 3 and 4 without and with prejudice, respectively.
The circuit court granted the State Defendants' motion for summary judgment (in which the DHHL Defendants joined), concluding that Counts 1 and 2 raised non-justiciable political questions. The circuit court concluded that there were "no judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the dispute over the definition and determination of 'sufficient sums' " under the Hawai'i Constitution "without making initial policy determinations of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." In other words, the circuit court declined to rule on the Plaintiffs' claims, leaving their resolution to the political process. See Nelson I, 127 Hawai'i at 194, 277 P.3d at 288.
On initial appeal to the ICA, an ICA majority concluded Plaintiffs' claims were not barred by the political question doctrine. Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm'n, 124 Hawai'i 437, 246 P.3d 369 (App. 2011). Chief Judge Nakamura concurred with the majority's holding that the political doctrine question did not preclude the justiciability of the dispute over whether the legislature provided DHHL with "sufficient sums." 124 Hawai'i at 447, 246 P.3d at 379 (Nakamura, C.J., concurring). In his opinion, the "pre-1978 levels and the framers' intent, including their concern with the DHHL's leasing of lands to the general public" provided the court with "judicially discoverable and manageable standards for evaluating whether the Legislature has satisfied the 'sufficient sums' requirement of Article XII, Section 1 without resort to nonjudicial policy determinations." 124 Hawai'i at 452, 246 P.3d at 384 (Nakamura, C.J., concurring).
Nelson I, 127 Hawai'i at 194, 277 P.3d at 288 (citing Yamasaki, 69 Haw. at 170, 737 P.2d at 455 (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, 82 S.Ct. 691 ) ) (brackets omitted). In Nelson I, the issue was whether the determination of "sufficient sums" under Article XII, Section 1 presented a nonjusticiable political question due to "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards" for resolving the issue and/or "the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for...
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From the Bench. What I've Learned
...after I had left the AG’s of-fice, to represent it as amicus curiae in a separation-of-powers case. See Nelson v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 412 P.3d 917 (Haw. 2018).When I was retained, the Speaker of the Hawaii House told me, “Bennett, one reason we’re hiring you is because all of us know tha......